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Abstract 
In marketing literature there is a large gap in understanding the importance of 
brands and brand management in interorganizational relationships. This thesis 
aims to extend the existing B2B branding literature by analyzing the spillover 
effect of companies’ brands in interorganizational relationships. The current paper 
suggests that relational governance form should be positively related to brand 
spillover effect on both focal and partner companies. Additionally, this thesis is 
testing whether the relationship between reputation, resources and contracting 
capabilities with brand spillover effect is strengthened (weakened) while 
moderated by governance forms. These ideas are examined using a sample of 86 
Ukrainian B2B managers. By means of hierarchical regression analyses it is found 
that (1) there is a significant positive relationship between relational governance 
form and the extent of spillover effect of brands in B2B relationship for partner 
firm; (2) the relationship between contracting capabilities and brand spill-over 
effect for partner firm is weakened while moderated by formal governance; (3) the 
direct relationship between reputation of a partner firm with brand spillover effect 
for a focal company is positive; and (4) positive relationship between reputation 
of a focal firm with brand spill-over effect for a partner company is strengthened 
while moderated by the relational governance form. Based on the results 
theoretical and managerial implications are provided. 
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1.0 Introduction  
Brand spillover is an important consequence of product and corporate brands 
relationships. Spillover effects are “potential costs and benefits to a firm that 
extend beyond an individual transaction” (Mayer 2006, p. 69). In particular, brand 
spillovers are positive or negative externalities which occur when brand of one 
company increases another company’s interest, profits, awareness, reputation etc. 
through the influence on another company’s brand (Goldman 2009, Lei, Dawar 
and Lemmink 2008, Simmonin and Ruth 1998 and others). 
In marketing research, spillover effects were studied within brand alliance (e.g. 
due to M&A), brand extension (sub-brands introduction) and brand choice topics 
(e.g. Aaker 1990, Keller and Aaker 1992, Simmonin and Ruth 1998, Janakiraman, 
Sismeiro and Dutta 2009, Lei, Dawar and Lemmink 2008, Balachander and 
Ghode 2003 and many others). However, brand alliance and brand extension 
literature highlights only consumer evaluation of mainly product brands (Keller 
and Aaker 1992, Sullivan 1990, Suh and Park 2009). In this thesis, I am willing to 
draw attention to existing exchange partners’ evaluation of corporate brands 
spillover resulting from particular business-to-business relationships. 
To my knowledge, there are no particular studies of brands spillover effect in B2B 
relationships. Presumably, by establishing relationship with exchange partners, 
companies’ corporate brands may “act” in the same way as during brand alliances 
and co-branding. The latter means that while entering B2B relationships, some 
linkages between brands of two parties may be created. Those linkages may result 
in increase of marketing efficiency, extension of positive or negative corporate 
brand associations and perceptions (e.g. among existing or potential buyers and 
suppliers), increase/decrease of image, brand equity etc. Additionally, the level 
and direction of spillover in B2B may depend on the perceived fit and brand 
strength, which is in line with brand extension findings (Völckner and Sattler 
2006; Jaju, Joiner and Reddy 2006). Considering abovementioned, examining 
brand spillover effect within B2B context might become an efficient extension of 
branding literature.  
Positive brand spillover may generate benefits for both sides of the dyad and can 
increase brand perception among potential partners (buyers and suppliers) or 
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competitors. Companies’ managers should realize that dealing with a partner with 
well-known corporate name and high brand equity might not only guarantee better 
quality and safety of B2B relationship. It can also be quite beneficial and can 
bring competitive advantages. Therefore, good management of brand spillovers in 
business market relationships may create advantages for B2B companies. 
The lack of research on brand spillover effect in B2B markets may be caused by 
the overall underestimation of brand management in B2B relationships. Business 
companies frequently fail to realize that brands play important part not only in 
consumer markets, but in B2B markets as well (Keller and Kotler 2012). 
Customers in interorganizational relationships well know all product offerings 
(including those of the competitors’), defining B2B markets as a “specialty” or 
commodity markets. Those markets are supposed to be rational (relies on rational 
decision making). Hence, they do not include any non-rational behavior like brand 
loyalty or brand attachment (Kotler and Pfoertsch 2006). Such assumptions lead 
to a conviction that brand management is not supposed to be an issue in managing 
B2B relationships, resulting in a small amount of its research (e.g. compared to 
branding on consumer markets). 
However, there are several studies dedicated to corporate brands; brand equity in 
industrial markets; significance of brands for B2B companies; and brand 
management in B2B markets (Kotler, Pfoertsch 2006, Keller and Kotler 2012, 
Webster and Keller 2004, Bendixen, Busaka and Abratt 2004, Mudambi 2002, 
Hutton 1997, Erevelles et al. 2008, Glynn, Motion and Brodie 2007, Aspara, 
Tikkanen 2008 and others). Most of these studies underline the slow development 
of brands research in business-to-business marketing. 
The question of whether branding plays the same part in B2B purchasing as in 
consumer purchasing is raised, while discussing the overall importance of 
corporate brands and B2B brand management. Keller and Kotler (2012) argue that 
branding in B2B is of the same importance as branding in B2C. Although, the 
authors acknowledge that many B2B companies simply ignore the opportunities 
which can emerge from developing and managing corporate brands. 
In this thesis I suggest that as brand spillover might occur in B2B markets, 
companies should learn how to create and use opportunities from it as well. In 
particular, it is important to know the mechanisms of managing brand spillovers 
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and study the role of predictors, which might have direct or indirect relationship to 
it.  
Specifically, each company operating in B2B market has its own ‘portfolio’ of ex- 
or potential partners. To create interorganizational relationships with those 
partners, a company has to go through a set of steps, including the actual choice of 
a partner and the choice of governance forms. Those governance forms could be 
defined as “the formal and informal rules of exchange” (Gosh and John 1999). 
They will guide partners’ business relationship.  
In line with previous argument, Poppo and Zenger (2002) suggest that B2B 
managers make choices of a governance form in response to all exchange hazards. 
In particular, they define whether to craft a formal contract (with different levels 
of complexity) or to develop relational governance (e.g. based on solidarity, 
flexibility, information sharing and trust). Despite of a quite common perception 
of both governance forms as substitutes, Poppo and Zenger (2002) argue that they 
might be complements. Therefore, in this thesis governance form choice is 
analyzed through two factors: formal and relational governance form; which 
appear in this study simultaneously. 
Governance form choice influences the course of the relationship between two 
companies. It might not only define future legal enforcement of the relationship 
(Masten 2000), but also influence the actual way companies cooperate, e.g. 
whether it is more formal or more based on trust (Poppo and Zenger 2002); and 
the consequences and side effects of that cooperation. In line with this I assume 
that governance form choice relates to the level of brand spillover effect for 
exchange partners. Therefore, in this study the direct and indirect relationship 
between governance form choice – relational and formal – and brands’ spillover 
effect will be analyzed.  
In this thesis I suggest that there are some other factors that might have a link to 
corporate brands’ spillover and should be considered by companies’ managers 
prior to establishing B2B relationships. For example, analysis of potential 
exchange partner’s history of previous relationships, level of partners’ corporate 
brand awareness, image, and brand equity may become valuable assets while 
deciding upon whether to start business relationship. Hence, in this study I argue 
that there might also be a relationship between B2B brand spillover effect and a 
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set of other factors, including companies’ reputation (in line with Rao and Ruekert 
1994, Mayer 2006 etc.), companies’ resources (Gosh and John 1999; 2012) and 
capabilities (Argyres and Mayer 2007, Weber and Mayer 2005). This relationship 
should be moderated by the actual governance form choice as all 
interorganizational relationships are managed through the “exchange rules”. Thus, 
different governance forms may strengthen or weaken the correlation between 
brand spillover and analyzed factors.  
This thesis tends to contribute to existing B2B branding literature in several ways. 
First, it aims to extend the current analysis of brands in B2B relationships by 
including the topics of brand spillover and governance form choice. Second, it 
aims to create insights of how to develop advantages for corporate brands from 
B2B partnership; how can corporate brands be efficiently managed; and what may 
influence focal firm’s and partner’s brand spillover. Third, this thesis tends to 
contribute to the existing analysis of B2B market in Ukraine by choosing this 
country as a topic of interest. Considering that, the overall research questions of 
this study are: 
How does the governance form choice influence the extent of brand 
spillover effect between the companies in B2B relationships? How 
can governance form choice moderate the relationship between 
companies’ resources, contracting capabilities and reputation of 
both focal and partner firm and corporate brand spillover effect? 
As there are at least two parties in one particular B2B exchange relationship, two 
dependent variables will be analyzed: brand spillover effect on focal firm and 
brand spillover effect on partner firm. 
This thesis is structured in the following way. First, the theoretical background of 
brand spillover effect, governance forms, company’s resource base, reputation and 
contract design capabilities will be discussed. Based on the literature review, 
research hypotheses are developed. Further, the applied methodology is described, 
including all methods and measurements. Prior to presenting results of a 
theoretical model testing, data examination analyses with all relevant conclusions 
are provided. Thesis is completed with discussion of the obtained results, 
suggestions for theoretical and managerial implication, discussion of study 
limitations and opportunities for future research. 
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2.0 Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Corporate brands in B2B markets 
Branding in interorganizational relationships literature is defined as a 
psychological phenomenon, a valuable intangible asset, which specifically is a 
name, logo, sign or symbol that identifies the product or service offerings of one 
firm and helps differentiate this particular firm from competitors (Webster and 
Keller 2004, Keller and Kotler 2012). In one of the early studies of brands in an 
organizational-buying context, Hutton (1997) gives the definition of brand equity. 
He suggests that it could be interpreted as a buyers’ willingness to pay price 
premium for their favorite brand, recommend that brand and “extend” from the 
brand to other products with the same brand name. 
Further, Mudambi (2002) provides an explanatory research of B2B branding. The 
author concludes that branding plays an important role in B2B decision making. 
However, she argues that branding is not equally important to all companies or in 
all situations. In particular, she found that buyers are most likely to select well-
known brands of office equipment and supplies in the following situations: if 
product failure will create serious problems for the buyer’s company; if the 
product requires high service and support; if the product is complex; and if there 
are time and resource constraints. 
In addition, Bendixen et al. (2004) suggest that brand equity in B2B exists in a 
form of willingness to pay price premiums. The authors show that leading 
corporate brand name can reach a price premium of 6.8% over the average 
corporate brand and 14% over a new-entry brand. They conclude that B2B 
companies will benefit from investing into building a likeable, strong and positive 
brand image among stakeholders in the same way as companies on consumer 
markets do. 
The returns business companies gain from managing their corporate brand equity 
are also discussed and analyzed in terms of value creation. Ackerman (1998) 
argues that corporate brands are “a comprehensive discipline for clarifying, 
humanizing, organizing, and communicating how the company creates value.” 
Therefore, business managers should acknowledge it as a significant tool for 
competitive advantage. 
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Additionally to price premiums and value creation communication, strong 
corporate brands may result in an increased demand in cooperation with particular 
company; higher brand extension opportunities; better trade leverage; potentially 
higher margins from operations; increased companies strategic vision and 
organizational culture etc. (Hague and Jackson 1994, Hatch and Schultz 2003, 
Keller 2008, Aaker 1996, Wood 2000, Bendixen et al. 2004, De Chernatony, 
McDonald and Wallace 2011, Balmer 2001).  
However, Aspara and Tikkanen (2008) argue that marketing literature tend to 
confuse product brands roles and definitions with corporate ones. These 
misinterpretations partially explain the reasons, why branding in B2B markets is 
perceived less important than branding on consumer markets. Nevertheless, 
business companies tend to estimate, value and make buying decisions based on 
perceptions related to supplier (seller) itself (its corporate brand) rather than its 
product brands. Hence, B2B managers should consider that business partners’ 
trust, repeated purchases and loyalty, future referrals and commitment are likely to 
depend on corporate brand management strategies, specific images and 
perceptions that are the outcome of those strategies (Aspara and Tikkanen 2008). 
In context of discourse about brands in B2C and B2B markets, Keller and Kotler 
(2012) argue that branding is much more focused on the consumers’ market. 
Therefore, brands are often neglected in B2B relationships. Corporate firms 
assume that manufacturers’ brand names are not significant for influencing 
purchase agents’ decisions. Still, the authors suggest that branding is B2B has the 
same importance as that in B2C markets. It simplifies the process of making 
decisions and reduces risks while evoking trust and safety in interorganizational 
relationships.  
Webster and Keller (2004) mention that some of the most valuable and powerful 
brands in the world belong to B2B companies. Homburg, Klarmann and Schmitt 
(2010) also support the idea of high brand importance in interorganizational 
relations and suggest that brand awareness significantly drives market 
performance in B2B environments. 
Thus, after arguing the significance of managing corporate brands in B2B 
markets, the discussion of brand spillover effect (particularly in B2B 
relationships) will be presented in the following section. 
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2.2  Brand spillover effect 
Spillover can be defined as costs and benefits that exceed individual transaction 
(Mayer 2006); positive externalities that occur when customer interest in some 
particular brand increases the profits to the third party only related to that brand 
(Goldman 2009); and reciprocal benefits from brand extension (Balachander and 
Ghose 2003). In some marketing studies, brand spillover effect is also interpreted 
as a brand-equity “halo effect” meaning that good and bad brand evaluations (or 
“brand goodwill”) can be transferred from one category, product or company to 
another one (Hutton 1997, Bendixen et al. 2004).  
Brand spillover effect is also seen as a cognitive process (Lei, Dawar and 
Lemmink 2008). In particular, spillover is a combination of two actions: the 
retrieval of related nodes and their updating. The first action occurs when brand 
node (origin brand or one of the corporate brands) is primed and activated by 
some external information (e.g. news report). Thus, associations about this exact 
brand are triggered. This activation, in turn, spreads to the related brand nodes 
(partner brands) through associative network linkages. These linkages might 
appear as a result of cooperation between two brands. Moreover, the strength of 
associations between brands (or brand relatedness) defines the probability of 
brand retrieval and the following level of triggering partner brand associations 
(Nedungadi 1990, Lei, Dawar and Lemmink 2008). The second action – updating 
– is an actual measure of spillover effect. It occurs when evaluation of a partner 
brand is “updated” by triggering in memory the connection to the origin brand 
through the influence of associations’ network. 
2.2.1 The effect of intra- and interorganizational brand spillover 
In branding literature spillover effect is discussed within analyses of brand 
extensions (Aaker 1990, Aaker & Keller 1990; Park et al. 1991; Broniarczyk and 
Alba 1994, Balachander and Ghose 2003, Völckner and Sattler 2006), co-
branding (Erevelles et al. 2008, Kalafatis et al. 2012), brand merges and 
acquisitions and brand alliances (Simonin and Ruth 1998; Levin, Davis and Levin 
1996, Jaju et al. 2006, Suh and Park 2009, Rao, Qu and Ruekert 1999, Park, Jun 
and Shocker 1996 and others). It is possible to distinguish that brand spillover 
may occur either within the company (e.g. “intraorganizational” effect in brand 
extensions and sub-branding, when brand associations stretch from one product of 
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a parent brand to another) or between two companies (e.g. “interorganizational” 
effect of co-branding or brand alliances, when two companies decide to mutually 
brand the same product). I assume that intraorganizational brand spillover may 
also occur as a consequence of M&A activities. When two companies merge into 
one, former corporate brand associations and brand evaluations of their products 
can be stretched to the new merged company creating spillover effect already 
within one new company. 
Several brand spillover definitions can be placed within the interorganizational 
spillover effect discussion. Sullivan (1990) argues that spillovers occur in the 
cases when information about one company can influence the demand for other 
companies’ products (service) offerings.  
While analyzing spillover effects of brand alliances, Simonin and Ruth (1998) 
prove that the evaluation of brand alliance itself has a spillover effect on 
subsequent attitudes of each partner’s brand. Additionally, this positive 
interorganizational spillover effect is significantly moderated by brand familiarity. 
Co-branding is a type of brand alliances. Interorganizational brand spillover can 
be discussed as a part or consequence of co-branding. Co-branding means 
presenting two or several independent brand names jointly on the same product or 
service (Erevelles et al. 2008). Indeed, some firms may tend to mention the name 
of their supplier or partner on their product, if their partner’s brand has a high 
value.  
Erevelles et al. (2008) suggest in their article that suppliers and manufacturers are 
both interested in co-branding, which presumes brand spillover effect. The authors 
empirically prove and support by real life examples that suppliers’ profits are 
higher with co-branding relationships than without it. Specifically, authors argue 
that co-branding and brand spillover effect can act as a safeguard for suppliers 
from possible entry of competitors with unobservable costs. At the same time, 
manufacturers expect to reach lower prices as a result of co-branding with 
suppliers (ibid.).  
Among other co-branding (and thus, interorganizational spillover) benefits, 
Erevelles et al. (2008) specify relationship benefits, when companies get some 
particular advantages from mutual co-operation, from becoming endorsers of each 
other’s offerings, sharing knowledge, capabilities, risks, experience and 
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generating trust. Moreover, suppliers may lower costs as a consequence of long-
term relationships through economies of scale. Finally, benefits from 
interorganizational spillover effect may emerge when suppliers support the 
advertisement of co-branded product or service offerings. 
Further, spillover effect (intra- and interorganizational) is discussed in marketing 
literature from both positive and negative angles. Essentially, brand extensions, 
alliances, sub-branding or co-branding may trigger different associations and 
evaluations of the buyer-supplier partnership.  
Regarding the spillover effect in brand alliance and brand extension studies, 
Keller and Aaker (1992) were measuring how customers evaluate brand extension 
and a core brand. They have found that successful extension increases consumer 
evaluation of a core brand and the extension itself in case when this particular 
core brand has either high or moderate quality. In other words, it has positive 
spillover. At the same time unsuccessful extensions decrease evaluation of core 
brand if it is of a high quality (negative spillover). However, it does not have any 
spillover effect if the core brand has average quality.  
Suh and Park (2009) have studied the negative spillover effect on a host brand due 
to the cognitive responses. Initially they proved that high-favorability host brand 
can benefit from alliance with moderate partner brand due to greater (fewer) 
positive (negative) cognitive responses. Nevertheless, when two brands with high 
favorability cooperate, initial negative cognitive responses will generate negative 
interorganizational spillover effect of brand alliance. 
Most of the discussed studies, however, focus on consumer evaluation of 
product/service brand combinations and resulting brand extensions. In this thesis 
I will analyze the B2B partners’ evaluation of corporate brands spillover. Thus, 
this will extend interorganizational brand spillover discussions with introduction 
of business-to-business context.  
2.2.2 Brand spillover effect in B2B relationships 
Brands have ability to stretch either to new line products; to sub-companies which 
were acquired by the parent brand or were involved in brand alliance etc. It 
happens due to the close cooperation between firms and consequential stretch of 
associations. However, similar effects were not studied in B2B marketing 
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research. In this thesis I assume that in B2B relationship, information about 
business exchange with a particular buyer can increase or decrease demand for 
seller’s products and services among potential partners. The same logic can be 
applied to buyers – information about business relationship with a seller who has 
strong corporate brand may increase perceptions of potential partners. Thus, the 
ability of a corporate brand to stretch to (in other words, to be passed to) another 
partnering company will be further referred to as the brand spillover effect. I 
argue that some corporate brands may become stronger or more well-known due 
to B2B relationship with another famous company with a strong brand. Hence, the 
possibility of positive brand spill-over effect in B2B will be analyzed. 
In this thesis I suggest that while negotiating B2B relationships, companies first 
choose their potential partners (e.g. according to the available information on their 
reputation, brand favorability, resource base etc.), choose governance form of 
their future relationship and then start cooperation. During such exchange 
relationship, the corporate brands of two partner companies might act in the same 
way as brands during alliances, brand extensions or co-branding, since brands of 
the exchange partners will appear simultaneously in connection to one another and 
might be perceived as “partnering brands”. The latter makes all the findings 
discussed above relevant to this particular B2B research. 
Further, I assume that among the main differences between spillover studies in 
brand extension or brand alliances (M&A’s) literature and brand spillover effect 
in B2B are the following issues. First, during interorganizational relationships 
brands are not actually merged or aligned. Thus, B2B brand spillover will be 
placed within interorganizational (not intra-) discussion with small structure 
difference. Second, while studying B2B spillovers only corporate brands (not 
product ones) will be analyzed. Finally, the level of cooperation and consequential 
spillover in B2B may be influenced by other factors related to interorganizational 
relationship only. For example, each B2B relationship is governed by some 
particular “rules of exchange”. Thus, B2B managers make choices of relational or 
formal governance to guide this exchange and define its consequences. I expect 
brand spillover effect in interorganizational relationship to be a side-effect rather 
than a goal. However, this side-effect might be directly or indirectly influenced by 
the governance form choice.  
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2.3 Governance form choice 
Governance form is defined as the institutional form a company chooses in order 
to manage a particular transaction in accordance with transaction costs analysis 
(Ghosh and John 2012). Moreover, governance structure can be interpreted as “the 
institutional framework within which the integrity of transaction is decided, […] 
negotiated and executed.” (Williamson 1979, p. 235). 
Williamson (1979) suggests that there are two main governance form alternatives 
– market and hierarchies. Later, to avoid polarization of governance form a hybrid 
one was also introduced (Williamson 1991). He finds that the governance forms 
depend on the nature of transaction, meaning that for the simple contractual 
relations, the simple governance structures should be implied, while complex 
governance should be prioritized for complex relations. Such ways of guiding 
transactions will save managers from spending extra costs during transaction. 
Moreover, Williamson (1991) points out that there are three main distinctions 
between governance forms: “contracting law” (each form of governance should be 
supported by a different form of contracting law), adaptability and the use of 
incentives and control mechanisms. 
In line with Williamson’s findings (1979, 1991), Ghosh and John (1999) suggest 
that governance form is split into three components: market, hierarchical and 
relational. In their study, market governance is the framework which “describes 
the rules of arm’s-length market exchanges”. Market governance gives partner 
companies considerable autonomy and incentives, which increases the ability to 
receive benefits from new opportunities, thus, to create value. Moreover, the 
authors argue that market governance relies on complex contingent contracts 
which specify burdens on the partnering firms. On the other hand, hierarchical 
governance gives the framework of vertical integrated exchange. It has lower 
level of incentives for value creation; still, it is less vulnerable to opportunism in 
value claiming stage than market governance (ibid.). The third form defined by 
Ghosh and John (1999) – relational governance – combines the element of 
previous two forms. If companies choose this type of governance, they rely on 
relationship-specific investments and social norms in the process of value 
claiming. 
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Further, in a framework developed by Ghosh and John (1999) governance form 
appeared to be a part of governance value analysis (GVA). The authors suggest 
that GVA included four basic components: exchange attributes, governance form, 
positioning and resources. In this context governance form is described as a part 
of classical transaction costs analysis. Additionally, in their study authors analyze 
the impact of governance structures and firm resources, including brand equity, on 
the outcomes of a business relationship. Taking that into account, I assume that 
the choice of governance form, or the rules of business exchange, may have a 
significant relationship to brand spillover which might be the outcome of 
companies’ cooperation. 
Considering that governance structures are distinct by the contacting laws (among 
other things), in this thesis governance form choices are measured using formal 
and relational contracts, which are two most important government mechanisms 
(Sande 2007). Both forms are further discussed. 
2.3.1 Formal contracts 
According to Lusch and Brown (1996) the relationship between two exchange 
parties can be governed by two types of contracts – explicit and normative 
(implicit). In particular, explicit contracts are the formal agreements that specify 
and detail the obligations of each party, including their roles and responsibilities, 
outcomes expectations, contingency planning, monitoring procedures and dispute 
resolutions (Zhou and Poppo 2010, Barthelemy and Quelin 2006, Sande and 
Haugland 2011). In addition, formal contracting can be defined as promises and 
obligations to perform certain actions in future (Macneil 1978, Poppo and Zenger 
2002). Writing formal contracts is perceived to be a good solution to situations 
that increase transaction costs (Zhou and Poppo 2010, Williamson 1996). 
Among the two most studied dimensions of formal contracting are role 
specification and contingency planning (Sande 2007, Sande and Haugland 2011). 
Role specification refers to the level of describing roles, responsibilities and 
performance tasks in their contracts (ibid.). Contingency planning relates to the 
specification of adaptation to changes (Sande 2007). The latter means that during 
exchange relationship some uncertainties, unexpected future events, 
disagreements or exchange hazards may occur. Hence, by designing complex 
formal contracts, parties are safeguarding themselves and enforcing future dispute 
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resolutions (Sande 2007, Sande and Haugland 2011, Poppo and Zenger 2002, 
Argyres et al. 2007). 
Among the main functions of formal contracts are: control and coordination (Zhou 
and Poppo 2010). Specifically, control function indicates that contracts aim to 
govern the agreed behavior, activities and sanctions for non-compliance (Poppo 
and Zegner 2002, Zhou and Poppo 2010). The second function – coordination – 
reflects the role of a contract as a “technical aid” for managing particular 
exchange relationship, including specification of terms, goals, specific 
coordination mechanisms etc. (Mayer and Argyres 2004, Zhou and Poppo 2010).  
Poppo and Zenger (2002) argue that formal contracts differ on the level of 
complexity. The authors suggest that the more the level of complexity is, the more 
detailed is the specification of promises, obligations and ways of resolving 
disputes. In addition, the level of formal contracting complexity depends on the 
extent of exchange hazards: the increase in exchange hazards promote the use of 
more formal contracts. However, exchange hazards increase makes contracts less 
complete due to the fact that it becomes less possible to forecast and be prepared 
to future uncertain states (Zhou and Poppo 2010).  
In this thesis, the choice of a formal contracting of different complexity in order to 
guide B2B relationships will be referred to as the choice of formal governance. 
2.3.2 Relational governance 
Relational governance is primarily identified by implicit or soft contracts, which 
define a set of mutual expectations and understandings between the channel 
partners (Lusch and Brown 1996). This type of contracts is also called “normative 
contracts” (ibid.). Moreover, relational contract can be explained as “a self-
enforcing agreement so rooted in the parties’ particular circumstances that the 
agreement cannot be enforced by a third-party such as a court” (Gibbons 2005, p. 
236). 
The choice of relational contracting can be argued by the fact that it sanctions 
exchange behavior from opportunistic attempts due to increased trust, willingness 
to rely on the partner company and the idea of enforced mutual long-term 
cooperation (Zhou and Poppo 2010). 
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Relational governance form occurs through a set of relational norms that govern 
acceptable behavior between exchange partners (Lusch and Brown 1996). These 
norms are based on common beliefs and depict particular informal rules that 
control and guide exchange process (Sande and Haugland 2011, Heide and John 
1992).  
Furthermore, Poppo and Zenger (2002) state that if companies choose relational 
governance form to manage their cooperation, then the enforcement of 
obligations, promises, and expectations of the exchange will occur through social 
processes. These social processes of relational governance are most commonly 
characterized by three basic relational norms (dimensions): solidarity, flexibility 
and information sharing (Ivens and Blois 2004, Heide and John 1992, Sande and 
Haugland 2011, Poppo and Zenger 2002). Solidarity norm depicts the bilateral 
approach to problem solving. It promotes commitment to joint actions in value 
creation and facilitates mutual efforts to adjustments. Flexibility shows the 
readiness of partners to adapt to unexpected circumstances, whereas information 
sharing norm assumes that parties are willing to independently share private 
information with one another about their plans and goals (Poppo and Zenger 
2002, Heide and John 1992). Since many other norms were measured in 
connection to relational contracting and governance (Ivens and Blois 2004), it is 
possible to assume that they depict the informal level of trust, mutual dependency 
and reliability between parties in exchange. 
To be more exact, analyses of relational contracts use will be the measure of 
relational governance form in this study. 
2.3.3 Governance form choice and brand spillover  
While discussing governance structures, Williamson (1979) argues that 
governance forms should be used with regards to optimization. That means that 
companies’ managers should be willing to shift from one form to another to 
reduce both costs of writing contracts and expenses of efficient execution in an 
uncertain environment. There is an assumption that formal contracts undermine 
trust, thus while choosing more formal governance, the level of relational one may 
decrease. On the contrary, relational governance choice may substitute the formal 
controls characteristics (Gulati 1995, Dyer and Singh 1998, Poppo and Zenger 
2002). However, Poppo and Zenger (2002) find that formal and relational 
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governance forms are more likely to be complements than substitutes. In addition, 
Sande and Haugland (2011) analyze the relationship between formal and 
relational contracting. Among other findings authors argue that misaligned formal 
contracts with the transaction attributes result in undermining relational norms. 
Considering these studies, both governance forms will be measured in this thesis 
simultaneously, assuming that B2B managers may imply formal and relational 
contracts with different levels of complexity and completeness as the parts of 
overall framework for their particular exchange relationships. 
Further, there are some discussions regarding the relationship between brands and 
governance form choice. Glynn, Motion and Brodie (2007) argue in their study 
that in terms of B2B relationship, brands are considered as market-based assets by 
resellers. These types of assets can be shared between companies and can create 
relational rents from relationship specific assets, knowledge sharing, 
complementary resources and governance. Thus, brands are influenced by the 
choice of governance structure. The latter supports the idea that governance form 
choice could be related to brand spillover effect in B2B relationships, as spillover 
is essentially the outcome of relationship between companies. 
Ghosh and John (2005, 2009) analyze branded components as “efficient 
government devices” in their studies on branded component contracts in industrial 
markets. They suggest that as well as any other contracts, brand contracts assign 
ownership and decision control to the parties at hand. Hence, governance type and 
principles should also apply to these contracts. The authors suggest that the 
allocation of brand ownership presumes an efficient governance response to 
exchange hazards. These findings are in line with Gonzalez-Diaz et al. (2002) and 
Azevedo et al. (2002) studies.  
The issue of brand spillover was not discussed in these studies. However, while 
brands are analyzed within the context of governance, it shows that there might be 
a connection (even causal effect) between governance form and brand spillover 
effect. As a result, in this study I propose that brand spillover might be the 
consequence of B2B relationship. At the same time, governance form choice is 
defined as a framework, which is used to manage a particular buyer-seller 
relationship and influence specific consequences of it. In other words, it is a 
structure within which the cooperation, negotiations and actual B2B performance 
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take place. Thus, governance form might as well manage, influence or determine 
the level of brand spillover among partnering companies (or the actual side effect 
of B2B relationship). 
Since both governance forms are present in this research model simultaneously, 
another suggestion about the governance-brand spillover relation is made. As it 
was mentioned before, formal contracts include specifications of roles, goals, 
monitoring procedures etc., while relational governance is based on informal 
rules, trust and joint actions. Considering that brand spillover as an outcome of 
B2B relationship is intangible, it might not be described and controlled by formal 
governance. Therefore, in this study I suggest that the level of relational 
governance will be linked to the level of brand spillover effect. This statement is 
based on assumption that while developing B2B relationship on the basis of 
solidarity, trust, information sharing, flexibility and reliability (characteristics of 
relational governance), it will guarantee more close relationship management, will 
increase perception of these two companies and their brands as partners and, 
eventually, will generate brand spillover effect. Taking this proposiyion into 
account, these study’s hypotheses are formulated as follows: 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between relational governance form 
and brand spillover effect for focal firm. 
H1b: There is a positive relationship between relational governance form 
and the level of spillover effect of brands in B2B relationship for 
partner firm. 
Additionally, in this thesis the choice of governance form is expected to have a 
moderating effect on the influence of companies’ resource base, companies’ 
contracting capabilities and reputation of both focal and partner firms on brand 
spillover effect. A moderator is defined as a variable which specifies under what 
conditions a predictor (independent variable) influences a dependent variable 
(Baron and Kenny 1986). It may reduce or enhance the direction of the 
relationship or even change the relationship from positive to negative (Lindley 
and Walker 1993, Kim, Kaye and Wright 2001). Since governance form defines 
“the rules” of B2B relationship, it might have a moderating effect on predictors. 
The mentioned factors and the possible moderating effect will be discussed in the 
following. 
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2.4  Companies’ resources 
Within GVA framework, resources are defined as “the imperfectly mobile and 
scarce skills or assets that are owned by the focal parties to the exchanges” 
(Ghosh and John 2012, p. 56). Moreover, Ghosh and John (1999; 2012) suggest 
that companies’ resource base, including technological, customer-side (brand) and 
supply-chain based, should be connected to the transaction attributes and 
governance form choice. In the essence, authors argue that firms should align their 
resource base with the appropriate governance form, so that it will guarantee 
further solution of potential conflicts, which weaken opportunities to realize 
mutually beneficial advantages. Further, Ghosh and John (1999) argue that 
resources such as brand equity have a different impact on companies’ 
performance and outcomes, depending on the choice of governance form or 
strategy. Recalling that brand spillover is considered to be one of the outcomes of 
B2B relationship, companies’ resource base may have a relationship to it. 
A company may use its resource base either to accomplish various activities 
within the company itself, or to achieve competitive advantages from joint 
activities with value-chain partners, including buyers and suppliers (Ghosh and 
John 2012). In particular, the firms with stronger resource base (including stronger 
brands) might tend to use formal contracts as governance form to safeguard 
themselves from opportunistic behavior during the value claiming stage. Hence, 
companies will protect their non-imitable resources.  
On the contrary, the companies with strong resource base may get more benefits 
from choosing relational governance. That can be explained by the fact that 
relational governance form will enable leveraging of partners’ resources which 
may lead to possible competitive advantages, e.g. positive brand spillover. That 
effect might be even more strengthened for a company with less well-known 
brand in B2B relationships (Ghosh and John 1999, Glynn, Motion and Brodie 
2007). 
Considering the discussion above, I assume that the stronger resource base of the 
focal firm will result in the higher level of brand spillover effect for partner firm 
while it is controlled by the relational governance form. Moreover, using the logic 
that while choosing greater level of relational governance companies tend to 
achieve higher benefits from relationship, I assume that companies resource base 
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will have the relationship with brand spillover effect on focal firm as well. Hence, 
the next hypotheses are: 
H2a: The relationship between company’s resource base and brand spill-
over effect for a focal firm is more positive if it is moderated by 
relational governance form.  
H2b: The relationship between company’s resource base and brand spill-
over effect for a partner firm is more positive if it is moderated by 
relational governance form. 
2.5  Contracting capabilities 
Contracting capabilities can be defined as alliance capabilities that determine the 
level of performance of this alliance and individual companies’ performance, 
which consequently influence companies’ competitive advantage (Argyres and 
Mayer 2007, Weber and Mayer 2005). In particular, contracting capabilities 
include contract designing, contract negotiation and knowledge sharing. Argyres 
and Mayer (2007) discuss that companies should determine the players 
(internal/external; lawyers, managers, engineers or sales agents) and their 
responsibilities at each stage of contracting process. 
Due to the definition of contracting capabilities it is possible to assume that they 
are the antecedence of formal (not relational) governance. Weber and Mayer 
(2005) argue that if during contract designing the roles were specified incorrectly 
(e.g. personnel involved in designing and negotiation lack the appropriate 
knowledge and information), then it would influence the efficiency and outcomes 
of governance.  
In line with the previous argument, I suggest that brand spillover as an outcome of 
B2B relationship will be related to contracting capabilities and this link will be 
weaker while it is moderated by the choice of formal governance. In other words, 
if companies choose more formal framework to guide their relationship, then the 
relationship between companies’s contracting capabilities (the efficiency of 
contracting and the ability to get all benefits from it) and the level of brand 
spillover effect between B2B companies will be lower. Considering that it is 
hypothesized: 
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H3a: The relationship between contracting capabilities and brand spill-over 
effect for focal firm is weakened while moderated by formal 
governance.  
H3b: The relationship between contracting capabilities and brand spill-over 
effect for partner firm is weakened while moderated by formal 
governance.  
2.6  Reputation 
Reputation and company’s soundness play quite important role during the process 
of B2B partner’s choice in line with price-quality and costs decisions. Corporate 
reputation is defined as a valuable intangible asset, accumulated impression 
formed by stakeholders after interaction with the company and receiving 
communication from it (Keller 2008, Chun 2005). Chun (2005) describes 
reputation through three concepts: image, identity and desired identity, and states 
that reputation affects the way various stakeholders act towards the company. This 
concept influence customer and employee satisfaction, retention rate and loyalty. 
In other words, reputation is what others think of the company. That is why of a 
company I assume that reputation plays important part in the process of choosing 
a business partner for exchange relationship as well. 
Mayer (2006) argues that reputation can be a function of product quality 
managerial competence and other factors which are essential for external 
constituencies. With respect to transaction cost economics framework, reputation 
can be characterized as a hostage firms can use as an evidence that exchange 
partner will imply high efforts (Mayer 2006, Klein and Leffler 1981). 
Additionally, according to Walsh and Beatty (2007), good corporate reputation 
can reduce transaction costs. 
Before signing the contract or entering relationship companies’ managers will 
most likely assess reputation of their potential partners as it provides competitive 
advantages as a point of differentiation (Rao and Ruekert 1994, Mayer 2006). 
Therefore, firms with better reputation might be considered as more safe and 
beneficial to do business with. In this thesis I assume that companies’ good 
reputation (or external evaluation of companies image, brand etc.) has positive 
link towards their brand equity and companies’ soundness. Moreover, some 
particular company may appear to have better reputation in B2B dyad, which 
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makes it a valuable partner. Hence, after entering B2B relationship it may 
influence its partner’s brand equity as an outcome of this cooperation. Thus, 
positive brand spillover will occur. Note that the reputation of a focal firm is 
expected to be positively related to brand spillover effect for partner firm and vice 
versa. In line with this argument, I hypothesize the following: 
H4a: The direct relationship between reputation of a focal firm with brand 
spill-over effect for a partner company is positive. 
H4b: The direct relationship between reputation of a partner firm with brand 
spill-over effect for a focal company is positive. 
Recalling this study’s research questions and all the restrictions and frameworks 
guiding B2B exchange I suggest that this relationship might be also moderated by 
governance form choice. In this case I argue that the level of relational 
governance will have significant moderating effect, since it requires building close 
cooperation based on trust and solidarity. Thus, the following hypotheses are: 
H4c: Positive relationship between reputation of a focal firm with brand 
spill-over effect for a partner company is strengthened while 
moderated by the relational governance form. 
H4d: Positive relationship between reputation of a partner firm with brand 
spill-over effect for a focal company is strengthened while moderated 
by the relational governance form. 
2.7  Model description 
Aforementioned hypotheses and relationships are illustrated on the following 
research model (Figure 2.1). This model shows that there are two dependent 
variable in this study – the extent of spillover effect of brands in B2B relationship 
for focal and for partner firm. Governance form choice (formal and relational), 
reputation of a partner and focal firm, company resources and contacting 
capabilities are the predictors. Moreover, the moderating effect of governance 
form choices on the relationship between other predictors and the level of brand 
spillover effect on both focal and partner companies will be tested. 
Furthermore, a number of control variables will be included in the analysis. They 
are discussed in the following section. 
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual model 
 
2.8  Control variables 
This theoretical model will use a set of control variables which may give insight 
on alternative explanations for the relationships between endogenous variables. 
Three classical transaction cost economics variables – relationship-specific 
investment, market uncertainty and measurement ambiguity – as well as 
institutional and legal environment and perceived fit will be included as control 
variables. 
2.8.1 Institutional and legal environment 
Institutions and legal environment are often explained as particular rules. For 
example, Williamson (1975) defines institutions as the ‘rules of the game’. In line 
with this definition, John (2008) explains institutions as the rules that govern the 
interaction between two actors. Institutional and legal factors often affect the 
financial and economic performance. These two factors state the conditions and 
rules of business partner relationships. Additionally, Carson et al. (1999) explain 
that institutional environment is the ‘rule’ on macro level, while institutional 
arrangements are the ‘rules’ of micro level of relationship. Legal environment 
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(e.g. country’s law system) is also assumed to be a part of institutional 
environment. 
Zhou and Poppo (2010) argue that in terms of transaction costs analysis, strong 
(weak) institutional and legal environment means that one partner in B2B 
relationship may perceive the court system able (unable) to defend company’s 
financial interests when some disputes emerge. Thus, weak institutional and legal 
environment may reduce managers’ reliance on formal governance form. 
In addition, efficient legal regulations provide guarantees of property rights safety 
and minimize transaction costs. More vulnerable legal systems (which presume 
corruption, for example) create more uncertainties in the interorganizational 
relationship outcomes etc. To adjust to all these circumstances, companies’ are 
expected to make the appropriate choices of governance form to ‘run’ their B2B 
relationships. Institutional environment can be measured using ranking by Doing 
business (provided by World Bank since 2005). 
Moreover, Homburg, Klarmann and Schmitt (2010) argue that characteristics of 
the market, which might be the part of institutional environment variable, 
influences brand awareness. Thus, I assume that institutional and legal 
environment may directly influence the level of spillover effect as well.  
2.8.2 Transaction costs analysis variables 
Relationship-specific investments are defined as the specialized portion of 
investments that cannot be reemployed if the exchange relationship terminates 
permanently (Williamson 1996, Sande 2007, Zhou and Poppo 2010). In other 
words this is an investment that buyers and suppliers made, tailored to specific 
exchange and which will lose their value outside this particular relationship. 
Market uncertainty is defined by Buvik and John (2000) as unpredictability of 
environment in which the relationship takes place. It is argued to have an 
influence on exchange coordination by creating the need to adapt strategies and 
actions in situations with incomplete and asymmetric information (Zhou and 
Poppo 2010,  
Performance measurement ambiguity can be interpreted as the difficulty a buyer 
or supplier face in defining their partner’s performance (Mooi and Ghosh 2010). It 
also relates to the challenges of measuring and monitoring collective actions of 
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partners (Zhou and Poppo 2010). Moreover, if the actions and efforts of parties 
are hard to measure, companies may tend to decrease their level of efforts, which 
may result in worse exchange outcomes. 
From the definitions above I conclude that all these three variables can have direct 
effect on the level of brand spillover effect as they are related to the way business 
relationships are governed and may define the outcomes of B2B relationship. 
2.8.3 Perceived Fit 
I decided to include perceived fit between partnering companies as control 
variable. According to a number of marketing studies of brand extension and 
alliances it was argued that the level and direction of spillover may depend on the 
perceived fit between brands (Völckner and Sattler 2006; Jaju, Joiner and Reddy 
2006, Simonin and Ruth 1998 and others). Thus, using the same logic, perceived 
fit between two partnering companies in B2B may be related to the extent of 
spillover. 
3.0 Methods 
In the following, an overview of research design, methods, participants, 
procedure, measurement scales of dependent and independent variables and data 
collection process will be presented. 
3.1  Research design 
Research design is a framework for data collection and analysis, which details 
decisions and actions necessary for obtaining required information to structure 
and solve research problems (Malhotra 2010, Bryman and Bell 2011). Aiming to 
test research predictions regarding the influence of governance form choice on the 
extent of brand spillover effect and all the consequential linkages that may 
strengthen or weaken this influence, the conclusive research design was chosen. I 
expect it to be the most suitable one as it is used to test hypotheses and examine 
relations in case when information needed for analysis is clear and does not 
require specifications (Malhotra 2010). To be more precise, descriptive cross-
sectional design (also called sample survey research design), which is a part of 
conclusive design, was conducted. This type of analysis is performed through data 
collection from any sample of population at a single point in time to conduct 
quantitative analysis of two or more variables (Bryman and Bell 2011). Among its 
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advantages are relative small amount of time and effort for data collection, 
possibility to collect large amount of data and the absence on previous response 
bias (as data is collected only once no previous responses can influence current 
judgments) (Malhotra 2010, Bryman and Bell 2011). 
As any type of research design, cross-sectional design has its disadvantages. First, 
it does not detect changes at the individual level as it is performed only once 
(compared to, for example, longitudinal design which measures sample 
repeatedly) (Malhotra 2010). Nevertheless, the purpose of this thesis does not 
include the detection of changes in time. It aims to analyze the current situation, 
meaning the effect which has already occurred. Research variables are more or 
less stable constructs and it takes quite a lot of time to change them (for example, 
companies’ brands, reputation, institutional and legal environment etc.). 
Therefore, inability to detect changes is not found to be a problem for this study. 
Second, cross-sectional design may require participants to recall their previous 
actions, activities that took place in their companies in the past or simply their 
own subjective opinion which may lead to a problem of inaccuracy. The data can 
be biased due to memory lapses or response prejudice (Malhotra 2010). 
The third weakness is patterns of association (Bryman and Bell 2011). Due to the 
fact that cross-sectional design intents only to detect relationships between 
variables, researcher is not able to manipulate those variables (as in experimental 
design). Thus, it is not possible to establish the direction of causality between 
variables, while the only possible conclusion that researcher can make is whether 
or not variables are related. Still, it is possible to draw theoretical and analytical 
conclusions about causal effect based on literature analysis and general 
knowledge, which will further be done in this thesis to interpret the results of 
analysis. 
3.2  Ukraine as empirical setting 
Ukraine was chosen as a country of interest for several reasons. Ukraine is a 
relatively young country (independent since 1991), which has gone through 
transition of its economy from centrally planned to market. In 2005 Ukraine was 
proclaimed by European Union as a country with market economy. Nowadays it is 
defined as lower middle income developing country according to World Bank 
classification (World Bank Data). In accordance to Doing Business 2013 rank 
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Ukraine is on the 137 place out of 185 economies indicating the overall ease of 
doing business, which is 15 points better result comparing to the previous year 
(Doing Business Data).  
Despite the ‘market economy’ status, in some cases Ukraine is still considered as 
a ‘transition economy’ country. Thus, it is expected that such vulnerable economy 
status may influence the type of governance form the companies choose while 
entering B2B relationships. The latter means that companies may be quite highly 
distributed on their governance form choice variables which may cause different 
levels of brand spillover effects. Furthermore, transition versus market economy 
status of Ukraine makes this country interesting for analysis in terms of studying 
Institutional and legal environment variable influence. Companies need to adjust 
to regulatory norms while creating their governance agreements. Moreover, such 
equity as companies’ reputation may also play quite important role in such 
economies as Ukrainian, due to the issue of trust in the case of unpredictable and 
inconstant economic conditions. 
Emerging economies (e.g. Ukrainian) might be quite an interesting even though 
challenging places to expand your business to. Considering that, many 
international partnering companies and suppliers are expected to be involved in 
B2B relationships in Ukraine.  
Moreover, there may be drawn some conclusions based on the analysis of the 
development of B2B market in Ukraine in 2012 (Yurchak 2012). First, Ukrainian 
B2B market lacks efficient analytical and theoretical studies particularly in B2B 
marketing field. Still, empirical work and business experience plays an important 
part in doing business in Ukraine. Next, marketing in Ukrainian B2B companies 
(even among market leaders) is quite a complementary, not main function in 
leading business. Thus, the importance of marketing function (e.g. the role of 
brand equity and brand spillover effect in particular) in neglected. 
Another challenge with Ukrainian B2B market deals with proper terminology and 
translation. Ukrainian economics and business schools are facing the problem of 
correct translation of international business language. Indeed, many terms bear 
slightly different meaning when translated to Ukrainian; some translations risk to 
lose the initial meaning at all, while many terms are not yet translated into 
Ukrainian. For example, there is no direct and correct translation of the term 
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“brand spillover effect” in Ukrainian, which might create some complications 
while explaining to potential informants the purpose of this research.  
Furthermore, according to the analysis of Ukrainian B2B trends in 2013 (B2B 
Report 2013, Program of B2B Ukraine 2013), only 23% of respondents agreed 
that their marketing activities directly or indirectly influence sales. The latter 
indicates the low level of marketing development in Ukrainian business world in 
general.  
Considering everything abovementioned, Ukraine appears to be an interesting 
country for analysis of interorganizational relationships and governance form 
choice. Moreover, this thesis may become a significant contribution towards 
strengthening positions of marketing function in B2B in Ukraine, both in 
analytical field and in a real business world. 
3.3  Research method 
Since new relationships between research variables and moderated effects are 
studied in this thesis quantitative primary data collection is required. For this 
reason, self-completion survey among managers of Ukrainian B2B companies (or 
firms involved in interorganizational relationships) was conducted. 
According to Hair et al. (2011), self-completion approaches use predetermined set 
of questions or questionnaires designed to gather data from respondents. Among 
the weaknesses of this method are loss of researcher’s control (e.g. due to delivery 
type – through mail, emails etc.), quite common low response rate, and the 
question of whether the chosen respondents accurately represent the target 
population as expected (Hair et al. 2011).  
Some of these disadvantages can be eliminated by other research methods, e.g. by 
structured or unstructured interviews. While conducting interview researcher has a 
power of controlling the process of data collection and can determine whether or 
not respondents represent the target population. Moreover, it is possible to get 
more insights on the researched topic, which could not be reached by structured 
questionnaires. On the contrary, interviews might require more time and efforts 
both for researcher and respondents. Hence, it becomes more complicated to 
collect many responses. When researcher is interested in collecting only 
quantitative (not qualitative) data for analysis, questionnaire might be more 
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appropriate. Another option – secondary sources examination, was not used due to 
the lack of previous studies on the researched topic. 
Furthermore, email questionnaire was chosen for data collection among all other 
survey methods. Malhotra (2010) defines a set of factors to evaluate different 
types of survey methods. According to that classification, email surveys eliminate 
problems of field force control (when interviewers subjectively influence 
respondents) and interviewer bias, as well as decrease the problem of perceived 
anonymity of responses. The latter one leads to a higher chance of obtaining 
sensitive information and to the possibility of more honest responses. Moreover, 
email surveys are conducted with low costs and comparably high speed. 
Still, researchers face some problems when they choose to use online survey. 
Among those problems are low response rates, low sample control (the ability to 
reach respondents effectively and efficiently) and low control of data collection 
environment. Likely response rate varies from 11 to 59 % depending on whether it 
is possible to distribute survey only through internet or throughout 
organization/intranet as well (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2012). Low response 
rates are also expected due to decreased control over when respondents decide to 
fill in questionnaire. Nevertheless, this particular research method is decided to be 
the most suitable for this study in terms of time, required resources and 
participants’ reachability. 
3.4  Procedure, sampling and participants 
The key informant data is used in order to analyze Ukrainian companies (national 
or international) involved in B2B relationships in terms of governance form 
relationship with brand spillover effect. This technique assumes that individual 
informants (managers, buyers etc.) can provide relevant and representative 
information about processes of group decision making, for example, companies’ 
governance form agreements (Wilson, Lilien 1992). The threats of using key 
informant data may be the following: questionable reliability and validity, 
respondents’ bias (e.g. overestimation of positive traits) etc. (Philips 1981, 
Wilson, Lilien 1992). Despite that, careful selection of group of formal or 
informal opinion leaders, influential leaders or experts, combined with a structural 
contact with them can lead to positive results (Key informant approach according 
to University of Wisconsin-Extension). 
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In this study, company representatives were asked to name a person (brand 
manager, CEO, marketing manager or other personnel) who is the most 
appropriate one to answer the questions on this papeer’s research topic and who 
eventually became the main respondents. This referring approach may decrease 
respondents’ bias. 
Initially, at least 70-80 representatives of Ukrainian companies in B2B 
relationships were expected to participate. Considering that in this study 
particularly B2B market is a topic of research and that in Ukraine there are no 
publicly available databases or lists of companies in B2B relationships, potential 
participants were planned to be reached through snowball sampling technique 
(also known as referral sampling (Hair et al. 2011)). This is a useful and 
convenient approach in the case when subjects are hard to locate. The researcher 
usually asks initial respondents to help identify and contact other potential 
respondents from the target population. This process is repeated until the required 
sample size is reached (Hair et al. 2011).  
This technique has several challenges. First of all, it is a threat to randomness and 
it can cause problems in representativeness. Next, this sampling approach may be 
biased towards the inclusion individuals within interrelationships. This can lead to 
responses’ correlation bias and exclusion of ‘isolated’ but important potential 
participants (Atkinson and Flint 2001). Still, in this particular study, where both 
focal and partner firms’ reputation and brand spillover effects are the points of 
interest, the inclusion of companies within interrelationships might be beneficial. 
These sampling biases can be reduced by larger sample sizes. Moreover, applying 
snowball sampling may help to reach (hidden) participants who will be missed in 
the case when any other sampling approach is used. Thus, snowball sampling 
technique is considered as the only one appropriate for this research. 
3.5  Validity, replication and reliability 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011), to evaluate any marketing research one 
must use the following three criteria: reliability, replication and validity. 
Moreover, these three criteria can be used both to evaluate the choice of research 
design and the measurement scale. 
Reliability is the extent to which a scale generates consistent results if repeated 
measurements are made. In other words it is the extent to which measures are free 
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from random error (Malhotra 2010). One of the forms of reliability is internal 
consistency, which assesses reliability of a summated scale were the total score is 
created from summing several items (Malhotra 2010). High reliability level will 
show greater consistency of results (Hair et al. 2010). To reach higher reliability 
in this study it was decided to introduce at least four items per each factor. 
Moreover, construct reliability will be later tested for each theoretical model 
(Cronbach’s alpha, AVE, CR). 
Replication is closely related to reliability of research. According to Bryman and 
Bell (2011), in some cases researchers choose to replicate the findings of others. 
Thus, all research process should be specified clearly and in detail. The choice of 
cross-sectional survey design increases this study’s replicability due to the fact 
that it specifies all procedures, including: selection of respondents, designing 
measures, administration of research instruments etc. (Bryman and Bell 2011). 
Validity is considered to be the most important criterion of research. It is 
concerned with the integrity of the conclusions that are created during research 
(Hair et al. 2010, Bryman and Bell 2011). In the following, different types of 
validity will be discussed with regards to this study. 
Content or measurement validity stands for the assessment of how well the 
content of a scale represents measurement task (Malhotra 2010, Bryman and Bell 
2011). In this study content validity was ensured through the initial interview 
(pre-test) with two of the participants, during which they were asked to evaluate 
whether the scale items cover the entire construct. 
Internal validity refers to the issue of causality. In the case of using cross-section 
survey design, this criterion is typically weak as it does not have the features of 
experimental design (Bryman and Bell 2011). Nevertheless, it is still possible to 
make judgments about causal inferences based on research findings. 
External validity deals with the question of whether or not it is possible to 
extrapolate findings beyond the analyzed sample (Bryman and Bell 2011). In this 
study, employing non-probability sampling technique (snowball sampling in 
particular) might decrease external validity in comparison to using probability 
sampling (e. g. random sampling or stratified sampling). Still, snowball sampling 
technique leaves researcher some control over potential participants’ selection, 
which might increase the possibility that all respondents will be adequate for this 
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particular study. Moreover, due to the lack of research on the topic of brand 
spillover effect in B2B relationships, I propose that the findings can be 
generalized on the population and can be further tested using other samples. 
Construct validity is also related to the efficiency and accuracy of measures in 
research. It refers to the question of what construct (characteristic) is actually 
measuring (Hair et al. 2010, Malhotra 2010). Almost all items and scales in this 
thesis were adapted and supported by previous studies, which strengthens its 
construct validity. Furthermore, construct validity consists of three components: 
convergent validity (the extent to which a construct share high portions of 
variance, meaning that the scale correlates positively with other measures of a 
scale); discriminant validity (the extent to which a measure does not correlate with 
other constructs which it should be distinct from), and nomological validity 
(assesses the relationship between theoretical construct and findings) (Hair et al. 
2010, Malhotra 2010). 
Reliability and validity of this research theoretical constructs will be checked and 
discussed in the Results part of this thesis. 
3.6  Measurement 
In this section, development of measurement scales and items will be discussed. 
To increase content and construct validity almost all items were based on previous 
research works with some adjustments introduced to meet this particular study’s 
requirements and goals. Several measures were newly designed based on common 
knowledge to cover all researched variables. The complete questionnaire in 
English is presented in appendix 1. 
3.6.1 Measurement of dependent variables 
Two dependent variables in this study’s model – brand spillover effect for focal 
firm and for partner one in B2B relationships – were measured using multiple-
item scale which was  the modification of previously used measures in brand 
extension, brand alliances and co-branding literature (Aaker and Keller 1990, 
Simonin and Ruth 1998, Levin and Levin 1996, Jaju, Joiner and Reddy 2006, 
Völckner and Sattler 2006). Since it is unlikely to measure these two variables 
using financial statements and accounting documents (e.g. brand equity value 
increase may not be documented in Ukrainian B2B companies), they were 
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measured using subjective scales. By introducing two dependent variables it is 
possible to measure brand spillover effect on both sides of buyer-supplier 
relationship. Hence, all parts of the dyad are analyzed. 
To be more precise, seven-point Likert scale was chosen to evaluate a cluster of 
attitudes. Likert scale is an ordinal scale format that indicates the cognitive part of 
respondents’ attitude (Shiu et al. 2009). The choice of a seven-point scale was 
approved by the fact that it allows to measure items with more accurate variations 
compared to four- or five-point scales. 
In this study seven-point scale anchored from 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 7 = 
“Strongly agree”. The question all participants were asked to respond was: “To 
what extend do you agree with the following statements about the impact of the 
relationship with partner firm on your own company brand”. In order to measure 
brand spillover effect on partner firm, respondents were offered to evaluate the 
same items statements, but with respect to partner firm (items are with PF prefix 
added). All items for the dependent variables are presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Questionnaire items for brand spillover effect on focal (partner) firm in B2B relationships 
 
Item  Item statement Item developed and modified from 
BrandSpillOver1 
It has improved my 
company’s (partner firm's) 
reputation among 
customers 
Modified from Mayer 2006, Chun 2005, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009 
BrandSpillOver2 
It has added value to my 
company’s (partner firm's) 
brand equity 
Based on Jaju, Joiner and Reddy 2006 
BrandSpillOver3 
It has made my company’s 
(partner firm's) brand more 
visible 
Based on Aaker and Keller 1990 
BrandSpillOver4 
It has increased the brand 
awareness of my company 
(partner firm) 
Völckner and Sattler 2006 
BrandSpillOver5 
It has benefited to the 
efficiency of company’s 
(partner firm's) other 
business relationships 
New, somewhat based on  Gosh and John 2005 
BrandSpillOver6 
It has increased my 
company’s (partner firm's) 
brand attitude 
Simonin and Ruth 1998, Jaju, Joiner and Reddy 
2006 
BrandSpillOver7 
(Reversed score) 
It has a negative impact on 
my company’s (partner 
firm's) brand familiarity 
Simonin and Ruth 1998, Levin and Levin 1996, 
Jaju, Joiner and Reddy 2006 
BrandSpillOver8 
My company’s (partner 
firm's) corporate brand 
image has benefited from 
this relationship 
New 
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The resulting evaluations were equally weighted and loaded directly to two brand 
spillover effect dependent variables (using factor analysis). Chronbach’s alpha test 
were conducted to analyze whether both focal and partner firm measures were 
highly correlated and could be joined into two variables. Note that item number 7 
has a reversed scaling. Therefore, it will be recoded as follows: 1=7, 2=6, 3=5, 
4=4, 5=3, 6=2, 7=1. 
3.6.2 Measurement of independent variables 
In this study’s model independent variables are: governance form choice (formal 
and relational), reputation of focal and partner companies, company’s resources 
and contract design capabilities. The measurement scales were developed on the 
basis of previously used scales in respective studies. Some of the items were 
newly introduced based on the discussions with my thesis supervisor Jon Sande. 
3.6.2.1 Governance form choice 
Influence of governance form choice was measured using two dimensions. The 
first one, formal governance dimension was measured using five-point scale. 
Participants were offered to indicate how detailed they specify contract terms in 
their companies on a scale, where 1 = “Not specified”, 2 = “General specifications 
with no details”, while the next three points had a common headline “Contract 
specification of details is” with 3 = “Low”, 4 = “Medium” and 5 = “High” (see 
Table 3.2 for statements formulation). The scale was adopted from the measures 
in studies by Lusch and Brown (1996), Grandori and Furlotti (2011).  
Table 3.2 Questionnaire items for formal governance dimension 
Item  Item statement 
Item developed and 
modified from 
Form1 Performance goals Grandori and Furlotti 2011 
Form2 Parties’ tasks (including production, delivery etc.) Grandori and Furlotti 2011 
Form3 Monitoring, audit, quality control New 
Form4 Information sharing obligations New 
Form5 Rights to overtake particular decisions Grandori and Furlotti 2011 
Form6 Property rights (technology possession rights, right to 
obtain or use income etc.) 
Grandori and Furlotti 2011 
Form7 Legal consequences of contract breach Lusch and Brown 1996 
Form8 Consequences and procedures of handling unexpected 
events  
Lusch and Brown 1996 
Form9 Procedures of managing conflicting situations Lusch and Brown 1996 
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The second dimension, relational governance, was measured using seven-point 
scale, where 1 = “Completely inaccurate description” and 7 = “Completely 
accurate description”. By using this scale respondents had to indicate the extent to 
which the statements from Table 3.3 describe their company’s relation with a 
partner firm. To measure relational governance choice, three basic dimensions 
were chosen for analysis: flexibility, information sharing and solidarity. The 
scales for this dimensions were adapted from Heide and John (1992), Anita and 
Frazier (2001), Sande (2007) and Ivens and Blois (2004).  
Table 3.3 Questionnaire items for relational governance dimension: flexibility, information sharing, 
solidarity, trust and reliance 
Item  Item statement Item developed and modified from 
 Flex1 
Parties are expected to be able to make 
adjustments during B2B relationship to 
cope with changing circumstances 
 Anita and Frazier 2001, Heide and 
John 1992, Ivens and Blois 2004, 
Sande 2007 
Flex2 
Parties are eager to work out new deal in 
case of any unexpected situation rather 
than holding to the previous relationship 
conditions 
Anita and Frazier 2001, Heide and 
John 1992, Ivens and Blois 2004, 
Sande 2007, Lusch and Brown 1996 
Flex3 Partner relationships can be characterized 
as flexible in response to external changes 
Anita and Frazier 2001, Heide and 
John 1992, Sande 2007, Lusch and 
Brown 1996 
Infosh1 Parties share information that might be 
interesting/useful for another party 
Anita and Frazier 2001, Heide and 
John 1992, Sande 2007 
Infosh2 Information is frequently shared and on 
the informal basis  
Anita and Frazier 2001, Heide and 
John 1992, Sande 2007, Ivens and 
Blois 2004 
Infosh3 The parties provide proprietary 
information if it can help the other party 
Anita and Frazier 2001, Heide and 
John 1992, Sande 2007 
Infosh4 
The parties keep each other informed 
about events or changes that may affect 
the other party 
Anita and Frazier 2001, Heide and 
John 1992, Sande 2007, Ivens and 
Blois 2004 
Solid1 
Problems that arise in the course of this 
B2B relationship are treated by the parties 
as joint rather than individual 
responsibilities 
Anita and Frazier 2001, Heide and 
John 1992, Ivens and Blois 2004, 
Sande 2007 
 Solid2 
The parties are committed to 
improvements that may benefit the 
relationship as a whole, and not only the 
individual parties 
Anita and Frazier 2001, Heide and 
John 1992, Ivens and Blois 2004, 
Sande 2007 
Solid3 The parties in this B2B relationship do not 
mind owing each other favors 
Anita and Frazier 2001, Heide and 
John 1992, Ivens and Blois 2004, 
Sande 2007 
Trust This B2B relationship is highly relied on 
trust among parties 
New 
Reliance1 
My company highly depends on the 
performance of the partner firm 
New 
Reliance2 
It is important for my company to have 
joint relational investments with the 
partner company 
New 
Reliance3 
The relationship with this partner 
company is hard to substitute with another 
potential B2B partner 
 New 
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Furthermore, new items were developed to test the effect of trust and reliance as a 
part of relational governance (Table 3.3). 
3.6.2.2 Reputation 
Reputation (either focal or partner’s firm) measurement was based on the 
discussions of corporate reputation and measurements previously used by Chun 
(2005), Walsh and Beatty (2007), Diermeier and Trepanier (2009) and Fortune 
AMAC reputation scale.  
Table 3.4 Questionnaire items for reputation measurement 
Item  Item statement Item developed and modified from 
ProdServ1 
The company offers high quality 
products and services 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
ProdServ2 
The company offers products and 
services that are good value for money 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
ProdServ3 
The company stands behind its 
products and services 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
LeadVision1 The company has excellent leadership 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
LeadVision2 
The company recognizes and take 
advantages of market opportunities 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
LeadVision3 
The company has defined a vision for 
its future 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
WorkplEnv1 The company is well managed 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
WorkplEnv2 
The company looks like an excellent 
place to work 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
WorkplEnv3 
The company’s employees are treated 
well 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
SocResp1 The company is socially responsible 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
SocResp2 
The company is environmentally 
friendly 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
FinancPerf1 
The company tends to outperform its 
competitors 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
FinancPerf2 The company is financially sound 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
FinancPerf3 
The company have strong prospects for 
future growth 
Chun 2005, Walsh and Beatty 2007, 
Diermeier and Trepanier 2009, 
Fortune AMAC 
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The seven-point scale was used where 1 = “Totally Disagree” and 7 = “Totally 
Agree”. Items are presented in Table 3.4. Same item statements were used both 
for focal company’s reputation measurement and for partner one. They were 
distinct by the prefix “PF” added to the partner firm’s measurement item (e.g. 
ProdServPF1, LeadVisionPF2 etc.). 
Additionally, in line with Jaju, Joiner and Reddy (2006) measurements, 
participants had to rate brand familiarity of both partner and their own companies 
among stakeholder, which is also an indicator of reputation as if both brands are 
highly familiar (in other words, they fit), then the interorganizational relationship 
should be rated equally. Otherwise, if one brand is more well-known it can be 
dominating in the relationship and, as a result be the one who causes greater 
spillover effect. These items (StholdFamiliar_Foc and StholdFamiliar_PF 
respectively) were measured using seven-point scale with 1 = “Unfamiliar” and 7 
= “Highly Familiar”. 
In order to measure reputation of a partner’s firm, participants were offered to 
evaluate whether they will recommend their partner firm as a good business 
partner. This item (RecomPartner) was anchored in a seven-point scale where 1 = 
“Definitely will not recommend” and 7 = “Definitely will recommend”. 
Moreover, Diermeier and Trepanier (2009) argue that while measuring 
companies’ reputation, customers’ opinion should be evaluated as well. For this 
reason, another scale was introduced to measure both focal and partner 
companies’ reputation. Scale items are presented in Table 3.5.  
Table 3.5 Questionnaire items for reputation (customer perception) 
Item  Item statement 
Item developed and 
modified from 
CustSat Customers find company’s performance satisfiable New, based on Chun 2005 
CustTrust Customers trust your company New, based on Chun 2005 
CustLoyl Customers are loyal to your company New, based on Chun 2005 
CustWOM 
Customers spread positive word of mouth about your 
company 
New, based on Chun 2005 
CustFeel Customers have a good feeling about the company New, based on Chun 2005 
CustAdm Customers admire and respect the company New, based on Chun 2005 
Most of them were developed on the basis of corporate reputation measurement 
analysis by Chun 2005 with slight adjustments. Seven-point Likert scale was used 
with 1 point = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree”. Like in the 
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abovementioned case, same item statements were used both for focal firm 
measurement and partner one (with the item prefix PF in the latter case). 
3.6.2.3  Companies’ resources 
Company’s resources variable was measured using seven-point Likert scale where 
1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree”. Respondents were asked to 
what extent they agree with the statements presented in Table 3.6. This variable 
was measured using three dimensions - technological, end-consumer and supply 
chain resources – previously discussed by Gosh and John (1999). 
Table 3.6 Questionnaire items for company’s resources construct 
Item  Item statement 
Item developed and 
modified from 
Tech1 My company obtains unique equipment 
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
Tech2 My company uses innovative processes 
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
Tech3 The company is active in gaining patents 
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
Tech4 The company invests heavily in R&D 
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
EndCons1 I perceive brand equity of my company as high 
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
EndCons2 Company’s customers are loyal  
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
EndCons3 My company has large market share 
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
SupChain1 
My company’s suppliers acquire high 
switching costs 
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
SupChain2 Supply chain partners are trustworthy 
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
SupChain3 Relationships with trading partners are reliable 
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
SupChain4 Channel partners cooperation is high 
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
SupChain5 
My company has sustainable relationship with 
channel partners 
New, based on Gosh and 
John 1999 
 
3.6.2.4 Contract design capabilities  
Contract design capabilities were measured in accordance to Weber and Mayer 
(2005) and Argyres and Mayer (2007) studies. First, participants had to estimate 
their level of experience in designing and negotiating contracts on a seven-point 
scale, where 1 = “Low experienced” and 7 = “High experienced”. Next, contract 
capabilities were presented as role specificities and knowledge management items 
in Table 3.7. Items were anchored in the seven-point Likert scales where 1 = 
“Totally disagree” and 7 = “Totally Agree”. 
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Table 3.7 Questionnaire items for contracting capabilities: Role specificity and Knowledge 
management 
Item  Item statement 
Item developed and modified 
from 
Rolespec1 
Specific roles are defined to employees 
at each step of contracting process in 
our company 
Based on discussions in Weber 
and Mayer 2005, Argyres and 
Mayer 2007 
Rolespec2 
Each party involved in designing and 
negotiating contracts knows its 
responsibilities 
Based on discussions in Weber 
and Mayer 2005, Argyres and 
Mayer 2007 
Rolespec3 
Employees participating in contract 
designing are the same as those 
participating in contract negotiating 
Based on discussions in Weber 
and Mayer 2005, Argyres and 
Mayer 2007 
Knman1 
Specific knowledge sharing process is 
managed well during contracting 
processes 
Based on discussions in Weber 
and Mayer 2005, Argyres and 
Mayer 2007 
Knman2 
Knowledge resource allocation in my 
company depends on the exchange 
requirements (different professionals 
can be involved with regards to the 
specific area of contracting) 
Based on discussions in Weber 
and Mayer 2005, Argyres and 
Mayer 2007 
Knman3 
Managers, lawyers and engineers of my 
company successfully manage trade-
offs for different types of contractual 
provisions 
Based on discussions in Weber 
and Mayer 2005, Argyres and 
Mayer 2007 
3.6.3 Control variables 
The choice of governance form may be influenced by variety of factors. In this 
study three classical transaction costs economics variables – relational specific 
investments, market uncertainty and performance measurement problems – will 
be included as control variables. In addition, due to the specific B2B market 
characteristics, it was decided to control for the influence of institutional and legal 
environment. Finally, companies’ size, turnover, country of performance, B2B 
relationship duration and respondents’ employment duration were measured to 
provide more detailed characteristics of a sample. 
3.6.3.1 Institutional and legal environment 
In this thesis, I decided to control for the possible influence of institutional and 
legal environment on brand spillover effect. Its items are presented in Table 3.8. 
Participants were offered a seven-point Likert scales with 1 = “Totally disagree” 
and 7 = “Totally Agree”. Items were newly developed on the basis of general 
knowledge of macroeconomic principles and the role of vulnerable and efficient 
institutional and legal environment. Reliability and validity tests will be 
performed to check the efficiency of these items. Note that statements with 
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indexes 3, 5, 6 and 8 have reversed scaling. Thus, they will be recoded as follows: 
1=7, 2=6, 3=5, 4=4, 5=3, 6=2, 7=1. 
Table 3.8 Questionnaire items for institutional and legal environment 
Item  Item statement 
Item developed 
and modified from 
ILEnv1 My company’s industry is heavily controlled by institutions New 
ILEnv2 
Market legal regulations are efficient New 
ILEnv3 The level of corruption is high in our industry New 
ILEnv4 Legal institutions positively contribute to contracts 
enforcement 
New 
ILEnv5 Legal institutions performance is volatile New 
ILEnv6 I perceive institutional environment as constricting New 
ILEnv7 The courts performance in resolving business conflicts is 
trustworthy 
New 
ILEnv8 
Institutional environment is vulnerable in the market New 
ILEnv9 Legal system effectively helps to solve uncertainties in B2B 
relationships 
New 
ILEnv10 Institutional and legal environment is perceived as highly 
regulatory 
New 
 
3.6.3.2 Relationship-specific investments 
To measure relationship-specific investments the seven-item scale adapted from 
Jap and Ganesan (2000) and Rokkan, Heide and Wathne (2003) was used with 1 = 
“Strongly Disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree”. Participants were asked to indicate 
whether they agree with the statements presented in Table 3.9 concerning 
relational specific investments generated between their company and a partner 
firm they were previously evaluating. 
Table 3.9 Questionnaire items for Relational specific investments 
Item  Item statement Item developed and modified from 
 RSInv1 
My company has made a significant 
investment in relationship-specific 
equipment (tailored to this particular B2B 
relationship only) 
Heide and John 1990, Jap and 
Ganesan 2000, Rokkan, Heide and 
Wathne 2003 
 RSInv2 
My company has spent a specific amount of 
non-refundable money in this particular 
interorganizational relationship 
New, based on Rokkan, Heide and 
Wathne 2003 
 RSInv3 
The company has invested time and energy  
in training and qualifying in order to adjust 
to this particular B2B partnership 
Anderson 1985, Heide and John 
1990, Rokkan, Heide and Wathne 
2003 
  RSInv4 
My company has made comprehensive 
investments to restructure and integrate 
production facilities with partner’s ones 
Buvik and John 2000, Heide and 
John 1990, Rokkan, Heide and 
Wathne 2003 
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3.6.3.3 Market uncertainty 
Buvik and John (2000) offer the four-item scale to measure market uncertainty 
variable, which was adapted for this study and are presented in Table 3.10. To 
make all measures more comparable, a seven-point scale was chosen in this 
analysis where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree”. To be more 
precise, participants were asked to evaluate environment in which their company 
is operating. 
Table 3.10 Questionnaire items for market uncertainty 
Item  Item statement 
Item developed and 
modified from 
 Mrkubc1 My company’s industry is highly innovative Buvik and John 2000 
Mrkubc2 
The demand for end products in our industry varies 
continually 
Buvik and John 2000 
Mrkubc3 
My company’s main competitors are constantly 
developing new products and invest in product 
improvements 
Buvik and John 2000 
Mrkubc4 My companies main product/service has short life cycle Buvik and John 2000 
 Mrkubc5 The economic trends in market are very vulnerable Buvik and John 2000 
3.6.3.4 Performance measurement problems 
The three item scale previously developed by Mooi and Ghosh (2010) was used to 
examine performance measurement ambiguity. The items are presented in Table 
3.11. Participants had to evaluate their partner’s performance measurement 
challenges using seven-point scale, where 1 = “Very easy”, 7 = “Very difficult”. 
Note that in this case reverse scaling was used.  
Table 3.11 Questionnaire items for performance measurement ambiguity 
Item  Item statement 
Item developed and 
modified from 
 MA1 
It is difficult to evaluate the quality of product/service 
at the time our partner firm delivers it 
Mooi and Ghosh 2010 
MA2 
It is difficult to compare this product/service to similar 
ones 
Mooi and Ghosh 2010 
 MA3 
It is difficult to compare price/quality ratio of potential 
partner’s product/service 
Mooi and Ghosh 2010 
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3.6.3.5 Perceived fit 
In line with Jaju, Joiner and Reddy (2006) research, participants were asked to 
evaluate perceived fit between focal and partner companies on a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 = “Low fit” to 7 = “High fit”. 
3.6.3.6 Additional characteristics variables 
In addition to aforementioned control variables, several other factors were 
measures to enable more accurate sample characteristics analysis. Company’s size 
was measured by the following question: “Please, indicate how many employees 
there are in your company” with an answer option: “Approximately ________ 
employees.” Participants were also asked how many years they have being 
working in their company (in years and months) and how long their company has 
been in the relationship with the partner firm they were evaluating (employment 
duration and relationship duration variables). Moreover, company’s value was 
measured by the question “Please, approximately indicate your company’s 
turnover in 2012” in UAH. Later this amount was recalculated in US dollars. 
Finally, business market was measure by asking participants to tick whether their 
company was operating nationally or internationally. 
3.7 Measure development 
At the beginning of data collection, to ensure validity of all measures, interviews 
with participants were organized. Summarizing all suggestions and discussions, 
the following problems were identified. 
First, some translations of English terms in Ukrainian were found confusing. To 
avoid that, either short descriptions of the terms or the English equivalent were 
provided in the brackets. Moreover, some questions were understood differently 
from what was originally intended. Thus, some formulations were explained in 
slightly different terms to add clarity. Furthermore, it was argued whether the 
question about turnover can be misinterpreted as an attempt to uncover some 
confidential information (due to cultural specificities of Ukrainian business). 
Thus, while asking about company’s sales it was specified that that information 
will be used only for value estimation. There were also some concerns that due to 
unstable political situation in Ukraine measurement of institutional and legal 
environment might be slightly inaccurate. Still, as subjective opinions are 
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measured in this research, particular participants’ judgments are valuable. Finally, 
the confidentiality problem was raised. It was suggested that in the case of 
conducting a study among Ukrainian managers it is better to point out that 
everything is completely confidential both in the cover letter and in the initial 
emails to potential informants. Such actions may increase willingness to 
participate in this study and overall response rate as well. 
Furthermore, to verify and assess the research variables Chronbach’s alpha test, 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were conducted with respective 
reliability and validity tests. All items with significant cross-loadings, poor 
reliability and validity were excluded from analysis.  
3.8 Data collection 
The data for this thesis was collected by online survey using Qualtrics software. It 
is user friendly both for researchers and informants. Moreover, it allows flexibility 
in questions designing and lets researcher keep track of and manage responses 
(including sending reminders and “thank you” letters). 
As the sample consisted of managers, CEOs and other business people, the survey 
completion should not take much time and efforts. For this reason, it was 
estimated, that the approximate questionnaire completion time should not exceed 
20 minutes. Moreover, an option of saving response and continuing later was 
introduced to guarantee higher convenience for participants. 
As it was discussed above, data collection process started with interviewing two 
respondents, who in addition to actual survey completion were asked to estimate 
general efficiency and clarity of the formulated questions as well as the 
appropriate application of translated marketing terms. 
The initial key informants’ contacts were found through ‘B2B Ukraine’ group on 
Linkedin. They were contacted via email and asked whether they agree to 
participate in this research or whether they can refer to other personnel who can 
become potential respondents. The template for the primary emails was designed 
and was used during all further recruiting process. 
Using the features of snowball sampling technique, all respondents were asked to 
provide contacts of potential participants either in the last question of the survey 
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or by answering to the email they get. It was mentioned that providing contact 
information was strictly voluntarily. Nevertheless, it would greatly help this study. 
By initially contacting key informants or potential respondents before sending 
them link through web-based survey software it was possible to ensure that 
participants are indeed representatives of the target population. Moreover, it 
enabled getting their personal agreement to participate in this research. While 
using such individual approach it was possible to provide more detailed 
information about this study upon request. It’s worth mentioning that mostly 
people reacted positively towards doing new study of B2B relationships in 
Ukraine. Though, there were people who responded skeptically to the fact that this 
is a student research for master thesis. Additionally, some of the potential 
respondents were sharing concerns towards unwillingness of possible company’s 
confidential information disclosure. Those concerns were settled by a promise of 
complete confidentiality and by providing clarifications that mainly their personal 
opinion is measured in this study. 
Furthermore, as emails with personal survey links were sent right after reaching 
agreements with potential respondents, it was assumed that this would increase 
the felling of more direct personal involvement in the study (“each response 
matters”) and the feeling of responsibility to fill in the survey. The latter was 
predicted to increase survey overall response rate. 
Each participant was promised to get a short report, which will sum up the 
collected data so that they could compare themselves to the average responses. 
The cover letter and the questionnaire, which was distributed to participants is 
provided in appendix 1 (English version). 
Using snowball sampling technique the overall number of 273 key informants and 
their referrals were contacted, 126 respondents agreed to participate in the 
research, while 147 persons refused to participate due to the lack of time, lack of 
knowledge in the researched topic or due to vacation time. Respondents were 
recruited mostly from the following industries: IT and communications, finance 
and banking, consulting, logistics etc. 
In total, 126 emails with personal survey links were sent. If respondents were 
staying inactive for four or five days they were sent reminder letters. Overall, 43 
respondents received from one to three reminders. Three respondents after starting 
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the survey declined to complete it, stating in their emails that they believe to be 
outside target group. Out of 126 links sent, 86 complete responses were collected. 
Out of 40 respondents, who did not complete the questionnaire, five sent an email 
explaining their decline with a lack of time. 
Thus, the overall sample of 86 responses was collected and recoded into 
numerical values (through the Qualtrics web-based software) in order to proceed 
with statistical analysis. 
4.0 Data examination and results 
In this part data analysis and results of measurements will be discussed. Initially, 
all data from Qualtrics was imported to SPSS to be checked for system missing, 
correct naming and labeling of measures. Next, all reversed-scale items were 
recoded to be able to proceed with further analysis. In the following paragraphs 
sample characteristics and descriptive statistics will be presented. Next, reliability, 
normality, construct validity of dataset and theoretical model will be checked, and 
factor analyses will be conducted. Finally, regression analysis will be performed 
to test theoretical model and its hypotheses. 
4.1 Sample characteristics 
In addition to the main model measurements, several supplementary variables 
were included in the analysis to give the broader characteristics of a sample. 
Respondents indicated that the size of their companies ranged from 2 to 167,000 
employees. Moreover, the annual turnover of the focal companies ranged from 
0.01 to 640000 million UAH
1
. Participants reported that their employment 
duration ranged from 1 year to 21 years with mean value of 4.27 years (Table 
4.1).  
Table 4.1 Characteristics of the focal company 
  Minimum Maximum Mean 
Employment duration in years 1,00 21,00 4,2727 
Size of focal company 
(number of employers) 
2,00 167000,00 8201,9647 
Value of focal company (in 
UAH) 
10000,00 640000000000,00 11167711445,9016 
                                                 
1
 Official exchange rate of UAH to NOW is: 1 UAH = 0.73 NOK (www.xe.com, 20.07.13) 
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Furthermore, respondents were asked to indicate the market their companies were 
operating in. Table 4.2 shows that out of 86 informants, 27.9% indicated that their 
companies operate only nationally, while 72.1% do their business on international 
markets. In the case of evaluating partner firms, respondents reported that 54.7% 
of companies worked only in national market, while 45.3% - in international one. 
Table 4.2 Characteristics of business market of focal company 
  Frequency Percent 
Business market of focal firm National 24 27,9 
International 62 72,1 
Total 86 100,0 
Business market of partner 
firm 
National 47 54,7 
International 39 45,3 
Total 86 100,0 
Next, respondents indicated that the length of cooperation between their 
companies and partner firms ranged from half a year to 20 years, with mean value 
of relationship duration equal to 4.81 years. The annual turnover of partner firms 
varied from 1000 UAH to 310000 million UAH. The size of partner firms ranged 
from 3 to 400,000 employees (table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 Characteristics of the partner firm 
  Minimum Maximum Mean 
Relationaship Duration in years ,50 20,00 4,8140 
Size of partner company (number of 
employees) 
3,00 400000,00 16688,1392 
Value of partner company (in UAH) 1000,00 310000000000,00 10916462102,3256 
 
Finally, respondents were asked to evaluate perceived fit between focal and 
partner companies. The results show that the mean value of fit between companies 
is 4.91. Considering that the seven-point scale was used, respondents generally 
answered that companies are more likely to have high fit level. This measurement 
should be taken into consideration while analyzing brand spillover effect. 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis requirements 
Descriptive statistics is used to give an overview of all collected data and to make 
judgments of variation in the data. Table 4.4 reveals that most of variables have 
mean values higher than 4. Considering that the seven-point scale was used 
(except for the formal governance measures where five-point scale was implied), 
it is possible to conclude that respondents were mostly agreeing with the 
statements. Different results were discovered in Institutional and legal 
environment assessment – respondents tend to more likely disagree with the 
statements showing generally more negative evaluation and distrust to courts and 
institutions in Ukraine. Moreover, mean values for technology companies’ 
resources and relationship specific investments items were lower than 4. Still, 
those variables have standard deviation exceeding 2, which indicates large 
variance of responses. 
To be more precise, standard deviation coefficient from Table 4.4 indicates how 
much the responses vary from their mean value. In this case, standard deviation 
does not generally exceed the value of 2 (with the exceptions discussed above). 
That means that almost all responses somewhat correspond to the mean value. 
Further, while implying multivariate analysis there are some assumptions which 
should be met in order to proceed with further estimations. Thus, normality tests 
and the problems of missing values issue will be discussed in the following. 
According to Hair et al. (2010), assumption of normality in multivariate analysis 
refers to the correspondence of data distribution shape to normal distribution 
(benchmark). If the distribution shape differs largely from normal, then neither F-
test statistics nor t-test one can be used in the analysis. The shape of distribution is 
estimated through skewness and kurtosis measures. Skewness relates to the 
symmetry of distribution shape and indicates the tendency of the deviations from 
the mean to be large in one direction (Malhotra 2010). At the same time kurtosis 
is a measure of the relative of peakedness or flatness of the curve of distribution. 
The distribution is normal when both skewness and kurtosis are equal to zero 
(Hair et al. 2010). Nevertheless, such measures happen rarely. Thus, there is the 
rule of thumb which indicates that only values outside [-1; 1] range are considered 
substantially skewed. Extreme skewness is present when a skewness characteristic 
exceeds 3 (Kline 2004, Hair et al. 2010).  
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Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics, skewness and kurtosis 
  Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
ProdServ1 1 7 6,12 1,121 -1,722 4,283 
ProdServ2 1 7 5,70 1,256 -,972 1,060 
ProdServ3 1 7 6,23 1,124 -1,952 4,988 
LeadVision1 1 7 5,28 1,307 -,957 ,753 
LeadVision2 1 7 5,20 1,454 -,777 ,039 
LeadVision3 1 7 5,30 1,638 -1,012 ,538 
WorkplEnv1 1 7 5,30 1,347 -,928 ,732 
WorkplEnv2 1 7 5,27 1,401 -,572 -,158 
WorkplEnv3 1 7 5,55 1,484 -1,164 1,126 
SocResp1 1 7 5,38 1,595 -1,011 ,414 
SocResp2 1 7 5,16 1,714 -,604 -,627 
FinancPerf1 1 7 5,94 1,268 -1,873 4,332 
FinancPerf2 1 7 5,52 1,272 -,897 ,933 
FinancPerf3 1 7 5,42 1,376 -1,047 1,326 
CustSat 1 7 5,52 1,145 -,564 1,272 
CustTrust 3 7 5,76 ,932 -,381 -,247 
CustLoyl 3 7 5,65 1,060 -,590 ,025 
CustWOM 2 7 5,44 1,144 -,361 -,441 
CustFeel 1 7 5,41 1,172 -,668 1,000 
CustAdm 1 7 5,16 1,336 -,669 ,410 
StholdFamiliar_Foc 1 7 5,70 1,406 -1,053 ,624 
ProdServPF1 3 7 5,60 ,924 -,223 -,324 
ProdServPF2 4 7 5,69 ,949 -,088 -,943 
ProdServPF3 3 7 5,67 1,068 -,677 ,062 
LeadVisionPF1 1 7 5,24 1,363 -,599 ,145 
LeadVisionPF2 1 7 5,55 1,271 -,881 ,885 
LeadVisionPF3 1 7 5,48 1,281 -,858 ,822 
WorkplEnv1PF1 1 7 5,43 1,288 -,923 1,142 
WorkplEnv1PF2 2 7 5,00 1,256 -,073 -,477 
WorkplEnv1PF3 2 7 4,98 1,422 -,033 -,842 
SocRespPF1 1 7 4,86 1,416 -,155 -,506 
SocRespPF2 1 7 4,60 1,566 ,102 -,961 
FinancPerfPF1 1 7 5,98 1,062 -1,459 4,244 
FinancPerfPF2 1 7 5,62 1,170 -,829 1,253 
FinancPerfPF3 3 7 5,51 1,145 -,246 -,880 
CustSatPF 2 7 5,38 1,065 -,587 1,061 
CustTrustPF 4 7 5,55 ,903 -,142 -,715 
CustLoylPF 3 7 5,35 ,967 ,041 -,653 
CustWOM_PF 1 7 5,01 1,269 -,305 ,018 
CustFeelPF 2 7 5,15 1,143 -,352 -,148 
CustAdmPF 2 7 5,05 1,197 -,133 -,503 
RecomPartner 1 7 5,80 1,206 -1,298 2,670 
StholdFamiliar_PF 1 7 5,38 1,416 -,611 -,130 
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BrandSpillOver1 1 7 5,29 1,345 -,521 ,229 
BrandSpillOver2 1 7 5,07 1,429 -,571 ,062 
BrandSpillOver3 1 7 5,12 1,522 -,570 -,238 
BrandSpillOver4 1 7 4,98 1,645 -,595 -,451 
BrandSpillOver5 1 7 5,14 1,543 -,613 -,148 
BrandSpillOver6 1 7 4,86 1,603 -,522 -,332 
BrandSpillOver7 1 7 6,31 1,043 -2,193 7,048 
BrandSpillOver8 1 7 4,88 1,523 -,397 -,330 
BrandSpillOverPF1 1 7 4,93 1,404 -,474 ,090 
BrandSpillOverPF2 1 7 4,84 1,556 -,471 -,377 
BrandSpillOverPF3 1 7 4,92 1,603 -,619 -,200 
BrandSpillOverPF4 1 7 4,98 1,557 -,535 -,327 
BrandSpillOverPF5 1 7 4,92 1,654 -,475 -,479 
BrandSpillOverPF6 1 7 4,92 1,551 -,598 ,018 
BrandSpillOverPF7 2 7 6,35 1,114 -1,934 3,374 
BrandSpillOverPF8 1 7 4,99 1,475 -,565 -,012 
Perceived Fit 1 7 4,91 1,508 -,724 -,209 
Form1 1 5 4,02 1,051 -1,104 ,566 
Form2 1 5 4,48 ,904 -2,082 4,479 
Form3 1 5 4,01 1,068 -,972 ,203 
Form4 1 5 4,01 1,163 -1,034 ,045 
Form5 1 5 4,01 1,153 -1,061 ,144 
Form6 1 5 4,13 1,282 -1,412 ,774 
Form7 1 5 4,29 1,039 -1,645 2,245 
Form8 1 5 3,97 1,100 -1,015 ,325 
Form9 1 5 3,71 1,216 -,584 -,736 
Flex1 2 7 5,53 1,205 -,766 ,408 
Flex2 1 7 4,24 1,728 -,066 -,981 
Flex3 2 7 5,37 1,284 -,802 ,366 
Infosh1 1 7 5,60 1,366 -1,147 1,280 
Infosh2 1 7 5,03 1,818 -,811 -,238 
Infosh3 1 7 4,73 1,690 -,750 -,061 
Infosh4 2 7 5,48 1,370 -1,061 ,396 
Solid1 2 7 4,93 1,396 -,564 -,375 
Solid2 2 7 5,23 1,352 -,436 -,476 
Solid3 1 7 4,24 1,673 -,351 -,725 
Trust 1 7 5,55 1,531 -1,066 ,370 
Reliance1 1 7 4,28 1,740 -,277 -,807 
Reliance2 1 7 3,13 2,011 ,336 -1,308 
Reliance3 1 7 3,87 1,963 ,030 -1,278 
ILEnv1 1 7 4,64 1,915 -,229 -1,235 
ILEnv2 1 7 3,35 1,622 ,464 -,509 
ILEnv3 1 7 4,01 1,985 -,137 -1,224 
ILEnv4 1 7 3,24 1,422 ,485 ,344 
ILEnv5 1 7 3,00 1,557 ,613 -,345 
ILEnv6 1 7 3,13 1,651 ,514 -,653 
ILEnv7 1 6 2,58 1,350 ,455 -,677 
ILEnv8 1 7 3,17 1,581 ,456 -,367 
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ILEnv9 1 6 2,70 1,293 ,586 -,478 
ILEnv10 1 7 4,37 1,609 -,023 -,760 
Tech1 1 7 3,97 2,209 -,029 -1,424 
Tech2 1 7 5,20 1,629 -,879 ,169 
Tech3 1 7 3,37 2,249 ,518 -1,232 
Tech4 1 7 3,91 2,304 ,093 -1,514 
EndCons1 1 7 5,22 1,837 -1,011 ,159 
EndCons2 1 7 5,09 1,316 -,619 ,189 
EndCons3 1 7 4,98 1,815 -,545 -,774 
SupChain1 1 7 3,93 1,651 ,033 -,618 
SupChain2 2 7 5,26 ,996 -,246 ,033 
SupChain3 2 7 5,28 1,113 -,577 ,379 
SupChain4 2 7 5,13 1,166 -,346 -,426 
SupChain5 1 7 5,21 1,228 -,646 ,693 
Rolespec1 1 7 4,50 1,734 -,409 -,741 
Rolespec2 1 7 5,24 1,388 -,937 ,728 
Rolespec3 2 7 4,86 1,504 -,500 -,720 
Knman1 1 7 4,93 1,501 -,605 -,378 
Knman2 1 7 5,24 1,414 -,728 ,244 
Knman3 1 7 5,03 1,537 -,617 -,212 
RSInv1 1 7 3,38 2,047 ,281 -1,300 
RSInv2 1 7 3,36 1,915 ,281 -1,152 
RSInv3 1 7 4,64 1,801 -,455 -,787 
RSInv4 1 7 3,35 2,068 ,343 -1,331 
Mrkunc1 1 7 4,77 1,753 -,439 -,676 
Mrkunc2 1 7 4,67 1,711 -,384 -,673 
Mrkunc3 1 7 4,72 1,780 -,476 -,864 
Mrkunc4 1 7 3,83 2,042 ,021 -1,407 
Mrkunc5 1 7 5,03 1,655 -,662 -,401 
MA1 1 7 4,45 1,685 -,401 -,711 
MA2 1 7 4,38 1,737 -,269 -1,054 
MA3 1 7 4,48 1,636 -,412 -,652 
 
Table 4.4 indicates that most items skewness absolute measurement is not higher 
than 1. Those which exceed 1 still are lower than extreme measure of 3. Those 
items have somewhat skewed distributions (e.g. ProdServ 1 and 3,  Form 6 and 7 
etc.). Positive kurtosis indicates more peaked distribution, while negative one – 
flatter distribution. The extreme value for kurtosis measurement is 10 (Kline 2004, 
Hair et al. 2010). In this analysis none of the items exceeds extreme value. Still, 
none of the items have kurtosis equal to zero. Thus, their distribution is somewhat 
different from normal one. Hair et al. (2010) point out that in the case of sample 
size lower than 50, significant departures from normality may have negative 
GRA 19003 Master Thesis  02.09.2013 
Page 49 
impact on results. Therefore, having sample larger than N=50 will somewhat 
solve the “nonnormality” problem.  
As in Qualtrics software it is possible to set validation option of forced response 
(respondent cannot proceed without answering the question), none of the main 
items has missing values. Considering that it is possible to proceed with further 
analysis. 
4.3 Primary reliability test – Cronbach’s alpha 
In order to test reliability of the data, I examine Cronbach’s alpha estimates. This 
measure tests internal consistency, meaning that it assesses the level of 
consistency between items which are planned to be summated. According to 
Malhotra (2010) Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient which gives the average of all 
possible split-half coefficients resulting from different scale-splitting types. 
Satisfactory reliability is reached if Cronbach’s alpha is larger than 0.8. If it is in 
the interval between 0.6 and 0.8, some items might be removed to increase alpha 
coefficient. If the coefficient is lower than 0.6 and items reduction does not 
increase it, then the summated scale cannot be constructed based on remaining 
items (Janssens et al. 2008). 
Table 4.5 gives the results of internal consistency. While testing the items of two 
dependent variables (brand spillover effect for focal company and for partner 
one), Cronbach’s alpha showed satisfactory results of 0.917 and 0.935 
respectively. However, while testing reliability in SPSS software it gives 
suggestions of how to increase reliability through items reduction. Thus, in both 
variables removing seventh item will significantly increase construct reliability. 
The seventh item had a reversed scaling, measuring the negative effect of 
relationship on brand familiarity of focal (partner) company (item was recoded 
before analysis). Comparing to other items of these constructs, which were 
measuring the positive effect of B2B relationship, informants might have misread 
the statement. Therefore, these items were removed from analysis. After reduction 
of one item in each dependent variable’s constructs, resulting alpha coefficients 
were 0.935 for focal company and 0.958 for partner firm (with total number of 
items – 7 in each construct). Cronbach’s alpha scores of formal governance was 
also high – 0.905. Still, there was a suggestion that removing of the first item 
(performance goals specifications) will increase reliability to 0.911. The increase 
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of 0.06 is quite low. Moreover, considering the fact that all items for formal 
contracting construct were previously tested in other analyses, it was decided not 
to remove this item. Relational governance construct showed satisfactory 
reliability of 0.826 with no significant suggestions for item reduction.  
Table 4.5 Reliability testing 
Variables Number of items Cronbach's alpha 
BrSpOv 8 0,917 
BrSpOv_reduced 7 0,935 
BrSpOv_PF 8 0,932 
BrSpOv_PF_reduced 7 0,958 
FormGov 9 0,905 
FormGov_reduced 8 0,911 
RelatGov 14 0,826 
Reput_FF 21 0,936 
Reput_FF_reduced 20 0,941 
Reput_PF 22 0,951 
Reput_PF_reduced 21 0,955 
ComRes 12 0,892 
ContrCap 6 0,854 
ContrCap_reduced 5 0,862 
ILEnv 10 0,448 
ILEnv_reduced 6 0,624 
RSpInv 4 0,855 
MrkUnc 5 0,529 
MrkUnc_reduced 4 0,55 
MA 3 0,87 
 
The reliability scores for the reputation of focal and partner firms were 0.936 and 
0.951 respectively. However, removing the items which measured the level of 
brand familiarity among stakeholder in both constructs will increase reputation 
variables reliability to 0.941 and 0.955 respectively. Reliability test for company’s 
resources variable (0.892) and for two control variables – relationship specific 
investments (0.855) and measurement ambiguity (0.870) – showed satisfactory 
results above lower limit. Thus, no item reduction is required. In the case of 
contract capabilities removing first item (RoleSpec1) will increase Cronbach’s 
alpha from 0.854 to 0.862. Cronbach’s alpha score for institutional and legal 
environment construct was below lower limit of 0.6. The reduction of four items 
allows increasing reliability to 0.624. This assumption for items reduction will be 
considered in the following analysis. Nevertheless, removing four items might 
negatively impact the significance of this variable. Finally, one control variable – 
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market uncertainties – showed reliability lower than 0.6. Even reduction of one 
item does not significantly increase alpha coefficient (0.55). Hence, it might be 
not efficient to summate a variable using respective items. 
As a result, all variables except measurement ambiguity show satisfactory 
reliability and, thus, ensure their theoretical concepts. Moreover, all suggestions 
for items reduction will be considered in the following factor analysis. 
4.4 Exploratory factor analysis 
Prior to actually confirming the validity of all measurement models, it was 
decided to explore data first. For this reason exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
was conducted. This type of analysis is used when there is a need to explore the 
consistency of measurements used in the research. EFA gives information about 
how many factors are needed to best represent the data. For this analysis all 
variables should be related to every factor (using factor loading estimates) and the 
factors should be uncorrelated. 
EFA was performed in IBM SPSS Statistics 20 software. To fulfill the 
requirements for sample size in factor analysis (10 respondents to one item, Hair 
et al. 2010) it was decided to run EFA separately for groups of theoretical 
constructs (e.g. dependent variables, reputation variables etc.). Afterwards, all 
constructs were checked for cross-loadings. 
Maximum likelihood method was chosen for extraction with Promax rotation 
method. The latter method allows rotation of factors so, that an item will load high 
on one factor and very low on another (if possible). Firstly, it was tested how 
many factors SPSS will statistically generate (based on eigenvalue equal to 1 
principle). This was done to verify, that constructs are consistent and that 
construct validity is good. Next, based on theoretical model, the exact number of 
factors for each set of variables was manually identified to enable cross-loading 
analysis. Moreover, factor loadings of 0.5 and above were considered as 
significant. 
Analysis of dependent variables measurement items showed that SPSS 
automatically defines variables into two factors. Moreover, each construct has 
significant factor loadings, and no essential cross-loadings were found (appendix 
2 shows results of exploratory factor analysis). 
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Testing two independent latent variables of governance form showed that all 
theoretically predicted items were well described by two factors. However, some 
items (Solid3, Flex2, Flex3, Infosh1) had quite low factor loadings. Some cross-
loadings were present as well. For this reason, both governance constructs should 
be analyzed more carefully. It’s worth mentioning, that choosing other rotation 
types may solve the cross-loading problems. Moreover, as it was discussed earlier, 
these two governance forms may be more complements than substitutes. That 
explains correlation between items that were chosen to measure different 
constructs. Further, testing each of these two constructs separately gave 
satisfactory results in terms of factor loadings in the case of formal governance. 
Relational governance model revealed insignificant factor loadings of Reliance1 
and Flex1 items. Recall, that there was a suggestion to eliminate Flex1 item in 
reliability test above. Thus, these findings should be counted for in the further 
analysis. Similar results were achieved after testing reputation of focal firm and 
partner firm constructs. All factor loadings were significantly high in both 
constructs with the exception of CustSat and FinancPerfPF1 items. However, 
alpha coefficient test has shown that deleting these items from analysis will 
decrease reliability of constructs. Further, cross-loadings were revealed between 
the items of two reputation measures. That might be explained by high correlation 
between items as they are measuring similar constructs and they were formulated 
using similar wording. 
Analysis of institutional and legal environment model showed that four items had 
unsatisfactory factor loadings (ILEnv4, 2, 7 and 9) and one item (ILEnv8) had 
quite low one. Thus, there are reasons to decrease number of items representing 
this construct in future analysis, which is in line with respective reliability test. 
Two of other control variables (relationship-specific investments and 
measurement ambiguity) models were tested against each other. SPSS results 
showed that theoretical items were described by the appropriate constructs with no 
significant cross-loadings. Market uncertainty – had two items (Mrkunc1 and 4) 
which had low factor loadings. Combined with low reliability results, this 
construct should be tested more carefully in further analysis. 
Analyses of all constructs revealed that there are some cross-loadings in this 
model (mostly insignificant, however). It is advised to consider deleting items 
with significant cross-loadings (Hair et al. 2010). Despite this, all items measuring 
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dependent and independent constructs were maintained for further analysis due to 
a fact that most of them were derived from prior research. Moreover, all 
inconsistencies revealed by EFA will be checked using CFA, validity and 
reliability tests. Hence, all insignificant items will be removed. 
4.5 Confirmatory factor analysis 
To test validity of all conceptual variables confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was 
conducted. CFA is used when researcher has theoretically specified the number of 
constructs (factors) and variables (items) which depend on each particular 
construct before actually running statistical analysis (Jöreskog, Sörbom 1993). In 
other words, CFA is used when there is a need to confirm and estimated 
postulated relationships in the data and suggest improvements. There are two 
main assumptions which should be satisfied before conducting CFA. First, 
degrees of freedom should be non-negative. Second, no different parameters 
configuration should give the same theoretical covariance matrix. Both 
assumptions were satisfied. Thus, it is possible to continue with analysis. 
Moreover, CFA is a method of testing validity of measurement model. According 
to Hair et al. (2010), to assess model fit the following estimations should be used: 
χ2 test (p-value greater than 0.05 would suggest good model fit); RMSEA (root 
mean squared error of approximation – should be less than 0.08 to indicate good 
fit); NFI (normed fit index – a model with perfect fit will be close to NFI=1); CFI 
(comparative fit index – higher values indicate better fit). To be more precise, χ2 
test checks whether the observed covariance matrix matches the estimated one 
within sample variance. RMSEA is a modification of χ2 test which helps to 
estimate how well a model fits the population and not just a sample. NFI is a ratio 
of the difference in the χ2 value for the fitted model and a null model divided by 
the χ2 test estimate for it. CFI is an improved measure of NFI (Hair et al. 2010). 
However, Hair et al. (2010) suggest that this cutoff model fit estimations should 
be sensitive towards model characteristics. The latter means that in the case of 
sample size lower than 250 and number of observed variables less than 12 or 
between 12 and 30, p-value is expected to be insignificant or significant even with 
good fit; CFI is expected to be 0.95 or better. With the sample size of N=86, this 
adjustments should be kept in mind. 
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Moreover, factor loadings should be used to assess construct and convergent 
validity. In this study, factor loadings should exceed the level of 0.6 to be kept in 
a measurement construct. 
Single-factor confirmatory factor analysis was performed in Lisrel 9.10 Student 
edition in order to analyze each construct discussed above and their measurement 
items validity. All path diagrams with basic fit measures are presented in the 
appendices (appendix 3). 
While testing two dependent variables constructs (brand spillover effect for focal 
and partner firm) one item was excluded from each construct due to results of 
reliability test discussed above. All factor loadings were significantly high; still, 
models have quite low fit. Lisrel offered suggestions that allowing for correlation 
between items bso3 and bso4 as well as between items bso4 and bso8 for focal 
firm spillover effect construct and between items bsopf1-bsopf2 and bsopf2-
bsopf3 for partner brand spillover effect will increase the goodness of fit of both 
models. Formal governance was initially tested with all theoretical estimates. 
However, two primary items appeared to have low factor loadings. Recalling that 
Cronbach’s alpha test and EFA also suggested item reduction, items with low 
factor loadings were removed from analysis. Resulting measurement model 
showed high and significant factor loadings. However, deleting items did not 
improve model fit. Modification indices showed that the largest improvement of 
fit will take place if the correlation between items from4 and form5, form5 and 
form7 will be opened. 
Relational governance model revealed one item with low factor loadings estimate 
(0.29). Thus, the first flexibility item was deleted from further analysis. Moreover, 
considering the results of EFA and a poor model fit it was decided to separate 
reliance and trust items into a new control construct – Reliance (further used as 
control variable). This new constructed showed that data fit the model well. 
Additionally, all factor loadings except trust item (0.26) were satisfactory high. 
Thus, trust item was removed from analysis. That resulting model showed perfect 
fit through all goodness of fit estimates. The new relational governance construct 
showed low factor loadings estimates for items flex3 at first. After testing model 
without this item, infosh1 appeared to have low factor loadings estimate as well. It 
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was decided to remove these items from the construct, which has increased 
model’s goodness of fit. 
The measurement models for reputation of both focal and partner firms were 
tested through two factors (RepFF, RepFF2, RepPF and RepPF2 respectively) due 
to the fact that Lisrel student addition allows testing only 15 items at once. All 
four constructs showed high factor loadings estimates, but quite poor fit. 
Generally speaking, all constructs measured in this study are rather sophisticated, 
meaning that they are either hard to measure or are analyzing subjective attitude, 
which may depend on different external factors. All these show possible 
limitations of this thesis work. Still, it was decided to keep all reputation 
constructs. 
Both company’s resources and contracting capabilities showed high factor 
loadings estimates with no further item reduction requirements. Companies 
resources model fit would increase, it correlation between Tech1 and SupCh4, 
Tech2 and SupCh5, SupCh2 and SupCh3 will be opened. In the case of 
contracting capabilities measurement construct, overall model fit increases when 
correlation between Rspec2 and Knman2 is allowed. The latter can be explained 
by the fact that both items were measuring close by meaning statements 
concerning responsibilities and knowledge sharing. 
Further, while checking reliability and conducting EFA on Institutional and legal 
environment variable, there was a suggestion to remove 4 items which did not 
appear to describe variation of a construct well enough. Initially, all 10 items 
where tested. Four showed very low factor loadings (-0.0, 0.19, 0.23, 0.25) and 
proved the earlier findings. Thus items ILEnv2, ILEng4, ILEnv7 and ILEnv9 
were deleted from analysis. Respondents were sharing concerns towards unstable 
economic and political situation in Ukraine, which might have resulted in low 
model fit for this construct. Nevertheless, removing items increased the overall 
goodness of fit of this measurement model. Further increase of fit can be reached 
by allowing correlation between ILEnv1 and ILEnv5, ILEnv1 and ILEnv10. 
Measuring control variables relationship-specific investments and measurement 
ambiguity constructs showed perfect model fit and satisfactory factor scores. 
Thus, both constructs were kept in the analysis. Another control variable construct 
– market uncertainty – showed lower model fit, but good factor loadings 
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estimates. Thus, despite unsatisfactory reliability estimates, this construct was 
kept as well. 
It’s worth mentioning that NFI and CFI model fit coefficients (Table 4.6) 
indicated that all measurement models have satisfactory fit. Slightly less level of 
goodness of fit was depicted in market uncertainty construct, while all other 
control constructs (including reliance one) showed perfect fit. However, these 
measures are sensitive to the number of items included in a construct (Hair et al 
2010).  
Table 4.6  NFI and CFI model fit coefficients 
  NFI CFI 
BSO 0,956 0,972 
BSO_PF 0,947 0,959 
FORMGOV 0,875 0,893 
RelGOV_full 0,754 0,837 
RelGOV_new 0,796 0,858 
RelGOV_final 0,875 0,927 
Reliance 0,982 1 
Reliance_new 1 1 
RepFF 0,901 0,934 
RepFF2 0,941 0,958 
RepPF 0,904 0,935 
RepPF2 0,901 0,92 
ILEnv 0,812 0,864 
ComRes 0,82 0,857 
ConCap 0,924 0,948 
RSInv 0,999 1 
MrkUnc 0,769 0,789 
MA 1 1 
 
Measuring theoretical constructs (RelGov, RepPF, RepFF etc.) through more than 
one measurement model has shown slight increase in overall measurement model 
fit. Moreover, high correlation between such sub-constructs enabled further 
description of their variances through only one factor (model variable) as it was 
theoretically argued. 
Cross-loadings were initially tested in EFA. Subsequently, CFA was conducted to 
test constructs (after items reduction) against each other and to test for cross-
loadings. As a result, no significant cross-loadings were detected. 
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4.6  Validity and reliability 
Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test construct validity or the extent to 
which items actually represent theoretical construct. The cases, when construct 
validity (model fit) was not high enough (or was poor), could be explained by 
quite complex theoretical model and sophisticated constructs in connection with 
rather small sample. That means that such concepts as reputation, brand spillover 
effect, type of governance form are rather complicated to measure in the real 
business world (particularly depending only on the subjective attitude of sample 
respondents). Thus, despite some problems with model fit estimations all 
theoretical constructs were kept.  
Moreover, convergent validity as a part of construct validity was tested through 
several ways (see Table 4.7 for results of validity estimation). First, as it was 
discussed above, all factor loadings estimates for each theoretical construct (after 
item reduction where it was necessary) were satisfactory high. The latter means 
that all factor loading were above 0.7 (or at least above 0.6), which indicates that 
items actually converge on a common point, which is particular construct. Next, 
following the procedure offered by Hair et al. (2010), average variance extracted 
(AVE) was estimated. This measure is a summary indicator of convergence and is 
calculated as a mean variance extracted for the items loading on a measurement 
construct (Hair et al. 2010). The AVE results above 0.5 indicate good 
convergence. Results of AVE below 0.5 mean that more error remains in the items 
compared to variance explained by latent variable. Table 4.7 shows that almost all 
construct exceed AVE equal to 50% point. However, three constructs have AVE 
below 0.5 – market uncertainty (which is in line with previous findings), 
institutional and legal environment (also supported by weak model fit) and 
relational governance, while two constructs showed AVE close to 50% - 
company’s resources and reliance). 
Further, reliability was tested through construct reliability (CR) measurement. It is 
computed from the squared sum of standardized factor loadings for each factor 
and the sum of the error variance terms for this factor (Hair et al. 2010). The basic 
rule of thumb here indicates that all estimates higher than 0.7 have good 
reliability. Estimations in Table 4.7 show that all constructs have satisfactory 
reliability. 
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Table 4.7 All constructs factor loadings, error terms, AVE and CR 
Constructs Items 
Stand. 
solutions 
Complete 
stand. 
solutions 
Squared 
multiple 
correlations 
Error 
terms AVE CR 
BrandSO BSO1 0,973 0,724 0,524 0,862 67,77% 0,94 
 
BSO2 1,145 0,801 0,642 0,731 
  
 
BSO3 1,391 0,914 0,835 0,383 
  
 
BSO4 1,465 0,891 0,793 0,56 
  
 
BSO5 1,079 0,699 0,489 1,217 
  
 
BSO6 1,357 0,846 0,716 0,729 
  
 
BSO8 1,315 0,863 0,745 0,59 
  
BrandSO_PF 
BSOPF
1 1,059 0,754 0,569 0,85 76,57% 0,96 
 
BSOPF
2 1,333 0,857 0,734 0,643 
  
 
BSOPF
3 1,52 0,948 0,899 0,259 
  
 
BSOPF
4 1,498 0,962 0,925 0,181 
  
 
BSOPF
5 1,359 0,822 0,675 0,889 
  
 
BSOPF
6 1,401 0,903 0,816 0,442 
  
 
BSOPF
8 1,27 0,861 0,742 0,562 
  
FormGov Form3 0,834 0,781 0,61 0,445 59,71% 0,92 
 
Form4 0,897 0,771 0,594 0,549 
  
 
Form5 0,792 0,687 0,472 0,702 
  
 
Form6 0,846 0,66 0,435 0,929 
  
 
Form7 0,864 0,832 0,692 0,332 
  
 
Form8 0,935 0,85 0,723 0,335 
  
 
Form9 0,983 0,808 0,654 0,512 
  
RelGov (final) Flex2 0,63 0,365 0,133 2,589 36,07% 0,79 
 
Infosh2 0,967 0,532 0,283 2,37 
  
 
Infosh3 1,229 0,727 0,529 1,345 
  
 
Infosh4 0,83 0,606 0,367 1,118 
  
 
Solid1 0,835 0,598 0,357 1,252 
  
 
Solid2 0,864 0,639 0,409 1,081 
  
 
Solid3 1,118 0,668 0,447 1,549 
  
Reliance Rel1 0,92 0,529 0,28 2,181 48,73% 0,74 
 
Rel2 1,533 0,762 0,581 1,695 
  
 
Rel3 1,522 0,775 0,601 1,536 
  Reputation 
(FF) PS1 0,754 0,673 0,453 0,688 90,99% 0,94 
 
PS2 0,642 0,511 0,261 1,165 
  
 
PS3 0,721 0,642 0,412 0,743 
  
 
LV1 1,056 0,808 0,653 0,593 
  
 
LV2 1,141 0,784 0,615 0,813 
  
 
LV3 1,314 0,802 0,643 0,957 
  
 
WplEnv
1 1,126 0,836 0,698 0,547 
  
 
WplEnv
2 1,139 0,813 0,661 0,664 
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WplEnv
3 1,043 0,703 0,494 1,115 
  
 
SResp1 1,161 0,728 0,53 1,196 
  
 
SResp2 1,229 0,717 0,514 1,428 
  
 
FinPerf
1 0,83 0,655 0,428 0,919 
  
 
FinPerf
2 0,761 0,598 0,358 1,039 
  
 
FinPerf
3 1,011 0,735 0,54 0,871 
  Reputation 
(FF)_cont CustSat 0,692 0,604 0,365 0,832 61,42% 0,91 
 
CustTr 0,663 0,711 0,506 0,429 
  
 
CustLoy
l 0,847 0,799 0,638 0,406 
  
 
CustW
OM 0,938 0,82 0,672 0,429 
  
 
CustFee
l 1,062 0,906 0,821 0,246 
  
 
CustAd
m 1,104 0,827 0,683 0,565 
  Reputation 
(PF) PSPF1 0,699 0,757 0,572 0,365 53,47% 0,94 
 
PSPF2 0,500 0,527 0,278 0,651 
  
 
PSPF3 0,774 0,724 0,525 0,542 
  
 
LVPF1 1,128 0,828 0,685 0,585 
  
 
LVPF2 0,991 0,780 0,608 0,634 
  
 
LVPF3 0,962 0,751 0,564 0,715 
  
 
WplEnv
PF1 1,123 0,872 0,76 0,399 
  
 
WplEnv
PF2 1,036 0,825 0,68 0,505 
  
 
WplEnv
PF3 1,173 0,825 0,68 0,647 
  
 
SRespP
F1 1,039 0,734 0,538 0,926 
  
 
SRespP
F2 1,099 0,702 0,492 1,264 
  
 
FPerfPF
1 0,386 0,364 0,132 0,979 
  
 
FPerfPF
2 0,836 0,715 0,511 0,669 
  
 
FPerfPF
3 0,777 0,679 0,461 0,707 
  Reputation 
(PF)_cont. CSatPF 0,617 0,579 0,335 0,754 60,37% 0,91 
 
CTrustP
F 0,719 0,797 0,635 0,298 
  
 
CLoylP
F 0,779 0,806 0,649 0,328 
  
 
CWOM
PF 1,132 0,892 0,795 0,33 
  
 
CFeelP
F 0,981 0,859 0,737 0,343 
  
 
CAdmP
F 0,999 0,834 0,696 0,436 
  
 
RecPar 0,742 0,616 0,379 0,903 
  
InstLegEnv ILEnv1 1,094 0,572 0,327 2,469 31,63% 0,72 
 
ILEnv3 -1,082 -0,545 0,297 2,769 
  
 
ILEnv5 -0,999 -0,641 0,411 1,427 
  
 
ILEnv6 -1,249 -0,757 0,573 1,165 
  
 
ILEnv8 -0,466 -0,295 0,087 2,282 
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ILEnv1
0 0,725 0,45 0,203 2,064 
  
ComRes Tech1 1,311 0,593 0,352 3,162 44,38% 0,88 
 
Tech2 0,938 0,576 0,331 1,774 
  
 
Tech3 1,313 0,584 0,341 3,335 
  
 
Tech4 1,416 0,615 0,378 3,304 
  
 
EndC1 0,954 0,52 0,27 2,464 
  
 
EndC2 0,794 0,604 0,364 1,101 
  
 
EndC3 0,882 0,486 0,236 2,516 
  
 
SupCh1 1,059 0,641 0,411 1,605 
  
 
SupC2 0,767 0,77 0,594 0,403 
  
 
SupCh3 0,864 0,776 0,602 0,493 
  
 
SupCh4 1,005 0,862 0,743 0,35 
  
 
SupCh5 1,03 0,839 0,704 0,446 
  Contracting 
Cap Rspec1 0,964 0,556 0,309 2,078 51,73% 0,86 
 
Rspec2 1,051 0,757 0,574 0,821 
  
 
Rspec3 0,918 0,611 0,373 1,419 
  
 
Knman1 1,366 0,91 0,829 0,386 
  
 
Knman2 0,999 0,706 0,499 1,002 
  
 
Knman3 1,109 0,721 0,52 1,133 
  
RelSpecInv RSInv1 1,654 0,808 0,653 1,453 59,90% 0,86 
 
RSInv2 1,448 0,756 0,572 1,571 
  
 
RSInv3 1,244 0,691 0,477 1,695 
  
 
RSInv4 1,722 0,833 0,694 1,31 
  Market 
Uncertainty 
Mrkunc
2 1,096 0,641 0,41 1,726 26,43% 0,54 
 
Mrkunc
3 0,603 0,339 0,115 2,805 
  
 
Mrkunc
4 0,63 0,309 0,095 3,773 
  
 
Mrkunc
5 1,094 0,661 0,437 1,541 
  Measurement 
Ambiguity MA1 1,264 0,75 0,563 1,24 69,63% 0,87 
 
MA2 1,518 0,874 0,764 0,712 
  
  MA3 1,428 0,873 0,762 0,637     
 
Discriminant validity checks the distinction between constructs, meaning 
construct uniqueness (Hair et al. 2010). In its essence it is close to 
unidimensionality aspect, which identifies whether items can be explained by only 
one underlying construct. Discriminant validity can be estimated through analysis 
of cross-loadings between constructs and by comparing the squared correlation of 
two constructs with their AVE scores. To prove good discriminant validity, 
squared correlations should be lower than respective AVE scores. That will 
indicate that the construct explains more of the variance in its item measures than 
other factors do. As no significant evidence of cross-loadings among constructs 
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was found (constructs are unidimensional), squared correlations were calculated 
(appendix 4 with AVE scores included at the bottom of a matrix). As a result 
almost none of the squared correlation values exceeded the respective AVE score 
indicating good discriminant validity. The exception is the reputation of a partner 
firm second measure (the one with ‘cont.’ index). Thus, this construct might be 
considered for reduction. 
Nomological validity is usually tested through assessing whether correlation 
between constructs make sense (Hair et al. 2010). That implies the idea that some 
constructs may be closely related (e.g. reputation of focal and partner firm, brand 
spillover effect for focal and partner firm etc.). Correlation matrix (Table 4.8) 
shows that each reputation construct (both focal and partner) was measured 
through two dimensions. However, high cross-correlations were detected, 
meaning that reputations of a focal and partner firm_cont. items were highly 
correlated to both reputations of a focal firm and to reputations of a partner firm. 
To avoid statistical mistakes, these constructs (Reputation of a focal firm (cont) 
and Reputation of a partner firm (cont)) were not further used in the analysis. 
Hence, I will represent reputation variables only through the following constructs: 
Reputation of a focal firm and Reputation of a partner firm. No other significant 
correlations were detected. Moreover, nomological validity will be theoretically 
and analytically checked during regression analysis later in this study. 
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4.7 Testing hypotheses and results discussion 
To test direct and moderation hypotheses, two statistical analyses are conducted. 
First, using IBM SPSS 20 software I analyze the direct relationship between two 
complementary forms of governance and brand spillover effect for both focal and 
partner firms (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). Next, a full hierarchical moderated 
regression for each of two dependent variables is conducted (Cohen 2003). This 
type of analysis includes step by step model testing. The first-step model 
represents regression of all control variables on the dependent ones. Second, all 
independent variables (including moderates) are added. The third “full” model 
includes interaction terms between independent and moderating variables. This 
model is used to test all remaining hypotheses (H2a-2b, H3a-3b, H4a-4d). Finally, in 
the fourth step I include quadratic terms in the models to test whether interaction 
terms are significant due to multicollinearity or due to true interaction (Ganzach 
1997). To gain more insights into moderating effects, significant interactions are 
decomposed and plotted using methods described by Aiken and West (1991) and 
Cohen (2003). 
Prior to analyses, I evaluate multivariate regression assumption of 
multicollinearity. According to Malhotra (2010) multicollinearity problem arises 
when there is a very high intercorrelation between independent variables. For this 
reason tolerance and VIF indices of each variable are assessed. Hair et al. (2010) 
argues that tolerance values should not exceed 0.10 and VIF should be less than 
10. All these requirements are satisfied in each model. Thus, it is possible to 
conclude that no significant multicollinearity is present in this study. 
4.7.1 Role of governance form testing 
Initially, I will analyze the direct relationship between formal and relational 
governance and brand spillover effect for focal (first sub-model) and partner firm 
(second sub-model) respectively (H1a and H1b). These models intend to test 
hypothesized constructs without controlling for external independent variables 
used later in this study. In other words, these models will provide additional 
information about the role of governance form choice on the level of spillover 
effect between companies in B2B relationship. Basic transaction economics 
variables as well as market of business operations variables were selected as 
control ones in these sub-models. 
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Three step hierarchical regression analysis is used to gain more insights. The first 
step in both sub-models includes only independent and control variables. The 
second one introduces interaction term of formal and relational governance. This 
step tests the relationship between formal governance and brand spillover when 
moderated by relational governance (and vice versa). 
The third step includes quadratic terms of analyzed independent variables. 
According to Ganzach (1997) it is important to introduce quadratic terms into the 
model with interaction to avoid “misleading interaction”. The latter occurs when 
the analysis shows insignificant interaction in the case of a strong true interaction, 
or when an observed interaction is positive when the true interaction is negative. 
Misleading interactions can happen when independent variables are correlated 
(multicollinearity is present). Thus, by including quadratic terms to the equation 
researcher can avoid multicollinearity problem and additionally study monotone 
rather than only linear relationship. 
Table 4.9 Influence of formal and governance form on brand spillover effect for partner and 
focal firms 
Variables  Brand spillover effect on focal firm  
Brand spillover effect on partner 
firm 
  
Initial 
model 
Including 
interaction 
With 
quadratic 
expressions 
 
Initial 
model 
Including 
interaction 
Including 
quadratic 
expressions 
Business market 
of focal company 
 -.194* -.196* -.201*  .069 .067 .086 
Business market 
of partner 
company 
 .327*** .303*** .314***  -.081 -.101 -.112 
Relationship-
specific 
investments 
 .354*** .385*** .371***  .135 .160 .192* 
Market 
uncertainties 
 .017 .008 .023  .245** .237** .226** 
Measurement 
ambiguity 
 .031 .056 .062  .124 .145 .157 
Formal 
governance form 
 .145 .056 .040  .122 .048 -.017 
Relational 
governance form 
H1a .033 .002 -.024 H1b .212* .186* .206* 
Formal*Relational 
governance 
  -.204* -.123   -.170 -.246* 
Formal 
Governance 
squared 
   -.067    -.065 
Relational 
Governance 
Squared 
   -.104    .177 
R2  .258 .289 .297  .262 .283 .307 
F  3.867*** 3.912*** 3.167***  3.946*** 3.802*** 3.326*** 
a N = 86.  
* p < .1; ** p < .05; ***  p  < .01 
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Table 4.9 shows that the initial models explain 25.8% and 26.2% of variance in 
brand spillover effect for focal and partner firm respectively. Moreover, F-
statistics reports that both regression modes are significant. No significant 
relationship was found between relational governance form and brand spillover 
effect on focal firm (0.033, p > 0.1). Thus, Hypothesis 1a is not supported. 
Further, relational governance form was found to significantly relate to brand 
spillover effect on partner firm (b=0.212, p < 0.1). This finding weakly supports 
Hypothesis 1b. The latter results can be interpreted as follows: while holding all 
other variables still, brand spillover effect on partner firm is predicted to increase 
by 0.212 for every one point increase in governance form. 
Analysis shows significant negative relationship between interaction term of 
governance forms and brand spillover effect on focal firm (b = -0.204, p < 0.1). 
However, after introducing quadratic terms into the model, this relationship 
becomes insignificant (b = -0.123, p > 0.1). Such results can be explained by the 
fact that significant interaction in the second step of a first sub-model was due to 
multicollinearity of independent variables rather than the true interaction. 
While analyzing the relationship between interaction of governance forms and 
brand spillover effect on partner firm, the results show significant negative 
interaction effect only in the third step of the hierarchical model after including 
quadratic terms (b = -0.24, p < 0.1). This means that the direct significant positive 
relationship between relational governance form and partner firm’s brand 
spillover is weakened when formal governance increases. 
4.7.2 Full hierarchical regression models: estimating brand spillover effect 
In order to separately analyze influences of control variables, predicting and 
moderating variables, and interacting terms I conduct hierarchical regression 
analysis. Table 4.10 reports main statistics and coefficients of two models. The 
third step of each model is used to analyze all remaining hypotheses. 
Overall, first model explained 48.8% (R
2 
= 0.448) of variance in brand spillover 
effect on focal firm, whereas variance in brand spillover effect on partner firm 
was explained by 60% of the variation in predicting variables. Considering that F-
tests show that all models are statistically significant, it is possible to conclude 
that models have good fit. 
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Table 4.10  Regression analysis of the direct and moderated relationships 
 
Brand spillover effect for focal firm Brand spillover effect for partner firm 
 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Relationship-
specific 
investments 
.24** .212* .246** .290** .152 -.048 -.018 -.016 
Market 
uncertainties 
.016 -.014 -.007 -.047 .259** .182* .217** .203** 
Measurement 
ambiguity 
-.013 -.045 -.034 -.012 .119 .199** .207** .222** 
Reliance .168 .194 .213* .177 .074 .152 .128 .152 
Perceived Fit .374*** .335*** .24** .270** .253** .108 .073 .063 
Institutional 
and legal 
environment 
.03 -.018 .002 -.061 -.007 .066 .093 .056 
Formal 
governance 
form 
 
.025 .005 -.134 
 
.030 -.022 -.086 
Relational 
governance 
form 
 
-.114 -.148 -.100 
 
.137 .131 .133 
Reputation of a 
focal firm  
.119 .042 -.078 
 
.051       H4a -.047 -.018 
Reputation of a 
partner firm  
.221**       H4b .299*** .370*** 
 
-.141 -.097 -.073 
Company's 
resources  
-.144 -.16 -.131 
 
.400*** .412*** .359*** 
Contracting 
capabilities  
.125 .119 .126 
 
.146 .168 .228** 
Reputation of a 
focal 
firm*Relationa
l Governance 
  
.046 .087 
 
   H4c .285** .304** 
Reputation of a 
partner 
firm*Relationa
l Governance 
 
      H4d .08 -.043 
  
.041 -.116 
Company's 
resources*For
mal 
Governance 
  
-.012 -.027 
  
0.18 .276* 
Company's 
resources*Rela
tional 
Governance 
 
   H2a -.298** -.228* 
 
   H2b -0.241** -.183 
Contracting 
capabilities*Fo
rmal 
Governance 
 
  H3a -.073 -.066 
 
  H3b -0.319** -.489*** 
Formal 
Governance 
squared 
   -.133    -.080 
Relational 
Governance 
squared 
   -.029    .029 
Reputation of a 
focal firm 
squared 
   -.134    .042 
Reputation of a 
partner firm 
squared 
   .308**    .243** 
Company’s 
resources 
squared 
   .127    -.125 
Contracting 
capabilities 
squared 
   -.068    .106 
R
2
 .324 .396 .488 .559 .251 .488 .600 .643 
F 6.317*** 3.981*** 3.807*** 3.419*** 4.407*** 5.794*** 5.994*** 4.847*** 
a
 N = 86. * p < .1; ** p < .05;  ***
  
p  < .01  
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As Table 4.10 shows, moderating construct “Company's resources*Relational 
Governance” has negative relationship with dependent variables in both models, 
which is contrary to what was predicted (b = -0.298, p < 0.05 and b = -0.241, p < 
0.05 respectively). Thus, Hypotheses 2a and 2b are not supported. In addition, 
after introducing quadratic terms to the models, the relationship between 
interaction term and brand spillover for partner firm becomes insignificant. This 
may show that independent variables are intercorrelated and that, in fact, there is 
no significant moderating effect on brand spillover for partner firm. 
The interaction term “Contracting capabilities * Formal Governance” in brand 
spillover effect for focal firm model is not significant (b = -0.073, p > 0.1). So, 
Hypothesis 3a is rejected. On the contrary, this interaction is found significant in 
the case of partner firm brand spillover effect model (b = -0.319, p < .05). It 
becomes significantly more stronger (b = -0.489,p < 0.01) after introducing 
quadratic terms (depicting the true interaction). Thus, Hypothesis H3b is 
supported. 
There is no significant relationship between reputation of a focal firm on partner’s 
brand spillover effect (-0.047, p > 0.1), while reputation of a partner firm is found 
to be positively related to brand spillover effect on focal firm (0.299, p < .01). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 4a is rejected and Hypothesis 4b is supported. 
The interaction term “Reputation of a focal firm * Relational Governance”, in 
brand spillover effect for partner firm model is significantly related to dependent 
variable (b = 0.285, p < .01) and remains significant after introducing quadratic 
terms. That means that the true relationship between reputation of a partner firm 
with brand spillover effect for a focal company becomes more positive while 
moderated by the relational governance form. This finding is in line with the 
discussed prediction. Thus, Hypothesis H4c is supported. 
Regression analysis provides no support for remaining moderating Hypothesis 4d 
as “Reputation of a partner firm * Relational Governance” is not significantly 
related to brand spillover effect on focal firm (b = 0.08, p > 0.1). 
Among control variables, relationship-specific investments, reliance and 
perceived fit were found to be positively related to brand spillover effect on focal 
firm (0.246, p < .05; 0.213, p < 0.1; 0.24, p < .05 respectively). Further, market 
uncertainties (0.217, p < .05) and measurement ambiguity (0.207, p < .05) were 
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significantly related to brand spillover effect on partner firm. Finally, companies’ 
resource base variable was found to significantly and positively relate to partner’s 
brand spillover effect (0.412, p < .01).  
The fourth step of hierarchical model also shows that squared term of reputation 
of a partner firm has significant positive relationship with brand spillover effect of 
both focal and partner firms (b = 0.308, p < 0.05 and b = 0.243, p < 0.05 
respectively). Recalling significant direct effect of partner’s reputation on focal 
company’s brand spillover, overall partner reputation has slightly exponential 
monotone and strong relationship with focal company’s brand spillover. This 
indicates that the higher spillover will occur in favour of focal company when the 
partner company initially has high reputation. Additionally, in partner brand 
spillover effect model only quadratic term of reputation is significant. These 
findings indicate that further analyses of non-linear relationship between 
reputation and brand spillover may give interesting insights on how this concepts 
interrelate and, hence, how they should be managed. 
4.7.3 Significant interaction terms assessment 
Using procedure proposed by Aiken and West (1991), and Cohen (2003), I 
decompose and analyze hypothesized significant interaction terms. Specifically, 
simple slope test is conducted and interaction relationships plotted. 
 For hypothesis H4c, both relational governance and reputation of a focal firm are 
divided into two groups – low (with one standard deviation below the mean value) 
and high (with one standard deviation above the mean). Afterwards, I evaluate the 
effect of these variables interaction on brand spillover effect for partner firm. 
Figure 4.1 shows that the relationship between reputation of a focal firm and 
brand spillover effect for partner’ company is more positive for companies with 
high level of relational governance. Moreover, for companies with high relational 
governance: the higher reputation of a focal firm is, the better brand spillover will 
be (b=0.4415, p < .05). For companies with low level of governance, there is a 
significant reversed trend: the higher the reputation of a focal firm is, the lower is 
the level of brand spillover effect for partner firm (b = -0.5104, p < .05). Thus, 
Hypothesis 4c is fully supported. 
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Figure 4.1 Interaction effect of reputation of a focal firm and relational governance on brand 
spillover effect for partner company 
 
Similarly, interaction argued in Hypothesis 3b is decomposed. Figure 4.2 shows 
that when formal governance is low, better contracting capabilities positively 
influence brand spillover effect for partner company (t = -0.227, p < .05). At the 
same time, there is a significant negative relationship with brand spillover effect 
when formal contracting is high (b = -0.9274, p < .05). The latter corresponds to 
the predictions in Hypothesis 3b. 
Figure 4.2 Interaction effect of contracting capabilities and formal governance on brand 
spillover effect for partner company 
 
Despite receiving contradictory results for Hypotheses 2a and 2b, interaction 
terms discussed in them were found significant (still, negative). Therefore, they 
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are decomposed using the same technique. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 present 
moderation plotting. There is no significant relationship between company’s 
resources and brand spillover effect for partner firm when relational governance is 
high (b = 0.175, p > .1). However, there is a significant positive relationship when 
relational governance is low (b = 0.649, p < .05).  
Figure 4.3 Interaction effect of company’s resources and relational governance on brand 
spillover effect for partner company 
 
Figure 4.4 Interaction effect of company’s resources and relational governance on brand 
spillover effect for focal company 
 
Plots of low versus high relational governance and company’s resources influence 
on brand spillover effect for focal firm are significant (b = 2.0905, p < .05; b = -
0.2556, p < .05 respectively). That indicates that companies using low relational 
governance have positive effect of resource base on brand spillover effect. 
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Alternatively, companies practicing high level of relational governance show 
decrease in their (focal) brand spillover effect having strong resource base. 
4.7.4 Summarizing hypotheses testing 
Prior to starting the discussion part, a short summary of argued model estimations 
and hypothesis testing results are presented in Table 4.11: 
Table 4.11 Summary of hypotheses 
Hupotheses Result 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between relational governance form and 
brand spillover effect for focal firm 
Not supported 
H1b: There is a positive relationship between relational governance form and 
the extent of spillover effect of brands in B2B relationship for partner firm 
Supported 
H2a: The relationship between company’s resource base and brand spill-over 
effect for a focal firm is more positive if it is moderated by relational 
governance form. 
Not supported 
H2b: The relationship between company’s resource base and brand spill-over 
effect for a partner firm is more positive if it is moderated by relational 
governance form. 
Not supported 
H3a: The relationship between contracting capabilities and brand spill-over 
effect for focal firm is weakened while moderated by formal governance. 
Not supported 
H3b: The relationship between contracting capabilities and brand spill-over 
effect for partner firm is weakened while moderated by formal governance. 
Supported 
H4a: The direct relationship between reputation of a focal firm with brand 
spillover effect for a partner company is positive. 
Not supported 
H4b: The direct relationship between reputation of a partner firm with brand 
spillover effect for a focal company is positive. 
Supported 
H4c: Positive relationship between reputation of a focal firm with brand spill-
over effect for a partner company is strengthened while moderated by the 
relational governance form. 
Supported 
H4d: Positive relationship between reputation of a partner firm with brand 
spill-over effect for a focal company is strengthened while moderated by the 
relational governance form. 
 Not supported 
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5.0 Discussion 
This thesis aimed to make a contribution to the prior empirical studies in both 
branding field: as it introduces analysis of brand spillovers within the context of 
B2B relationship; and B2B-marketing field: as it provides more insights into the 
roles of brands in B2B markets and their relationship to particular governance 
form choice. 
The main purpose of the present study was to investigate the relationship between 
formal and relational governance form choice and two possible “branding” 
outcomes: brand spillover effect for focal company and for exchange partner firm. 
While interorganizational research tend to perceive formal contracting and 
relational governance as two extremes of governance form continuum, in this 
study they are analyzed simultaneously, presuming more complementary effect. 
On the basis of previous discussions of characteristics, roles and antecedents of 
two governance forms, in this thesis I argue that the choice of more relational 
governance will be positively related to the level of brand spillover effect on focal 
and partner firms. Therefore, changing the level of relational governance during 
B2B cooperation will change the level of corporate brand influence (stretching) 
between two partnering companies. The empirical analysis supports this 
assumption with respect to partner firm’s outcome only. Hence, there is no 
significant effect of relational governance on brand spillover for focal company. 
Such findings can be justified by the fact that brand spillover is a subjective 
variable depicting perception of the “stretch” effect of one corporate brand to 
another. Thus, measuring intangible activities resulting in additional advantages 
(or disadvantages) for the brand perception might be challenging. For example, 
there might be additional explanatory variables, which can clarify the effect of 
brand spillover for focal firm, like brand strength or number of exchange partners, 
which were not included in this study’s empirical model. Moreover, as this thesis 
relies on subjective scales, the evaluation of focal vs. partner brand spillover may 
be slightly biased due to the absence of any accounting or financial documents, 
which might give objective validation. 
Remarkably, the interaction effect of governance form choice variables provide 
additional insights to the relationship of relational governance and brand spillover. 
In my analysis I have found that the positive influence of relational governance on 
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brand spillover of a partner firm is decreased by the interaction term of formal and 
relational governance. The latter means that if managers use both governance 
forms simultaneously they have more substitutional effect on brand spillover than 
complementary. However, I assume that this finding does not deny the fact that 
both relational and formal governance might be used by managers simultaneously. 
One of the main issues of brands’ role in B2B relationships is how to best manage 
your relationship, so that it would generate advantages in terms of branding 
outcomes (e.g. positive brand spillover). Since a choice of governance form may 
be perceived as a tool to manage brand spillover (the outcome of B2B 
relationship), in this thesis I measure the moderating effect of governance 
structures.  
I argue that company’s resources as a basis for performance outcomes and 
possible competitive advantages will be positively related to both focal and 
partner brand spillover while moderated by relational governance. To be more 
precise, I assume that the higher level of resource base of the focal company will 
lead to better outcomes of B2B relationship. While moderated by more relational 
governance choice (e.g. enabling greater level of solidarity, flexibility and 
information sharing), resources factor is expected to more positively affect brand 
spillover for focal and partner companies on B2B marketing.  
However, the empirical analysis showed contradictory results. Specifically, 
company’s resource base has significant but negative effect on brand spillover for 
both focal and partner firms, while moderated by relational governance form 
choice. A possible reason for such results may be that while having good (or non-
imitable) resource base companies may tend to protect it from opportunistic 
behavior of B2B partners during value claiming stage, rather than enable possible 
advantages for partners. For this reason they might either use formal governance 
(which is not supposed to have any influence on brand spillover), or apply some 
other safeguarding mechanisms. Thus, such actions will result in a tendency that 
the better resource base a company obtains, the lower spillover effect will take 
place as an outcome of exchange relationships. 
Graphical interpretation can be used to get more insights into moderating effect of 
governance form choice. From the interaction of relational governance and 
company’s resources effect on focal firm brand spillover (Figure 4.4) I conclude 
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that choosing low relational governance will result in greater spillover effect for 
focal company under the condition of high resource base, than choosing high 
(stronger) relational governance. On the contrary, if a company has low resource 
base and choose high relational governance, it will result in higher brand 
spillover, than in the case of low relational governance choice. 
Another proposition in this thesis concerns the relationship between company’s 
contracting capabilities and brand spillover. I argue that if a company obtains 
good contracting capabilities it may tend to choose formal governance form. As 
the level of contracting capabilities (or the way a firm manages contracting 
process, define roles and share knowledge) should have an influence on the 
outcome of B2B relationship, I suggest that there is a relationship with brand 
spillover effect as well. However, I argue that if a company uses high level of 
contracting capabilities in its interorganizational relationship, it might limit the 
extent to which companies mutually cooperate and as a result – limit the 
externalities of the “close” cooperation (like brand spillover). Thus, while 
choosing more formal governance form, the level of contracting capabilities will 
be negatively related to the extent of spillover effect for both focal and partner 
companies. The analysis supports this proposition, but with respect to brand 
spillover effect for partner firm only. 
Graphical interpretation of this moderation (Figure 4.2) provides additional 
findings. In particular, it shows that in condition of high contracting capabilities, 
choosing more formal governance will lead to lower extent of spillover effect for 
partner firm than choosing less formal governance structure. This is in line with 
thesis proposition above. On the contrary, in case of low contracting capabilities, 
the choice of more formal contracting governance will result in larger spillover 
effect. The explanation for the latter may be that contracting capabilities are in 
fact antecedents of formal contracting. If they are weak in a company, then the 
quality of formal governance might be questioned. As Williamson (1979) 
suggested, governance forms should be used with a purpose of optimization. In 
this case, when one governance form (formal) has disadvantages, another one 
should be implied (relational governance) to fill in the gaps. Considering that 
relational governance lead to greater brand spillover effect, it explains the 
interaction effect in the low contracting capabilities condition. 
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Finally, I empirically analyze both direct and indirect effect of reputation on brand 
spillover. Reputation is a perceptional construct which may influence the choice 
of potential exchange partner. Moreover, good reputation may be the source of 
competitive advantage through its effect not only on the progress of cooperation 
itself, but on the outcomes as well. Considering there are some linkages between 
corporate brands and reputation, in this study I argue that reputation of one 
company will have a positive direct relationship to the brand spillover effect for 
another firm in B2B dyad. The significant positive relationship is found between 
reputation of a partner firm and brand spillover effect on focal company. 
However, no support was found for the influence of focal firm’s reputation. 
In line with research problem I suggest that the relationship between reputation of 
one partner and brand spillover for another in the dyad should be moderated by 
the choice of relational governance. To be more precise I assume that the choice 
of more “close” flexible governance (relational) will result in more positive 
relationship between reputation and brand spillover constructs. The empirical 
analysis supports this suggestion, but only for the effect of focal reputation on 
partner’s brand spillover. Visual analysis of this moderation (Figure 4.1) shows 
that for companies with high level of reputation, the choice of more relational 
governance will result in a greater level of spillover effect for partner firm, than if 
they choose lower level of relational governance. On the contrary, in a condition 
of low reputational level, low relational governance shows greater brand spillover 
than high relational governance form. It can be explained by the fact that in the 
case of lower reputation level, other external factors can be the predictors of the 
change in corporate brands’ stretching. 
Overall, this study is investigating intangible, perceptional constructs relying on 
subjective scales, personal attitude and evaluations of managers of companies 
operating on B2B market. Thus, some biased responses may take places. For 
example, managers may tend to overestimate their companies’ reputation or 
underestimate their partners’ one, give inaccurate assessment of contracting 
capabilities or details specification in contracts etc. That may result in a lack of 
variation in particular predictors and therefore in the insignificant relationships of 
the proposed constructs. 
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Additionally, in this analysis relatively small sample and large number of 
variables decrease the degrees of freedom, resulting in the increase of the width of 
confidence interval. The latter statistically explains a large amount of insignificant 
variables in the model, whereas in reality they might have strong true relationship. 
Thus, the easiest way to increase statistical significance and improve the results of 
this analysis is to test the same model using larger sample. 
Each theoretical model should be supported by a set of control variables, which 
can provide additional information about possible influences on analyzed 
concepts. In this research relationship-specific investments and perceived fit 
between partnering companies were found significantly related to the focal firm’s 
brand spillover effect. These findings are in line with previous arguments. It 
means that the more companies invest in common business and the more they are 
perceived as good partners, the stronger and closer mutual relationship may be 
developed. Hence it will result in a greater spillover effect for focal firm. 
Additionally, market uncertainties and measurement ambiguity appeared to have 
positive direct relationship to brand spillover effect on partner firm. In the 
uncertain environmental conditions as well as in the case, when it is hard to assess 
the performance and the level of partner firm’s efforts, it might be costly and 
inefficiently to rely on the formal contracting only. Thus, companies may 
introduce more relational governance which results in higher brand spillover. In 
sum, the analysis of control variables has proven that there are other predictors the 
B2B managers should consider to reach the proficient level of corporate brands 
and spillover management. 
5.1 Theoretical implications 
From the theoretical standpoint, the present thesis contributes to brand spillover 
research in that the brands role in B2B perspective is identified. Existing 
marketing literature has discussed brands spillover effects in brand alliances (e.g. 
Simonin and Ruth 1998, Suh and Park 2009, Rao, Qu and Riekert 1999), parent 
brand extensions (Park et al. 1991, Völckner and Sattler 2006, Aaker and Keller 
1990, Balachander and Ghose 2003, Lei, Dawar and Lemmink 2008 and many 
others) and co-branding (e.g. Kalafatis et al. 2012, Erevelles et al. 2008 and 
Baumgarth 2004). This study’s brand spillover research extension and proposition 
is that company’s brands in B2B relationship will act in the same way they do 
during brand alliances or in brand portfolios.  
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However, it is necessary to consider that B2B companies are administrated by 
slightly different “rules” than companies in alliances. Hence, the theoretical model 
included predictors from transaction costs economics and governance value 
analysis frameworks (Williamson 1979, 1996; Ghosh and John 1999, 2012 and 
others). 
Further, existing studies in B2B field are limited in terms of the role of brands and 
their management (Keller and Kotler 2012). To my knowledge, no research was 
done to analyze spillover effect as a consequence of formal and relational 
governance choice. Thus, proving the proposition that relational governance form 
choice is positively related to the brand spillover effect for partner firm is a 
significant theoretical contribution to both brand and B2B governance literature. 
This thesis contributes to a number of studies which were dedicated to the 
simultaneous (not separate) analysis of formal and relational governance as 
complements or substitutes (Poppo and Zenger 2002, Cannon, Achrol and 
Gundlach 2000 and others); or formal contracting as predictor of relational 
governance (Sande and Haugland 2011) etc. In this study both governance forms 
are examined at the same time. I assume that managers of B2B companies do not 
have to make a choice between either formal or relational governance. Instead, 
interorganizational companies are expected to manage their B2B relationships 
using optimal for particular exchange combination of both governance structures. 
It should be done to ensure greater B2B performance outcomes and possible 
generation of brand spillover. The latter is the core topic of the current study. 
Additional analysis of governance form interaction showed that formal and 
relational governance forms relate to brand spillover effect more like substitutes 
than complements. 
Another theoretical contribution is that this thesis provides insights into how to 
manage brand spillover effect. Recalling that this study is dealing with 
interorganizational context, I analyze company’s resource base (as part of GVA) 
as a predictor (Ghosh and John 1999; 2012). In line with Ghosh and John (1999) 
arguments, I align company’s resources with particular governance form to 
estimate the impact on the relationship outcome under the influence of classical 
TCE exchange attributes. The current study extends GVA model by analyzing 
specifically relational governance form choice and by introducing a particular 
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outcome variable – brand spillover. The findings show that aligning company’s 
resource variable with relational governance choice has a negative effect on brand 
spillover for both focal and partner firm. 
This study introduces reputation and contracting capabilities as possible predictors 
of brand spillover. I find that the effect of former should be moderated by 
relational governance, whereas the latter – by formal. The results show that both 
constructs impact brand spillover differently: reputation has a positive effect while 
moderated by relational governance, whereas contracting capabilities have 
negative effect while moderated by formal contracting choice. Thus, these 
findings are a significant contribution to governance form analysis in B2B 
markets (e.g. Ghosh and John 1999, 2012; Williamson 1979, 1991) and to 
discussion of contracting capabilities role in managing B2B relationships (e.g. 
Argyres and Mayer 2007, Weber and Mayer 2005). 
Analyses of moderating effect of governance form choice and the respective 
findings (including graph interaction interpretation) provide insights into the 
strategic brand opportunities of managing corporate brand spillover effect. Hence, 
the proper choice of governance structure and the accurate evaluation of 
reputation, resources and contracting capabilities may lead to the expected level of 
brand spillover as an outcome of B2B partnership, which can be a source of strong 
competitive advantage. 
Finally, the present study makes a contribution to the research of B2B market in 
Ukraine, which still remains hardly explored in comparison to international B2B 
research (Yurchak 2011, 2012). No respective studies of corporate brands 
spillover on Ukrainian B2B market were conducted, particularly with regard to 
governance form choice. 
5.2 Managerial implications 
From the findings discussed above, it is possible to draw on the main conclusions 
of this study that can be practically implied. While operating in the uncertain 
environment B2B managers should be aware of the range of opportunities they get 
from accurate management of their interorganizational relationships. This 
argument is even more efficient when the outcome of the relationship is an 
intangible perceptional concept, like corporate brand spillover effect. It takes a 
long time for companies to “build” their corporate brands (Keller 2008). 
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Moreover, it takes time and efforts to generate advantages (or eliminate 
disadvantages) from brands spillover. 
This thesis provides several suggestions for managerial implication. First, 
managers of the companies operating in B2B markets should not make choices 
between two types of governance forms. Instead, they should look for the ultimate 
combination of formal contracting and relational governance, which will be 
aligned to all external circumstances and will optimize final exchange outcomes. 
Since I am not making distinctions between positive or negative effect from brand 
spillover in this thesis, it is up for managers to make choices whether they want it 
to be an outcome of a particular B2B relationship or not. Therefore, this study 
provides insights on how it is possible to manage brand spillover due to the 
obtained reputation, contracting capabilities and resources, and the respective 
governance form choice. In particular, if B2B managers want to enhance brand 
spillover for their own company, they should rely more on the choice of exchange 
partners with high reputational level. Additionally, if managers perceive brand 
spillover for partner firm as a desired outcome, they should support high 
reputation of the focal firm with a choice of more relational governance.  
On the contrary, if managers aim to limit brand spillover effect in favour of their 
partner’s firm due to high level of resources, they should choose more formal 
governance structure. Moreover, aligning high contracting capabilities with 
formal contracting will diminish effect of brand spillover for the exchange 
partner. 
Finally, it might be beneficial to pay attention to exchange partners’ perceived fit 
as it has direct positive relationship towards brand spillover. Thus, if companies 
want to generate spillover effect out of their relationship, then the more mutually 
close and good business partners they are perceived, the greater brand spillover 
will occur. 
5.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The goal of this thesis was to extent existing interorganizational and marketing 
literature with the research of yet unexplored concept – brand spillover effect in 
B2B markets. However, this study has important limitations which denote 
possible further research extensions.  
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First, the choice of Ukrainian B2B market is quite a narrow subject of analysis, 
which requires specific data collection methods. Due to the absence of any 
respective sources of data for this research, a snowball sampling technique was 
applied. However, conducting in-depth interviews with managers of B2B 
companies may provide more insights on the unobserved concepts.  
Second, this study’s findings might be improved by analyzing the influence of 
governance choice on brand spillover effect over time. To be more precise, it 
might be useful to analyze to what extent brand spillover will change in time due 
to the change in the governance form (e.g. from more relational to more formal or 
vice versa). These could be solved by using panel data collection method. 
Furthermore, such analysis will enable studying additional exogenous variables, 
which were not controlled for in the present research model, but can have 
significant relationship to study constructs. The latter will solve the issue of 
endogeneity. 
Third, even though generalizability of this study is an essential suggestion, this 
study might have some context limitations due to the particular characteristics of 
Ukrainian business market. This problem might be resolved either by extension of 
the area of analysis (e.g. Eastern or Western Europe) or by conducting 
comparative analysis between countries.  
Fourth, several studies are dedicated to the negative brand spillover effect (e.g. 
Suh and Park 2009, Lei, Dawar and Lemmink 2008). However, the primary aim 
of current research is to verify the existence of such effect and to provide 
suggestions how to manage it. No additional estimations of positive versus 
negative connotations of brand spillover effect were made. Thus, analyzing 
negative brand spillovers in B2B markets might be an interesting topic for future 
research. 
Fifth, the analysis was based on subjective perceptual data which enables the 
threat of judgmental or social desirability bias. Nevertheless, recalling specificity 
of theoretical model, no other method could be applied due to time, efforts and 
availability of accounting data limitations. Hence, a possible extension to this 
study might be the analysis objective resources (corporate documents stating 
governance mechanism of B2B relationship, financial statements that prove 
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increase or decrease of brand equity, content analysis of publications covering the 
exchange partnership etc.). 
Finally, in the present study, I estimate companies’ resource base and contracting 
capabilities variables for only one side of the buyer-seller dyad. Additionally, 
partner’s reputation and brand spillover effect for partner firm might be limited 
due to the measurement based on their B2B partners’ perception (not actual 
responses of another side of the dyad). Future research should therefore include 
the estimation of both buyers’ and sellers’ sides to make more accurate and 
generalizable conclusions.  
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7.0 Appendices 
Appendix 1 Cover Letter and questionnaire 
 
Hello! 
My name is Anna Stepanova. I am a Master of Science student at BI Norwegian 
Business School in Oslo, Norway. I am writing a thesis about companies’ brands 
in B2B relationships. The purpose of my research is to contribute to the existing 
literature on brands in interorganizational relationships by analyzing the ways of 
managing B2B relationships and companies’ brands spill-over effects in 
particular. For that reason I am interested in conducting an online survey among 
managers of Ukrainian companies involved in business-to-business relationships. 
Thank you for your willingness to participate in my research! The quality of this 
study depends on your answers! 
The questionnaire should take no more than 20 minutes of your time. It is 
completely confidential and will be used for study purposes only. The summary 
and the main findings of this study will be provided upon request to all informers 
after the thesis is submitted (September 2013). Thus they can compare themselves 
with the average. 
This survey consists of 5 blocks of questions. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Please, share your personal opinion while answering the following 
questions. 
If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact me: 
Anna.Stepanova@student.bi.no 
annast90@gmail.com 
+4792508343 
+380506966393 
 
Best regards, 
Anna Stepanova 
BI Norwegian Business School 
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Part A Questions about your company  
Please, answer the following questions about your own firm. The information you 
provide will be strictly confidential. 
 
1. Please, indicate how long you have been working in your company 
About _____ year(s) and ______ month(s). 
 
2. Is your company operating: 
 Nationally (Ukraine only)  
 Internationally 
 
3. Please, indicate how many employees there are in your company 
Approximately ________ employees. 
 
4. Please, approximately indicate your company’s turnover: 
Approximately _________ UAH. 
 
5. Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements about 
your company: 
 
 Totally 
Disagree  
Totally 
agree 
The company offers high quality products and services 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company offers products and services that are good value for 
money 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company stands behind its products and services 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company has excellent leadership 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company recognizes and take advantages of market 
opportunities 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company has defined a vision for its future 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company is well managed 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company looks like an excellent place to work 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company’s employees are treated well 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company is socially responsible 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company is environmentally friendly 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company tends to outperform its competitors 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company is financially sound 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company have strong prospects for future growth 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
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6. Please, indicate how customers perceive your company 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Strongly 
agree 
Customers find company’s performance satisfiable 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Customers trust your company 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Customers are loyal to your company 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Customers spread positive word of mouth about your company 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Customers have a good feeling about the company 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Customers admire and respect the company 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
7. Please, rate the level of brand familiarity of your company among 
stakeholders: 
 
Unfamiliar  Highly familiar 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
Part B Questions about your company’s B2B partner firm 
 
In the following part, please, think of one of your B2B partner companies. Your 
answers will not be disclosed due to strict confidentiality. You do not need to 
name your partner company. Simply answer the questions with regards to it. 
 
8. How long has your company been in B2B relationship with this partner 
company? 
About _____ year(s) and _____ month(s). 
 
9. Is your partner company operating: 
 Nationally (Ukraine only) 
 Internationally 
  
  
10. Please, indicate how many employees there are in your partner company: 
Approximately ________ employees. 
 
11. Please, approximately indicate your partner’s turnover: 
Approximately __________ UAH. 
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12. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about your 
partner firm? 
 
 Totally 
Disagree  
Totally 
agree 
The partner firm offers high quality products and services 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm offers products and services that are good 
value for money 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm stands behind its products and services 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm has excellent leadership 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm recognizes and take advantages of market 
opportunities 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm has defined a vision for its future 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner company is well managed 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm looks like an excellent place to work 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm’s employees are treated well 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm is socially responsible 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm is environmentally friendly 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm tends to outperform its competitors 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm is financially sound 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The partner firm have strong prospects for future growth 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
13. Please, indicate how customers perceive your partner company: 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Strongly 
agree 
Customers find the partner company’s performance satisfiable 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Customers trust the partner company 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Customers are loyal to the partner company 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Customers spread positive word of mouth about the partner firm 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Customers have a good feeling about the partner firm 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Customers admire and respect the partner firm 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
14. Will you recommend your partner firm as a good business partner? 
Definitely will 
not recommend  
Definitely will 
recommend 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
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15. Please, indicate the level of your partner firm’s brand familiarity among 
stakeholders: 
 
Unfamiliar  Highly familiar 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
In the following part you will be asked to evaluate the B2B relationship between 
your company and your partner firm you were evaluating above. 
 
16. To what extend do you agree with the following statements about the 
impact of the relationship with partner firm on your own company brand? 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Strongly 
agree 
It has improved my company’s reputation among customers 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has added value to my company’s brand equity 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has made my company’s brand more visible 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has increased the brand awareness of my company 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has benefited to the efficiency of company’s other business 
relationships 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has increased my company’s brand attitude 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has a negative impact on my company’s brand familiarity 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
My company’s corporate brand image has benefited from this 
relationship 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
17. To what extend do you agree with the following statements about the 
impact of this relationship on your partner firm’s brand? 
 Totally 
Disagree  
Totally 
agree 
It has improved partner firm’s reputation among its 
customers 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has added value to the partner firm’s brand equity 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has made partner firm’s brand more visible 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has increased the brand awareness of the partner firm 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has benefited to the efficiency of partner firm’s other 
business relationships 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has increased partner firm’s brand attitude 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It has a negative impact on the partner firm’s brand 
familiarity 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Overall, the partner firm corporate brand image has benefited 
from this relationship 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
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18. How will you rate the level of perceived fit between your company’s and 
your partner firm’s brands? 
Low fit  High fit 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
Part B Agreements and relationships between partners  
 
19. Contracts as a tool of governance form choice specify the terms of B2B 
relationships, including the parties’ rights, obligations and responsibilities. 
Please, indicate how detailed you specify contract terms in your company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
General 
specifications with 
no details 
Contract specification of details is: 
Low Medium High 
Performance goals 1 2 3 4 5 
Parties’ tasks (including production, 
delivery etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Monitoring, audit, quality control 1 2 3 4 5 
Information sharing obligations 1 2 3 4 5 
Rights to overtake particular 
decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Property rights (technology 
possession rights, right to obtain or 
use income etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Legal consequences of contract 
breach 
1 2 3 4 5 
Consequences and procedures of 
handling unexpected events  
1 2 3 4 5 
Procedures of managing conflicting 
situations 
1 2 3 4 5 
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20. In this question, please, indicate to what extent the following statements 
describe your company’s relationship with partner firm: 
 Completely 
inaccurate 
description  
Completely 
accurate 
description 
Parties are expected to be able to make adjustments during 
B2B relationship to cope with changing circumstances 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Parties are eager to work out new deal in case of any 
unexpected situation rather than holding to the previous 
relationship conditions 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Partner relationships can be characterized as flexible in 
response to external changes 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Parties share information that might be interesting/useful 
for another party 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Information is frequently shared and on the informal basis  1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The parties provide proprietary information if it can help 
the other party 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The parties keep each other informed about events or 
changes that may affect the other party 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Problems that arise in the course of this B2B relationship 
are treated by the parties as joint rather than individual 
responsibilities 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The parties are committed to improvements that may 
benefit the relationship as a whole, and not only the 
individual parties 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The parties in this B2B relationship do not mind owing 
each other favors 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
This B2B relationship is highly relied on trust among 
parties 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
My company highly depends on the performance of the 
partner firm 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
It is important for my company to have joint relational 
investments with the partner company 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The relationship with this partner company is hard to 
substitute with another potential B2B partner 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
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Part C Institutional environment, company’s resources and contracting 
capabilities 
 
21. To what extent do you agree with the following: 
 Totally 
Disagree  
Totally 
agree 
My company’s industry is heavily controlled by 
institutions 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Market legal regulations are efficient 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The level of corruption is high in our industry 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Legal institutions positively contribute to contracts 
enforcement 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Legal institutions performance is volatile 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
I perceive institutional environment as constricting 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The courts performance in resolving business 
conflicts is trustworthy 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Institutional environment is vulnerable in the market 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Legal system effectively helps to solve uncertainties 
in B2B relationships 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Institutional and legal environment is perceived as 
highly regulatory 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
22. Is your company a part of any professional or business network? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
23. If yes, how do you evaluate your company’s network density? 
 
Network density means the average strength of relations in a network, as well as 
the level of information and beliefs sharing. 
 
Low density  High density 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
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24. Indicate, to what extent you agree with the following statements 
concerning your company’s resources: 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Strongly 
agree 
My company obtains unique equipment 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
My company uses innovative processes 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company is active in gaining patents 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company invests heavily in R&D 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
I perceive brand equity of my company as high 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Company’s customers are loyal  1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
My company has large market share 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
My company’s suppliers acquire high switching costs 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Supply chain partners are trustworthy 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Relationships with trading partners are reliable 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Channel partners cooperation is high 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
My company has sustainable relationship with channel 
partners 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
25. Please, indicate the level of experience you have obtained in designing 
contracts: 
Low 
experienced  
Highly 
experienced 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
26. How experienced you are in negotiating contracts? 
 
Low 
experienced  
Highly 
experienced 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
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27. Please, indicate whether you agree with the following statements 
concerning capabilities which your company has in the process of 
designing contracts in B2B relationships: 
 Totally 
Disagree  
Totally 
agree 
Specific roles are defined to employees at each step of 
contracting process in our company 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Each party involved in designing and negotiating contracts 
knows its responsibilities 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Specific knowledge sharing process is managed well during 
contracting processes 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Employees participating in contract designing are the same 
as those participating in contract negotiating 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Knowledge resource allocation in my company depends on 
the exchange requirements (different professionals can be 
involved with regards to the specific area of contracting) 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Managers, lawyers and engineers of my company 
successfully manage trade-offs for different types of 
contractual provisions 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
Part D Attributes of relationships with partners 
 
28. Please, indicate whether you agree with the following statements 
concerning relational specific investments generated between your 
company and a partner firm you were evaluating above: 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Strongly 
agree 
My company has made a significant investment in 
relationship-specific equipment (tailored to this particular 
B2B relationship only) 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
My company has spent a specific amount of non-refundable 
money in this particular interorganizational relationship 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The company has invested time and energy  in training and 
qualifying in order to adjust to this particular B2B 
partnership 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
My company has made comprehensive investments to 
restructure and integrate production facilities with partner’s 
ones 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
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29. Please, evaluate market environment your company is operating in: 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Strongly 
agree 
My company’s industry is highly innovative 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The demand for end products in our industry varies 
continually 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
My company’s main competitors are constantly 
developing new products and invest in product 
improvements 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
My companies main product/service has short life cycle 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
The economic trends in market are very vulnerable 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
30. In the following question, please, evaluate your partner’s performance 
measurement challenges: 
 Very easy  Very difficult 
It is difficult to evaluate the quality of product/service at 
the time our partner firm delivers it 
1         2         3         4         5  
It is difficult to compare this product/service to similar ones 1         2         3         4         5          
It is difficult to compare price/quality ratio of potential 
partner’s product/service 
1         2         3         4         5          
 
 
Thank you very much for participating in this survey! 
 
The data for my thesis is collected through snowball sampling technique. Thus, I 
kindly ask you to refer me to other managers from Ukrainian companies involved 
in B2B relationships and leave their contact information in the box below. This is 
not obligatory. Still, it would a great help for my research! 
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Appendix 2 Exploratory Factor analysis: factor loadings results 
 
Brand 
spillover of a 
partner firm 
Brand 
spillover of 
a focal firm 
Relational 
governance 
Formal 
governance 
BrandSpillOverPF3 0,942 
   BrandSpillOverPF4 0,935 
   BrandSpillOverPF6 0,926 
   BrandSpillOverPF2 0,901 
   BrandSpillOverPF8 0,895 
   BrandSpillOverPF1 0,838 
   BrandSpillOverPF5 0,826 
   
BrandSpillOver1 0,892 
  BrandSpillOver3 0,89 
  BrandSpillOver8 0,886 
  BrandSpillOver4 0,876 
  BrandSpillOver2 0,805 
  BrandSpillOver6 0,787 
  BrandSpillOver5 0,773 
  
Infosh3 
  
0,706 
 Solid2 
  
0,692 
 Infosh2 
  
0,668 
 Infosh4 
  
0,642 
 Infosh1 
  
0,631 
 Solid3 
  
0,627 
 Solid1 
  
0,605 
 Trust 
  
0,575 
 Reliance2 
  
0,552 
 Reliance3 
  
0,542 
 Flex2 
  
0,426 
 Flex3 
  
0,407 
 Reliance1 
  
0,396 
 Flex1 
  
- 
 
Form3 
   
0,847 
Form4 
   
0,832 
Form8 
   
0,816 
Form7 
   
0,815 
Form5 
   
0,785 
Form9 
   
0,775 
Form6 
   
0,731 
Form2 
   
0,656 
Form1 
   
0,529 
a
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
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Exploratory Factor analysis: factor loadings results (cont.) 
 
 
Reputation of a 
focal firm 
Reputation of a 
partner firm 
Institutional 
and legal 
environment 
Company's 
resources 
Contracting 
capabilities 
WorkplEnv2 0,815 
    WorkplEnv1 0,806 
    LeadVision1 0,791 
    LeadVision2 0,774 
    CustAdm 0,77 
    LeadVision3 0,742 
    CustFeel 0,741 
    FinancPerf3 0,732 
    WorkplEnv3 0,731 
    SocResp2 0,725 
    SocResp1 0,724 
    ProdServ1 0,708 
    ProdServ3 0,684 
    CustLoyl 0,611 
    CustWOM 0,598 
    FinancPerf1 0,596 
    CustTrust 0,576 
    ProdServ2 0,568 
    FinancPerf2 0,567 
    CustSat 0,462 
    WorkplEnvPF1 0,825 
   CustWOMPF 0,818 
   WorkplEnvPF2 0,817 
   LeadVisionPF1 0,813 
   CustFeelPF 0,801 
   WorkplEnvPF3 0,797 
   ProdServPF1 0,793 
   CustTrustPF 0,79 
   LeadVisionPF2 0,768 
   ProdServPF3 0,767 
   CustAdmPF 0,765 
   SocRespPF1 0,75 
   LeadVisionPF3 0,729 
   CustLoylPF 0,722 
   FinancPerfPF2 0,72 
   FinancPerfPF3 0,712 
   SocRespPF2 0,687 
   RecPar 
 
0,683 
   CustSatPF 0,6 
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ProdServPF2 0,588 
   FinancPerfPF1 0,391 
   ILEnv6 
  
0,778 
  ILEnv1 
  
-0,706 
  ILEnv5 
  
0,684 
  ILEnv3 
  
0,642 
  ILEnv10 
  
-0,594 
  ILEnv8 
  
0,35 
  ILEnv4 
  
-0,27 
  ILEnv7 
  
-0,244 
  ILEnv9 
  
- 
  ILEnv2 
  
- 
  SupChain4 
  
0,808 
 SupChain5 
  
0,803 
 SupChain2 
  
0,742 
 SupChain3 
  
0,742 
 Tech4 
   
0,727 
 Tech1 
   
0,71 
 SupChain1 
  
0,7 
 Tech2 
   
0,675 
 Tech3 
   
0,667 
 EndCons2 
  
0,657 
 EndCons1 
  
0,619 
 EndCons3 
  
0,567 
 Knman1 
    
0,89 
Knman3 
    
0,797 
Rolespec2 
   
0,786 
Knman2 
    
0,785 
Rolespec3 
   
0,705 
Rolespec1 
   
0,626 
a
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
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Exploratory Factor analysis: factor loadings results (cont.) 
 
 
Relationship-
specific 
investments 
Measurement 
ambiguity 
Marketing 
uncertainty 
RSInv1 0,878 
  RSInv2 0,86 
  RSInv4 0,847 
  RSInv3 0,745 
  MA2 
 
0,904 
 MA3 
 
0,897 
 MA1 
 
0,869 
 Mrkunc2 
  
0,725 
Mrkunc3 
  
0,694 
Mrkunc5 
  
0,634 
Mrkunc4 
  
0,475 
Mrkunc1 
  
0,409 
a
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
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Appendix 3 Confirmatory factor analysis: single-factor 
measurement models 
 
Brand spillover effect on focal firm: 
 
 
 
Brand spillover effect on focal firm: 
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Formal governance: 
 
 
After factor reduction: 
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Relational Governance: 
 
 
 
After first factor reduction: 
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After second factor reduction: 
 
 
 
After third factor reduction: 
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Reliance: 
 
 
After first factor reduction: 
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Reputation of a focal firm: 
 
 
 
 
Reputation of a focal firm (cont.): 
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Reputation of a partner firm: 
 
 
Reputation of a partner firm (cont.): 
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Institutional and legal environment: 
 
 
 
After factor reduction: 
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Company’s resources: 
 
 
 
Contracting capabilities: 
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Relationship-specific investments: 
 
 
 
Marketing uncertainties: 
 
 
Measurement ambiguity: 
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Appendix 4 Squared correlation and AVE scores  
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Abstract 
In academic circles brands in B2B markets get less attention than brands in B2C 
markets. That creates a huge gap in understanding the importance of brand 
management in interorganizational relationships. This thesis aims to extend the 
existing B2B branding literature by analyzing the spill-over effect of companies’ 
brands in interorganizational relationships. The current paper tends to examine 
whether there is a significant influence of governance form choice on 
market/relational continuum on brand spill-over effect in B2B relationship for 
either partner or focal firm. Moreover, the influence of institutional and legal 
environment, companies’ reputation, resources and contracting capabilities on 
brand spill-over effect through the mediating influence of governance form will be 
analyzed. 
Based on discussed research findings, seven hypotheses are developed and 
research model presented. A survey among Ukrainian B2B companies will be 
conducted to collect the necessary data. As a result, it will be used to analyze and 
test the main thesis assumptions. 
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Introduction 
Underestimation of brand management in B2B relationships led to a large gap in 
academic research on this topic. It is assumed that sometimes companies fail to 
realize that brands play important part not only in consumer markets, but in 
business-to-business markets as well (Keller and Kotler 2012). Every B2B 
company has its own ‘portfolio’ of ex- or potential partners. To create 
interorganizational relationships with those partners, each company has to go 
through a set of steps, including the actual choice of a partner and the choice of 
governance form which will guide their business relationship. Thus, companies’ 
history of previous relationships, reputation, as well as the image and brand equity 
of possible partners may become valuable assets in the process of making that 
kind of choices. 
In academic circles there exist some studies on brands and brand management in 
B2B markets (Kotler, Pfoertsch 2006, Keller and Kotler 2012, Webster and Keller 
2004, Erevelles et al. 2008, Glynn, Motion and Brodie 2007, Aspara, Tikkanen 
2008 etc.). However, there are no particular studies dedicated to whether there is a 
brand spill-over effect in B2B relationship and what can be the reason of it. In this 
study the main question is how the choices of governance form will influence the 
extent of brand spill-over effect in B2B relationships. To be more precise, the 
selection of governance form in this study is considered to be making choices on 
the governance continuum with essentially two extremes: market governance and 
relational one. 
 Moreover, it is argued that B2B brand spill-over effect may be influenced by a set 
of other aspects, including companies’ reputation, institutional environment, 
companies’ resources and capabilities through their effect on the choice of 
governance form. Basically, various companies’ managers should realize that 
dealing with a partner with well-known name and high brand equity not only 
guarantees the quality and safety of B2B relationship. It can also be quite 
beneficial and can bring competitive advantages (e.g. due to brand extension). 
Taking into account all external circumstances, managers should count for all 
aspects that can increase this ‘spill-over’ effect to make B2B relationship even 
more efficient.  
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This study aims to contribute to existing B2B branding literature in several ways. 
First, it tends to extend the current analysis of brands in interorganizational 
relationships by including the question of governance. The latter, basically, can 
create limitations to the way companies exchange their brand images. Second, it 
aims to create insights of what can be done to create advantages from B2B 
partnership, how can they be more efficient and how it will influence focal firm’s 
and partner’s brand equity. Considering aforementioned, the overall research 
questions of this study are: 
How does the choice of governance form on market-relational continuum 
influence the extent of brand spill-over effect between the companies in B2B 
relationships? How can governance form mediate the influence of 
institutional environment the companies operate in, companies’ resources, 
contracting capabilities and reputation of both focal and partner firm on 
brand spill-over effect? 
In the next sections, consistent with the presented topic theoretical findings will 
be first discussed. Next, research hypotheses will be developed and expected 
outcomes will be argued, followed by the overall study model. Finally, all 
methods and research procedure will be analyzed. 
 
Theoretical background and hypotheses 
In this part the main research variables will be discussed, supported by the study 
hypotheses. Next, the research model will be presented and all interrelationships 
and possible outcomes argued. 
Brand spill-over effect in B2B relationships 
Branding in interorganizational relationships literature is defined as a 
psychological phenomenon, a valuable intangible asset, which specifically is a 
name, logo, sign or symbol that identifies the product or service offerings of one 
firm and helps differentiate this particular firm from competitors (Webster and 
Keller 2004, Keller and Kotler 2012). Keller and Kotler (2012) in their research 
argue that branding is much more focused on the consumers’ market. Therefore, 
brands are often neglected in B2B relationships. Moreover, corporate firms 
assume that manufacturers’ brand names are not significant for influencing 
purchase agents’ decisions. Still, the authors prove that branding is B2B has the 
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same importance as that in B2C markets. It simplifies the process of making 
decisions and reduces risks while evoking trust and safety in interorganizational 
relationships.  
Furtehrmore, Webster and Keller (2004) mention that some of the most valuable 
and powerful brands in the world belong to B2B companies. Homburg, Klarmann 
and Schmitt (2010) also support the idea of brand importance in 
interorganizational relations and suggest that brand awareness significantly drives 
market performance in B2B environments. 
In branding academic literature there are some precise discussions on brand 
extensions (Aaker & Keller 1990; Park et al. 1991; Völckner and Sattler 2006), 
co-branding (Erevelles et al. 2008), brand merges and acquisitions and brand 
alliances (Simonin and Ruth 1998; Jaju et al. 2006). Considering all these findings 
it can be suggested that corporate brands have ability to stretch either to new line 
products, or to sub-companies which were acquired by the parent brand. In this 
study, the ability of a corporate brand to stretch to (in other words, to be passed 
to) another partnering company will be further called the brand spill-over effect. 
According to Sullivan (1990), spill-overs occur in the cases when information 
about one company can influence the demand for other companies’ products 
(service) offerings with the same brand name.  
In B2B, while entering partner relationships, companies first choose their 
potential partners (according to available information), often sign contracts and 
then start cooperation. The main difference from brand alliances and brand spill-
over effect in M&A’s is that during interorganizational relationships brands are 
not actually merged or aligned. Instead, it is expected that cooperation with more 
well-known company will indirectly raise the focal firm brand awareness through 
this particular relationship. In other words, some company’s brand may become 
more well-known due to B2B contract with another famous company with already 
famous (or simply more well-known to some target audience) brand.  
Furthermore, co-branding is explained as presenting two or several independent 
brand names jointly on the same product or service (Erevelles et al. 2008). Brand 
spill-over effect can be discussed as a part or consequence of co-branding. Indeed, 
some firms may tend to mention the name of their supplier or partner on their 
product, if their partners brand has a high value. Erevelles et al. (2008) suggest in 
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their article that suppliers and manufacturers are both interested in co-branding, 
which include brand spill-over effect. They empirically prove and support by real 
life examples that suppliers’ profits are higher with co-branding relationships than 
without it. Specifically, authors argue that co-branding and brand spill-over effect 
can act as a safeguard for suppliers from possible entry of competitors with 
unobservable costs.  
At the same time, manufacturers expect to reach lower prices as a result of co-
branding with suppliers (ibid.). Among other co-branding benefits authors specify 
relationship benefits, when companies get some particular advantages from 
mutual co-operation, from becoming endorsers of each other’s offerings, sharing 
knowledge, capabilities, risks, experience and generating trust. Moreover, 
suppliers may lower costs as a consequence of long-term B2B relationship 
through economies of scale. Finally, benefits may emerge when suppliers support 
the advertisement of co-branded product or service offerings. 
Taking everything into consideration, brand spill-over effect in B2B appears to be 
beneficial for companies involved in the relationship, and thus, it becomes an 
important topic for analysis. In this study, as there usually are at least two parties 
in one particular B2B relationship, two dependent variables will be analyzed: 
brand spill-over effect on focal firm and brand spill-over effect on partner firm. 
Governance form continuum 
Governance form is defined as the institutional form companies choose to a 
particular transaction determined within transaction costs analysis (Ghosh and 
John 2012). Governance form appeared to be a part of governance value analysis 
(GVA) framework developed by Ghosh and John (1999). The authors suggest that 
GVA included four basic components: exchange attributes, governance form, 
positioning and resources. In this context governance form is described as a part 
of classical transaction costs analysis. 
According to Ghosh and John (1999), governance form is split into three 
components: market, hierarchical and relational. In their study authors also 
analysed the impact of governance types and firm resources, including brand 
equity, on the outcomes of a business relationship. Taking that into account, it is 
assumed that there is a significant relationship between governance form and 
branding. 
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Furthermore, Glynn, Motion and Brodie (2007) discuss in their study that in terms 
of B2B relationship, brands are regarded as market-based assets by resellers. 
These types of assets can be shared between companies and create relational rents 
from relationship specific assets, knowledge sharing, complementary resources 
and governance. The latter supports the idea that governance could be related to 
brand spill-over effect in B2B relationships.  
In addition, Ghosh and John (2005, 2009) in their study on branded component 
contracts in industrial markets analyze branded components as “efficient 
government devices”. They suggest that as well as any other contracts, brand 
contracts assign ownership and decision control to the parties at hand. Hence, 
governance type and principles should also apply to these contracts. The authors 
prove that the allocation of brand ownership presumes an efficient governance 
response to exchange hazards. These findings are in line with Gonzalez-Diaz et al. 
(2002) and Azevedo et al. (2002) studies. 
As the abovementioned studies prove the possibility of connection (causal effect) 
between governance form and brand spill-over effect, governance form will 
appear as independent variable in this study. To be more precise, in contrast to 
three-dimensional definition of governance in GVA model by Ghosh and John 
(1999), this variable will be analyzed as a continuum between market (more 
formal contracting) and relational governance. That means that the choice of the 
level of governance form on this continuum is expected to influence the level of 
brand spill-over effect in interorganizational relationship. The following 
hypotheses are: 
H1a: Governance form on market/relational continuum has a significant effect on 
the extent of spill-over effect of brands in B2B relationship for focal firm. 
H1b: Governance form on market/relational continuum has a significant effect on 
the extent of spill-over effect of brands in B2B relationship for partner firm. 
Moreover, in this study the choice of governance form is expected to be a 
mediator of the influence of institutional and legal environment, companies’ 
resources availability, companies’ contracting capabilities and reputation of both 
focal and partner firms on brand spill-over effect. The latter variables will be 
discussed in the following. 
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Institutional and legal environment 
Institutions and legal environment are often explained as particular rules. For 
example, Williamson (1975) defines institutions as the ‘rules of the game’. In line 
with this definition, John (2008) explains institutions as the rules that govern the 
interaction between two actors. It is assumed that institutional and legal factors 
often affect the financial and economic performance. These two factors state the 
conditions and rules of business partner relationships. Additionally, Carson et al. 
(1999) explain that institutional environment is, basically, the ‘rule’ on macro 
level, while institutional arrangements are the ‘rules’ of micro level of 
relationship. Legal environment (e.g. country’s law system) is also assumed to be 
a part of institutional environment. 
Considering abovementioned, institutional and legal environment variable is 
expected to have a significant influence on the choice of governance form in B2B 
relationship. For example, constricting legal environment is assumed to increase 
the entry barriers, consequently allowing suppliers to increase their opportunity 
costs. At the same time, efficient legal regulations provide guarantees of property 
rights safety and minimize transaction costs. More vulnerable legal systems 
(which presume corruption, for example) create more uncertainties in the 
interorganizational relationship outcomes and so on. To adjust to all these 
circumstances, companies’ are expected to make the appropriate choices of 
governance form to ‘run’ their B2B relationships. Institutional environment can be 
measured using ranking by Doing business (provided by World Bank since 2005). 
Moreover, Homburg, Klarmann and Schmitt (2010) argue that characteristics of 
the market, which might be the part of institutional environment variable, 
influences brand awareness. Thus, it can be assumed that institutional and legal 
environment may indirectly (in this study – through governance form choice) 
influence the level of spill-over effect as well.  
In addition, the influence of institutional environment can be measured through 
the fact whether or not B2B companies are the participants of any network. 
Wathne and Heide (2004) argue that the dyad governance form depends on how 
other relationships in the company’s network are governed. It is expected that 
more strict and detailed institutional environment will eliminate uncertainties and 
hence, will cause more formal governance form. As a result, lower level of spill-
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over effect is assumed to be observed. Taking previous findings into account, the 
hypothesis in this study will be: 
H2: Strict institutional and legal environment negatively influence both brand 
spill-over effect for focal and for partner firms through influencing the choice 
of governance form on market/relational continuum. 
Companies’ resources 
In GVA framework Ghosh and John (1999; 2012) offers that companies’ resource 
base, including technological, brand (end-consumer) and supply-chain based, 
should be connected to the transaction attributes and governance form choice. In 
the essence, authors argue that firms should align their resource base with the 
appropriate governance form, so that it will guarantee further solution of potential 
conflicts which “undermine opportunities to realize mutually beneficial gains.” 
Moreover, it is argued that resources such as brand equity have a different impact 
on companies’ performance, depending on the choice of governance form or 
strategy. 
Basically, the firms with brands that have stronger brand equity with the end-
customer should better use market governance form. On the contrary, the 
companies may get more benefits from choosing relational governance if they 
have less well-known brands while entering B2B relationships (Ghosh and John 
1999, Glynn, Motion and Brodie 2007). The same could be applied to other 
resources. 
It could be also assumed that the stronger resource base of the focal firm will 
result in the higher level of brand spill-over effect for partner firm and vice versa. 
The latter could be reached through the mediating effect of governance form 
choice. Note, that in line with previous research, companies may tend to use more 
formal governance form to safeguard their resources. Hence, the next hypothesis 
is: 
H3: Stronger resource base of the focal (partner) firm will cause lower level of 
brand spill-over effect for the partner (focal firm) if they choose market 
governance form compared to relational governance.  
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Contracting capabilities 
Contracting capabilities can be defined as alliance capabilities that determine the 
level of performance of this alliance and individual companies’ performance, 
which consequently influence companies’ competitive advantage (Argyres and 
Mayer 2007, Weber and Mayer 2005). In essence, contracting capabilities include 
contract designing, contract negotiation and knowledge sharing. Argyres and 
Mayer (2007) discuss that companies should determine the players 
(internal/external; lawyers, managers, engineers or sales agents) and their 
responsibilities at each stage of contracting process. 
Moreover, Weber and Mayer (2005) argue that if during contract designing the 
roles were specified incorrectly (e.g. personnel involved in designing and 
negotiation lack the appropriate knowledge and information), then it would 
influence the efficiency of governance. This actually reveals the fact that there 
might be a direct significant effect of companies’ contracting capabilities on the 
choice of governance form. The higher the level of company’s contracting 
capabilities is, the more confident this company might be during first stages of 
B2B relationship. The latter might support the idea that trust will be increased to 
the company with high contracting capabilities, the companies will be more open 
to relational governance, which will result in higher brand spill-over effect. 
Thus, it can be assumed that contracting capabilities, meaning the efficiency of 
contracting and the ability to get all benefits from contracting, can significantly 
influence the level of brand spill-over effect between companies in B2B 
relationship through influencing the way companies govern their relationship. 
Considering that it is hypothesized: 
H4: Better contracting capabilities of focal firm (partner firm) will cause higher 
level of brand spill-over effect for partner (focal) firm, while mediated by the 
choice of governance form on market vs. relational continuum. 
Reputation 
Reputation and company’s soundness play quite important role during the process 
of B2B partner’s choice in line with price-quality and costs decisions. Corporate 
reputation is defined as a valuable intangible asset, accumulated impression 
formed by stakeholders after interaction with the company and receiving 
communication from it (Keller 2008, Chun 2005). Chun (2005) describes 
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reputation through three concepts: image, identity and desired identity, and states 
that reputation affects the way various stakeholders act towards the company. This 
concept influence customer and employee satisfaction, retention rate and loyalty. 
In other words, reputation is what others think of the company. That is why 
reputation of a company plays important part in the process of choosing partner in 
B2B relationship as well. 
Before signing the contract or entering relationship companies’ managers will 
most likely assess reputation of their potential partners and make preliminary 
judgments on whether it is safe and beneficial to do business with them. In these 
terms, better reputation can guarantee competitive advantage and present 
company in a much better light. Moreover, according to Walsh and Beatty (2007), 
good corporate reputation can reduce transaction costs. Hence, reputation may 
have a direct effect on governance level choice (e.g. higher reputation will lead to 
more relational governance form). Hence, in this study it is hypothesized: 
H5a: Both focal firm and partner reputation has significant direct influence on the 
choice of governance form on market/relational continuum. 
However, corporate reputation can also have a direct influence on brand spill-over 
effect. The latter can be explained by the fact that companies’ good reputation 
significantly contributes to their brand equity and companies’ soundness. Thus, 
some particular company may appear to have better reputation in B2B dyad 
interaction (contracting). Hence, after the beginning of common relationship it 
will influence its partner’s brand equity. In line with this study’s research 
questions it is assumed that this direct effect will be moderated by governance 
form the companies decide to use to guide their B2B relationship. For example, if 
a company with high reputation will still choose more market governance form, it 
might result in lower level of brand spill-over effect than if companies choose 
relational governance. That might happen due to more formal encounters which 
do not require building cooperation on trust. Thus, the following hypothesis is: 
H5b: Reputation level of focal (partner) firm will significantly increase brand 
spill-over effect for partner (focal) company while moderated by the choice 
of governance form. 
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Model description 
Aforementioned hypotheses and relationships are illustrated on the following 
research model (Figure 1). This model shows that there are two dependent 
variable in this study – the extent of spill-over effect of brands in B2B relationship 
for focal and for partner firm. There are two main effects on each of these 
dependent variables – the influence of governance form and the influence of 
reputation.  
 
Figure 1 Conceptual model 
Moreover, there are three mediating effects of institutional and legal environment, 
companies’ resources and contracting capabilities on the brand spill-over effect 
variables. Considering one of the argued hypotheses in the case of reputation, 
governance form continuum appears to be mediating moderator. Next section will 
describe how all these interactions will be tested. 
Methodology 
In the following, a brief overview of methods, participants, procedure, 
measurement scales of dependent and independent variables will be presented. 
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Aiming to test research predictions regarding the influence of governance form 
choice on the extent of brand spill-over effect and all the consequential linkages 
that may strengthen or weaken this influence, the survey among managers of 
Ukrainian B2B companies (or firms involved in interorganizational relationships) 
was conducted.  
Ukraine was chosen as a country of interest for several reasons. Ukraine is a 
relatively young country (independent since 1991), which has gone through 
transition of its economy from centrally planned to market. In 2005 Ukraine was 
proclaimed by European Union as a country with market economy. Nowadays it is 
defined as lower middle income developing country according to World Bank 
classification (World Bank Data). In accordance to Doing Business 2013 rank 
Ukraine is on the 137 place out of 185 economies indicating the overall ease of 
doing business, which is 15 points better result comparing to the previous year 
(Doing Business Data).  
Despite the ‘market economy’ status, in some cases Ukraine is still considered as 
a ‘transition economy’ country. Thus, it is expected that such vulnerable economy 
status may influence the type of governance form the companies choose while 
entering B2B relationships. The latter means that companies will be quite highly 
distributed on the governance form continuum which may cause different levels of 
brand spill-over effects. Furthermore, transition versus market economy status of 
Ukraine makes this country interesting for analysis in terms of studying 
Institutional and legal environment variable influence. Companies need to adjust 
to regulatory norms while creating their governance agreements. Moreover, such 
equity as companies’ reputation may also play quite important role in such 
economies as Ukrainian, due to the issue of trust in the case of unpredictable and 
inconstant economic conditions. 
Emerging economies (e.g. Ukrainian) might be quite an interesting even though 
challenging places to expand your business to. Considering that, many 
international partnering companies and suppliers are expected to be involved in 
B2B relationships in Ukraine. Considering everything abovementioned, Ukraine 
appears to be an interesting country for analysis of interorganizational 
relationships and governance form choice. 
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Procedure and participants 
In order to analyze Ukrainian companies (national or international) involved in 
B2B relationships in terms of governance form influence on brand spill-over 
effect the key informant data will be used. This technique assumes that individual 
informants (managers, buyers etc.) can provide relevant and representative 
information about processes of group decision making, for example, companies’ 
governance form agreements (Wilson, Lilien 1992). The threats of using key 
informant data may be the following: questionable reliability and validity, 
respondents’ bias (e.g. overestimation of positive traits) and so on (Philips 1981, 
Wilson, Lilien 1992). Despite that, careful selection of group of formal or 
informal opinion leaders, influential leaders or experts, combined with a structural 
contact with them can lead to positive results (Key informant approach according 
to University of Wisconsin-Extension). 
In this study, company representatives will be asked to name a person (manager, 
CEO other personnel) who is the most appropriate one to answer the questions on 
this work’s research topic and who will eventually become the main respondents. 
This referring approach may decrease respondents’ bias. 
At least 70-80 Ukrainian companies in B2B relationships are expected to 
participate. Considering that in Ukraine there are no publicly available databases 
of companies in B2B relationships, potential participants will be reached directly 
at first. For this purpose, snowball sampling technique will be applied. This is a 
useful and convenient approach in the case when subjects are hard to locate. The 
current respondent will be asked to name a person/company, who can potentially 
become further study participant and so on. This technique has several challenges. 
First of all, it is a threat to randomness and it can cause problems in 
representativeness. Next, this sampling approach may be biased towards the 
inclusion individuals within interrelationships. This can lead to responses’ 
correlation bias and exclusion of ‘isolated’ but important potential participants 
(Atkinson and Flint 2001). Still, in this particular study, where both focal and 
partner firms’ reputation and brand spill-over effects are the points of interest, the 
inclusion of companies within interrelationships might be beneficial. These 
sampling biases can be reduced by larger sample sizes. Moreover, applying 
snowball sampling may help to reach (hidden) participants who will be missed in 
the case when any other sampling approach is used. 
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In this study potential respondents will be reached by telephone and after their 
agreement to participate they will be provided with a link to study questionnaire. 
A reminding phone calls and emails will be sent if necessary. 
Measurement of dependent variables 
Two dependent variables in this study – brand spill-over effect in B2B for focal 
firm and for partner one – will be measured using multiple-item scale which will 
be the modification of previously used measures in brand extension, brand 
alliances and co-branding literature (Simonin and Ruth 1998, Jaju, Joiner and 
Reddy 2006, Völckner and Sattler 2006). Respondents will be asked to indicate 
the extent to which the relationship with their partner firm has influenced their 
firms’ and their partners’ firm reputation/brand equity/brand visibility among 
customers/other partner companies on the seven-point Likert scale (ranking form 
1 – ‘not at all’ to 7 – ‘very much’). In line with Gosh and John (2005) 
measurement, participants will be also asked to rate the extent to which joint 
interorganizational relationships made business processes (focal and partner) more 
efficient on seven-point semantic differential scale. The resulting evaluations will 
be equally weighted and loaded directly to a single brand spill-over effect variable 
(using factor analysis). Chronbach’s alpha test will be conducted to analyze 
whether these measures are highly correlated and can be joined into one variable. 
Measurement of independent variables 
Influence of governance form continuum will be measured using two dimensions. 
The first one, market governance dimension will be measured using nine-item 
scale aiming to question about the extent to which participants specify details in 
their contracts and make them contingent in terms of property rights, obligation to 
share information, performance hazards and so on. The scale will be adopted from 
the measures in studies by Lusch and Brown (1996), Grandori and Furlotti (2011). 
The second dimension, relational governance, will be measured using similar 
multiple-item scale based on previously used scales by Heide and John (1992) and 
on scales discussed by Ivens and Blois (2004). Among other things participants 
will be asked about the extent to which they rely on social norms, about the level 
of reliance on contract-specific investments, trust and so on. Five-point Likert 
scale will be used in both cases. 
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Reputation (either focal or partner firm) measurement will be based on the scale 
previously used by Walsh and Beatty (2007). The respondents will be asked to 
evaluate customer satisfaction, trust, loyalty and word of mouth. Furthermore, in 
line with Jaju, Joiner and Reddy (2006) measurements, participants will be asked 
to rate brand familiarity, which is also an indicator of reputation as if both brands 
are highly familiar (in other words, they fit) then the interorganizational 
relationship should be rated equally. Otherwise, if one brand is more well-known 
it can be dominating in the relationship and, as a result be the one who causes 
greater spill-over effect. 
Institutional and legal environment will be measured on the seven-point Likert 
scale. Participants will be asked to evaluate the extent to which they perceive 
institutional norms influence their B2B relationship and the choice of governance 
form. Furthermore, different legal environments stimulate companied to enter 
professional networks to secure their rights. Therefore, participants will be asked 
whether they are parts of any networks and how dense those networks are. 
Measurement of the latter will be based on the scale previously used by Antia and 
Frazie (2001). 
Companies’ resources variable means that the resource positioning of the firm can 
influence brand spill-over effect while mediated by the choice of governance 
form. Basically, this variable will be measured using seven-point Likert scale (1 – 
‘totally disagree’, 7 – ‘totally agree’). Respondents will be asked to assess to what 
extend their technological, end-consumer and supply chain resources influence the 
choice of particular governance form. This approach is in line with Gosh and John 
(1999) study. 
Contract design capabilities will be measured in accordance to Weber and Mayer 
(2005) and Argyres and Mayer (2007) studies. Participants will be asked to 
evaluate on a multiple-item scale the extent to which they define roles and 
responsibilities and manage knowledge generated from interorganizational 
relationship during contract designing. As some capabilities are expected to 
emerge during the longitudinal relationship, respondents will be also asked to 
evaluate the extent to which contract duration will influence knowledge sharing 
and the growth of contracting capabilities. 
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Control variables 
The choice of governance form may be influenced by variety of factors. In this 
study three classical transaction costs economics variables – relational specific 
investments, market uncertainty and performance measurement problems – will 
be included as control variables.  
Relational specific investments will indicate the extent to which buyers and 
suppliers made the relationship-tailored investments (those that lose their value 
outside this particular relationship). To measure this variable the four-item scale 
adapted from Jap and Ganesan (2000) and Rokkan, Heide and Wathne (2003) will 
be used. Participants will be asked to indicate on the seven-point Likert scale (1- 
‘strongly disagree’, 7 – ‘strongly agree’) the extent to which they have made 
investments in time, energy, inventory and money in the relationship that can be 
lost if they switch to another partner.  
Market uncertainty is defined by Buvik and John (2000) as unpredictability of 
environment in which the relationship takes place. The authors offer the four-item 
scale to measure this variable, which will be used in this study. Scale items will be 
measured using seven-point Likert scale.  
Performance measurement problems variable assumes the difficulty a buyer or 
supplier face in defining their partner’s performance. The three item scale 
previously developed by Mooi and Ghosh (2010) will be used. This will include 
the difficulty in judging the quality of the product or service at the time of 
delivery, in comparing the focal product or service with competing offerings, and 
in judging the price/quality ratio of potential suppliers’ products or services. 
Measure development 
To verify and assess the research variables Chronbach’s alpha test and 
explanatory factor analysis will be conducted. If any significant cross-loadings are 
revealed during analysis, they will be removed in order to increase the validity of 
this study. On the contrary, items with high loadings will be retained for further 
analysis. 
Results analysis 
To test the proposed hypotheses and analyze overall research question, the 
collected data will be studied using OLS regression and ANOVA tests. These 
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statistical analyses are expected to be the most appropriate ones to test 
significance of all linkages and interactions, and, consequently, the general 
soundness of the research model. 
  
Preliminary Thesis Report in GRA 19003  15.01.2013 
Page 17 
References 
Aaker, David A. and Kevin Lane Keller. 1990. “Consumer Evaluations of Brand 
Extensions.” Journal of Marketing 54 (January): 27-41. 
Antia, K. D., and G. L. Frazier. 2001. “The severity of contract enforcement in 
interfirm channel relationships.” Journal of Marketing, 65 (4): 68-81. 
Argyres, Nicholas, Kyle J. Mayer. 2007. “Contract Design as a Firm Capability: 
an Integration of Learning and Transaction Cost Perspectives.” Academy 
of Management Review, 32 (4): 1060-1077. 
Aspara Jaakko, Henrikki Tikkanen. 2008. “Significance of Corporate Brands for 
Business-to-Business Companies.” The Marketing Review 8 (1): 43-60. 
Atkinson, R & J Flint (2001) “Accessing hidden and hard-to-reach populations: 
Snowball research strategies.” Social Research Update, 28 (1): 93-108. 
Azevedo, Paulo F., Vivian L. S. Silva, and Andre G. A. Silva. 2002. “Contractual 
Mix in Food Franchising.” Working paper, International Society of New 
Institutional Economics. 
Buvik, A., and G. John. 2000. “When does vertical coordination improve 
industrial purchasing relationships?” Journal of Marketing, 64 (4): 52-65. 
Carson, S. J., T. M. Deviney, G. R. Dowling, G. John. 1999. “Understanding 
Institutional Designs Within Marketing Value Systems.” Journal of 
Marketing, 63 (Special issue): 115-130. 
Chun, Rosa. 2005. “Corporate reputation: Meaning and measurement.” 
International Journal of Management Reviews, 7 (2): 91-109.  
Erevelles, Sunil, Thomas H. Stevenson, Shuba Srinivasan, Nobuyuki Fukawa. 
2008. “An Analysis of B2B Ingredient Co-branding Relationships”. 
Journal of industrial marketing management, 37: 940-952. 
Ghosh, Mrinal and George John. 1999. “Governance Value Analysis and 
Marketing Strategy.” Journal of Marketing, 63 (Special Issue): 131-45. 
Preliminary Thesis Report in GRA 19003  15.01.2013 
Page 18 
Ghosh, Mrinal and George John. 2005. “An Empirical Investigation of Branded 
Component Contracts in Industrial Markets”. Working paper. Available at: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu. 
Ghosh, Mrinal and George John. 2009. “When should original equipment 
manufacturers use branded component contracts with suppliers?” Journal 
of Marketing Research, 41 (5): 346-357. 
Ghosh, Mrinal and George John. 2012. “Progress and prospects for governance 
value analysis in marketing : when Porter meets Williamson.” In 
Handbook of business-to-business marketing, Lilien, G. L., and R. Grewal 
(Eds.), pp. 54-72. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 
Glynn, M. S., Motion, J. M. and Brodie, R. J. 2007. “Sources of Brand Benefits in 
Manufacturer-Reseller B2B Relationships”. Journal of Business and 
Industrial Marketing, 22(6): 400-09. 
Gonzalez−Diaz, Manuel, Marta Fernandez Barcala, and Benito Arrunada. 2002. 
“Performance, Efficiency, and the Logic of Multi−Branding: The Case of 
Fresh Beef,” International Society of New Institutional Economics 
Conference, 2002. Available at: http://www.isnie.org. 
Grandori, A., and M. Furlotti. 2011. “Contracts as organizational documents: 
Designing flexible formalization.” Working Paper, Center for Research in 
Organization and Management at Bocconi University, (11/002). 
Heide, J. B., and G. John. 1992. “Do norms matter in marketing relationships?” 
Journal of Marketing, 56 (2): 32-44. 
Homburg, Christian, Martin Klarmann and Jens Schmitt. 2012. “Brand awareness 
in business markets: When is it related to firm performance?” 
International Journal of Research in Marketing 27 (3): 201-212. 
Ivens, B. S., and K. J. Blois. 2004. “Relational exchange norms in marketing: A 
critical review of Macneil’s contribution.” Marketing Theory, 4 (3): 239-
263. 
Preliminary Thesis Report in GRA 19003  15.01.2013 
Page 19 
Jaju, Anupam, Christopher Joiner and Srinivas K. Reddy 2006. “Consumer 
evaluations of corporate brand redeployments.” Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science 34 (2): 206-215. 
Jap, Sandy D., and Shankar Ganesan. 2000. “Control Mechanisms and the 
Relationship Life Cycle: Implications for Safeguarding Specific 
Investments and Developing Commitment,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 37 (May): 227-45. 
John, G. 2008. “Designing price contracts for procurement and marketing of 
industrial equipment.” In Review of Marketing Research. Naresh K. 
Malhotra ed. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
Keller, Kevin L. 2008. Strategic Brand Management. 3rd edition, Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Keller, K. L., and Kotler, P. 2012. “Branding in B2B Firms.” In Handbook of 
business-to-business marketing, Lilien, G. L., and R. Grewal (Eds.), pp. 
208-225. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 
Kotler, Philip, and Waldemar Pfoertsch. 2006. B2B Brand Management. Berlin: 
Springer. 
Lusch, R. F., and J. R. Brown. 1996. “Interdependency, contracting, and relational 
behavior in marketing channels.” Journal of Marketing, 60 (4): 19-38. 
Mooi, E., and M. Ghosh. 2010. “Contract specificity and its performance 
implications.” Journal of Marketing, 74 (2): 105-120. 
Park, C. Whan, Sandra Milberg and Robert Lawson. 1991. “Evaluation of Brand 
Extensions: The Role of Product Feature Similarity and Brand Concept 
Consistency.” Journal of Consumer Research 18 (September): 185-193. 
Phillips, Lynn W. 1981. “Assessing Measurement Error in Key Informant 
Reports: A Methodological Note on Organizational Analysis in 
Marketing.” Journal of Marketing Research, 18 (November): 395-415. 
Preliminary Thesis Report in GRA 19003  15.01.2013 
Page 20 
Rokkan, Aksel I., Jan B. Heide, Kenneth H. Wathne. 2003. “Specific Investments 
in Marketing Relationships: Expropriation and Bonding Effects.” Journal 
of Marketing Research, 40 (May): 210-224. 
Simonin, B.L. and J.A. Ruth. 1998. “Is a company known by the company it keeps? 
Assessing the spillover effects of brand alliances on consumer attitudes.” 
Journal of Marketing Research, 35 (February): 30-42. 
Sullivan, Mary. 1990. “Measuring Image Spillovers in Umbrella-Branded 
Products.” The Journal of Business, 63 (3): 309-329. 
Völckner, Franziska and Henrik Sattler. 2006. “Drivers of Brand Extension 
Success.” Journal of Marketing 70 (April): 18-34. 
Walsh, G. and Beatty, S.E. 2007. “Customer- based corporate reputation of a 
service firm: scale development and validation.” Journal of the academy of 
marketing science, 35: 127-143. 
Wathne, Kenneth H., Jan B. Heide. 2004. “Relationship Governance in a Supply 
Chain Network.” Journal of Marketing, 68 (January): 73-89. 
Weber, Libby, Kyle J. Mayer. 2005. “Building Contracting Capabilities: Party 
Selection for Template Design and Contract Negotiation.” Working paper. 
Webster, Frederick E. Jr, and Kevin Lane Keller. 2004. “A Roadmap for Branding 
in Industrial Markets.” Journal of brand management, vol. 11 (5): 388-
402. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization. New 
York: The Free Press. 
Wilson, Elizabeth J., Gary L. Lilien. 1992. “Using Single Informants to Study 
Group Choice: An Examination of Research Practice in Organizational 
Buying.” Marketing Letters, 3 (3): 297-305. 
Doing Business 2013. Ukraine: Economy Profile. The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. Accessed 24.12.12. 
Available at: http://doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/ukraine. 
Preliminary Thesis Report in GRA 19003  15.01.2013 
Page 21 
Key Informant Approach. Accessed 12.12.12. Available at: 
http://www.uwex.edu/ces/pdande/progdev/pdf/keyinform.pdf. 
World Bank Data. Ukraine. Accessed 24.12.12. Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/ukraine?display=graph. 
